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INTRODUCTION: LOOKING INWARD? 
America is a world power, but does it have the strength to understand 
itself? Is it content, even now, to remain an intellectual colony, borrowing 
European categories to decode the meaning of its national identity? 
This was not always a question posed by the American Constitution. 
When America was a military and economic weakling on the European 
fringe, it was at the forefront of constitutional thought. As it transformed 
itself into the powerhouse of the West, its leading constitutionalists be- 
came increasingly derivative. Two centuries onward, the study of the 
American Constitution is dominated by categories that owe more to Euro- 
pean than to American thought and experience. 
Unsurprisingly, this has led to a peculiarly ahistorical kind of theory. 
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Since the dominant conceptual frameworks have not been designed with 
American history in mind, they can hardly be used to reflect fruitfully on 
distinctive features of our constitutional development. Indeed, many of the 
most remarkable parts of the story are entirely ignored-if they were con- 
fronted, they would only embarrass European notions that were never 
designed to take them into account. 
To discover the Constitution, we must approach it without the assis- 
tance of some philosophical guide imported from another time and place. 
Neither Aristotle nor Cicero, Montesquieu nor Locke, Harrington nor 
Hume, Kant nor Weber, provides the key. While Americans have bor- 
rowed much from such thinkers, they have built up a genuinely distinctive 
pattern of constitutional thought and practice. Once we have reconstructed 
the whole, we shall find it bears comparison with the deepest reflections 
on the nature of politics offered up by the greatest of the Greeks or Ro- 
mans, Germans or English. 
My interest in this reconstructive enterprise is not purely intellectual. 
The Constitution presupposes a citizenry with a sound grasp of the ideals 
that inspire our political practice. As we lose sight of these ideals, the 
organizing patterns of political life unravel. If "sophisticated" constitu- 
tionalists are blinding themselves to the distinctively American aspects of 
the Constitution, this must be a cause for more general concern. 
Not that the mass of American citizens are at the mercy of their intel- 
lectuals when it comes to understanding their Constitution. After two cen- 
turies of civic experience, the rhythms of American constitutional life have 
become second nature for most of us-the two, four, six year electoral 
cycles, the distinctive interchanges between Congress and President, Presi- 
dent and Court, Court and Congress, nation and state, politics and law. 
Along with these rhythms comes a rough and ready grasp of the animat- 
ing constitutional ideals of American democracy. 
Nonetheless, the intellectual alienation of opinion leaders takes its toll. 
Sophisticated talk gets around that political practices having a deep consti- 
tutional point are "really" mystifying rituals that distort the character of 
American politics. Generations of such talk loosen the popular grasp on 
the democratic ideals animating our constitutional life, increasing the vul- 
nerability of these ideals at future moments of crisis. 
The costs of intellectual alienation are no less evident when we turn 
from the mass of citizens to the caste of American lawyers and judges. As 
Tocqueville saw early on, this group has taken on a special responsibility 
in sustaining the Constitution's operation on a day-to-day basis. As we 
shall see, practicing lawyers and judges have done a better job than one 
would suppose if one focused on the leading lights of the nation's universi- 
ties. Without giving the matter much thought, they have built up some- 
thing I will call a professional narrative, a story about how the American 
people got from the Founding to the Bicentennial. This narrative colors 
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the constitutional meanings lawyers and judges give to the particular 
problems that press before them for decision. It contains, moreover, funda- 
mental insights that purveyors of constitutional sophistication would do 
well to ponder. But, precisely because this pondering has not been going 
on, the existing professional narrative expresses these insights in ways that 
fail to capture their historical reality or constitutional complexity. If con- 
stitutional theorists turned their attention from Locke to Lincoln, from 
Rousseau to Roosevelt, they might contribute positively to the construction 
of a better professional narrative-one that is truer to the historical facts 
and to the constitutional ideals that animate our continuing experiment in 
self-government. 
Behold, then, a pretty picture: an America in which a rediscovered 
Constitution is the subject of an ongoing dialogue among scholars, profes- 
sionals, and the people at large; an America in which this dialogue allows 
the citizenry, and its political representatives, an ever-deepening sense of 
their historical identity as they face the transforming challenges of the 
future. Lest I be mistaken too quickly for Pangloss, let me say that, even 
if this project succeeded beyond my wildest hopes, it would not lead 
straight-way to Utopia. As we discover the distinctive features of the Con- 
stitution, we will find much that is imperfect, mistaken, evil in its basic 
premises and historical development. Never forget that James Madison 
was a slaveholder as well as a great political thinker. And who can imag- 
ine that our Constitution's peaceful coexistence with injustice came to an 
end with Emancipation? We cannot remain comfortable with the status 
quo; the challenge is to build a constitutional order more just and free 
than the one we have inherited. 
It hardly follows that we can build a better future by cutting ourselves 
off from the past. Especially when American public discourse constantly 
treats the constitutional past as if it contained valuable clues for decoding 
the meaning of our political present. No single essay-no single 
mind-can hope to do justice to the centuries of experience that serve as 
the historical foundation of our present patterns of constitutional thought 
and practice. All I can do here is to sketch the outlines of a larger work in 
progress that represents my best effort.' 
This essay will have three parts. The first confronts the remarkable 
breach between theory and practice that burdens our present constitu- 
tional situation. While our civic practice remains rooted in the distinctive 
patterns of the American past, sophisticated constitutional thought has in- 
creasingly sought to elaborate the genius of American institutions with the 
use of theories generated elsewhere-to the point where these rival theo- 
ries are more familiar in the universities than the one I shall be elaborat- 
1. B. Ackerman, Discovering the Constitution (unpublished manuscript on file with author) 
[hereinafter Discovering the Constitution]. 
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ing. Thus, it seems wise to begin by comparing the distinctive American 
matrix-which I will call dualistic democracy-with these more familiar 
academic rivals. 
After glimpsing an organizing pattern in constitutional thought and 
practice, the second Part confronts the professional narrative modern law- 
yers use to express this pattern. As we shall see, dualist democracy places 
a special value on the political conclusions reached after an extraordinary 
process of popular mobilization, debate, and institutional testing that fi- 
nally culminates in a citizen-movement earning the authority to make 
higher law in the name of We the People of the United States. This em- 
phasis is taken up by professional lawyers and judges in the story they tell 
themselves about the constitutional past. Every day in the nation's court- 
rooms and assembly-halls, lawyers, legislators, and judges look backward 
to a few great turning points in our history for guidance. The lessons 
these men and women take from the great constitutional transformations 
marked by the Founding, Reconstruction, and the New Deal deeply shape 
their understanding of the conflicting constitutional arguments swirling 
around them. 
All practicing constitutionalists recognize the significance of all three of 
these turning points. There is, however, a big difference in the stories they 
tell about each of them. The prevaling patterns of professional narrative 
do not encourage lawyers and judges to reflect upon the things the Found- 
ing, Reconstruction, and the New Deal have in common. Instead, each of 
these three great jurisgenerative2 events is cabined by a set of lawyerly 
categories that emphasize how different one episode is from the next. 
Of the three, the Founding is treated as if it were the most radical 
break with the past. Almost all modern lawyers recognize that, in propos- 
ing a new Constitution in the name of We the People, the Philadelphia 
Convention was acting illegally under the terms established by America's 
first formal constitution-the Articles of Confederation solemnly ratified 
by all thirteen states only a few years before. Thus, while the thirteenth 
Article of Confederation required amendments to gain the unanimous 
consent of all thirteen state legislatures, Article Seven of the Federalists' 
proposed Constitution blithely excluded state legislatures from any role in 
ratification, and went on to assert that the approval of special constitu- 
tional conventions meeting in only nine of the thirteen states sufficed to 
validate the Philadelphia Convention's effort to speak for We the People 
of the United States.3 
2. See Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. 
REV. 4,11 (1983). 
3. See, e.g., S. LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 130-31 (1988); Kay, The Illegality of the 
Constitution, 4 CONST. COMMENTARY 57 (1987); Kay, The Creation of Constitutions in Canada 
and the United States, 7 CANADA-UNITED STATES L.J. 111, 124-36 (1984). But see Amar, Phila- 
delphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043, 1047-54 
(1988). Professor Amar concedes that ratification of the Constitution "obviously violates Article XIII 
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Things are very different when the subject turns to the Civil War 
Amendments. Here modern law-talk exhibits a sharp dichotomy between 
substance and procedure. Substantively, everybody recognizes that these 
amendments profoundly transformed pre-existing constitutional principle. 
If, however, we turn from the substance of the amendments to the process 
by which they became part of our higher law, a remarkable silence de- 
scends on the legal community. Modern lawyers simply assume that the 
Reconstruction Republicans obediently followed the formal tracks for con- 
stitutional amendment established by the Federalists in Article Five. Ac- 
cording to received opinion, the Civil War Amendments are just that: or- 
dinary amendments which, like all the others, owe their validity to the 
"rule of recognition" set out in the text of the 1787 Constitution. To put 
the point in a formula: While the professional narrative recognizes that 
Reconstruction was substantively creative, it supposes that it was proce- 
durally unoriginal. 
Even this much originality is denied the New Deal. Though everybody 
recognizes that the 1930's mark the definitive constitutional triumph of 
activist national government, they tell themselves a story which denies that 
anything deeply creative was going on. This view of the 1930's is obtained 
by imagining a Golden Age in which Chief Justice Marshall got things 
right for all time by propounding a broad construction of the national 
government's lawmaking authority. The period between Reconstruction 
and New Deal can then be viewed as a (complex) story about the fall 
from grace-wherein most of the Justices (not Holmes, of course) strayed 
from the path of righteousness and imposed their antidemocratic laissez- 
faire philosophy on the nation through the pretext of constitutional inter- 
pretation. Predictably, these acts of judicial usurpation set the judges at 
of the pre-existing Articles of Confederation," but suggests that the Articles should be viewed as a 
treaty whose obligations had lapsed as a result of state violations, and hence that the Convention was 
not acting illegally in calling upon nine or more states to secede from the Confederation. While some 
Federalists undoubtedly held this view in private, even they were reluctant to rely on it in public. 
Compare THE FEDERALIST No. 40, at 251, 254 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (illegality explic- 
itly conceded) with id. No. 43, at 279-80 (J. Madison) (noting that perhapsap, also" (emphasis in 
original) justification for ratification procedure "may be found" in breach-of-treaty theory). And, as 
Amar recognizes, many anti-Federalists denied that the Articles pledge of "perpetual" Union could be 
evaded so easily after so short a trial. See Art. XIII, reprinted in M. FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 211, 223 (1913). Overall, I find Professor Kay's argu- 
ments more persuasive than Professor Amar's. At the very least, Amar's confidence in the legality of 
the Convention's end-run around the state legislatures was not shared by the Federalists them- 
selves-who recognized that their "legal" argument for secession would not get them very far in 
popular debate, and that they would have to invoke other, more fundamental, principles of popular 
sovereignty if they hoped to legitimate their act of constitutional creation. 
Indeed, the rest of Amar's article usefully emphasizes how important the principles of popular 
sovereignty were to the revolutionary generation-though, once again, I think he goes overboard in 
suggesting that the Convention's call for ratification by state conventions, rather than state legisla- 
tures, was legal under the laws of all thirteen states. While some states, like Massachusetts, had given 
great authority to constitutional conventions in their domestic law, see Amar, supra, at 1049-51, 
others, like Rhode Island, were much more backward in conceding that constitutional conventions, 
meeting in the name of the People, might legally modify pre-existing state charters. See Luther v. 
Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). 
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odds with more democratic institutions, which acutely perceived the fail- 
ure of laissez-faire to do justice to an increasingly complex and interde- 
pendent world. The confrontation between the New Deal and the Old 
Court serves as the climax in a traditional morality play of decline, fall, 
and resurrection. Only Justice Roberts' "switch in time," and the depar- 
ture of the worst judicial offenders, permitted the Court to expiate its 
countermajoritarian sins without permanent institutional damage. If only 
the Justices had not strayed from Marshall's original path, perhaps all 
this unpleasantness could have been avoided! 
As always, this basic story line invites countless disagreements about the 
precise character of the Marshallian vision, the precise scope of the latter- 
day aberrations. For present purposes, the critical point is simple enough: 
In contrast to the first two turning-points, modern lawyers do not describe 
either the substantive or procedural aspects of the New Deal by telling 
themselves a tale of constitutional creation. Instead, the triumph of the 
activist welfare state is mediated by a myth of rediscovery-it is as if the 
Founding Federalists had foreseen the works of Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt and would have been greatly surprised to learn that the strug- 
gles of the first third of the twentieth century were necessary to gain the 
welfare state's constitutional legitimation. 
Founding Federalists-oIllegal Constitution; Reconstruction Republi- 
cans-a- Formal Amendments; New Deal Democrats-m' Judicial Redis- 
covery of Ancient Truths. This schema suggests a subtle, but unmistaka- 
ble, decline in the constitutionally generative capacities of the American 
people. Apparently, We the People have never again engaged in the 
sweeping kind of critique and creation attempted by the Founding Feder- 
alists. While we have made substantive revisions in the original structure, 
we have never again gone so far as to revise the very process of constitu- 
tional revision. A similar loss of energy is implied by the narrative's move- 
ment from the nineteenth to the twentieth centuries: While the Recon- 
struction Republicans gained the consent of the American people to 
fundamental changes in their pre-existing substantive principles, appar- 
ently the sweeping transformations won by the New Deal Democrats rep- 
resented nothing more than a return to the wisdom of the early Founders. 
I mean to question this core interpretive schema. Despite its familiarity, 
it is built on sand. Part Two presents a two-stage critique. First, it chal- 
lenges the view that the Civil War Amendments were proposed and rati- 
fied in strict compliance with the rules of Article Five. Instead, the 
Republicans transformed the higher lawmaking system itself in their suc- 
cessful struggle to gain constitutional authority for their transformative 
intiatives. The new Republican process was far more nationalistic than 
the one described by the Federalists in the rules of Article Five. Rather 
than relying exclusively on a Federalist dialogue between assemblies on 
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the national and state levels, the Republicans gave Congress, the Presi- 
dent, and the Court new roles in the evolving higher lawmaking system. 
Once we rediscover the radical character of the Republicans' revision of 
our amendment procedures, we can move the critique of the reigning pro- 
fessional narrative to a second stage. Here we use the revised description 
of Reconstruction to gain a new perspective on the next great constitu- 
tional transformation: the struggle between the Roosevelt Presidency and 
the Old Court that culminated in the legitimation of the activist regulatory 
state. Rather than disguise it with a myth of rediscovery, we shall begin to 
see it as a twentieth-century variation on nationalistic themes first worked 
out in the 1860's. Like the Reconstruction Republicans, the New Deal 
Democrats amended the Constitution by provoking a complex constitu- 
tional dialogue between the voters at large and institutions of the national 
government, a dialogue that ultimately substituted for the more federalis- 
tic processes of constitutional revision detailed in Article Five. In contrast 
to the 1860's, however, this exercise in nationalistic revision was not inter- 
rupted in mid-stream by the assassination of a President and the substitu- 
tion of a Vice-President who defected from the transformative coalition. 
As a consequence, the New Deal Democrats could work out a model of 
Presidential leadership in a far more elaborate way than could their Re- 
publican predecessors. 
Part Two, in short, denies the need to continue telling ourselves a pro- 
fessional narrative in which we cast ourselves as the epigones of bygone 
eras of constitutional creativity. By confronting the original documents left 
to us by the Founding Federalists, Reconstruction Republicans, and New 
Deal Democrats, we can gain the resources to tell ourselves a different 
story-one in which the dualistic project in higher lawmaking begun at 
the Founding was creatively adapted, time and time again, by Americans 
of later generations as they struggled over, and sometimes won, the consti- 
tutional authority to speak in the name of We the People. To jargonize: 
Since the received narrative recognizes only two great jurisgenerative eras 
in our constitutional history, I shall call it a two-solution narrative and 
urge its replacement by a three-solution narrative which recognizes that 
the project of constitutional politics has had its transformative triumphs in 
the twentieth century and continues, both in victory and defeat, onward to 
the present day. 
Part Three sketches the way this three-solution narrative provides a 
new framework for understanding the modern Supreme Court. The key 
idea here is synthetic interpretation. We are familiar enough with the 
problem, if not the term, as we puzzle over the relationship between the 
transformations in public values wrought by the Civil War Amendments. 
Under any interpretation of these great texts, they destroyed a host of 
eighteenth-century premises concerning slavery, federalism, and citizen- 
ship. However coherent the Founding scheme of government may have 
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been before the War, the old system was fragmented by the new national- 
istic, libertarian, and egalitarian affirmations proclaimed by the Republi- 
cans in the name of the People. While so much was always clear, it was 
quite another matter to synthesize new and old into a coherent doctrinal 
structure. Precisely which fragments of the Founding order were now in- 
consistent with the new Republican constitution? Which aspects might be 
saved if they were reinterpreted in the light of the new Republican affir- 
mations? From its first encounter with these questions in the Slaughter- 
house Cases4 of 1873, the Court has self-consciously struggled with the 
synthetic problems involved in integrating Founding (time one) and Re- 
construction (time two) into a principled doctrinal whole. Perhaps the 
most famous modern synthetic problem is raised by Hugo Black's claim 
that the Fourteenth Amendment (time two) made the Bill of Rights (time 
one) binding on the states.5 But there are many other issues that raise 
similar questions. 
I will invite you to apply the lessons you have learned from these syn- 
thetic exercises to analogous problems that arise as soon as one views the 
New Deal as a creative constitutional achievement that transformed con- 
stitutional premises as radically as Reconstruction had two generations 
before. Once this three-solution narrative is accepted, the familiar effort at 
one-two synthesis will seem only one facet of a larger interpretive enter- 
prise left to the courts in the wake of the New Deal's affirmation of ac- 
tivist national government. In addition to the continuing interpretive effort 
to make sense of the relationship between Founding and Reconstruction, 
judges-and the rest of us-must also confront two other sides of a syn- 
thetic triangle left to us in the aftermath of the New Deal. On one side, 
there is the one-three problem: What is the relationship between the New 
Deal's affirmation of the activist welfare state and the Founding ideals of 
limited government and individual rights? The final side of the triangle is 
defined by the two-three problem: how to understand the relationship be- 
tween New Deal welfarism and the egalitarian and libertarian principles 
announced during Reconstruction? 
These basic interpretive questions cannot be stated cleanly within the 
reigning two-solution narrative, which pretends that John Marshall 
would have had no constitutional problems validating the National Indus- 
trial Recovery Act.' Since the professional narrative asserts that there was 
nothing new about the New Deal, it cannot self-consciously confront the 
interpretive difficulties involved in synthesizing the (nonexistent) new 
principles of the 1930's into the fabric of our higher law. Despite the lack 
4. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 
5. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68-69 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). 
6. But see Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 321, 332 (1827) (Marshall, C.J., dissenting). 
For some usefully revisionist historiography, see J. NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIM- 
ITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (forthcoming 1990). 
1989] Constitutional Politics 461 
of theoretical encouragement, however, modern lawyers and judges have 
been far too sensible to ignore the obvious and pervasive ways in which 
our public values and institutional practices have been transformed by the 
legitimation of the activist state over the past half-century. Indeed, they 
have been far more astute in their practical judgments than the academic 
commentators who have been keeping score by the wrong scorecard on the 
side-lines. To make my case, I shall invite you to reread the opinions for 
the Court in Brown v. Board of Education and Griswold v. Connecticut 
from the perspective offered by a revised three-solution narrative. 
I. THEORY: DUALIST DEMOCRACY 
A. The Basic Idea 
Begin with a capsule statement of the dualist project.7 Above all else, a 
dualist constitution seeks to distinguish between two different kinds of de- 
cision that may be made in a democracy. The first is a decision by the 
American People; the second, by their government. 
Decisions by the People occur rarely, and under special constitutional 
conditions. Before gaining the authority to enact its proposals into the na- 
tion's higher law, a political movement must, first, convince an extraordi- 
nary number of its fellow citizens to take its proposed initiative with a 
seriousness that they do not normally accord to politics; second, allow op- 
ponents a fair opportunity to organize their own forces; third, convince a 
majority of Americans to support transformative initiatives as their merits 
are discussed, time and again, in the deliberative fora provided by the 
dualist constitutional order for this purpose. It is only those initiatives that 
survive this specially onerous higher lawmaking system that earn the spe- 
cial kind of legitimacy the dualist accords to decisions made by the People. 
Decisions made by the government occur daily, also under special con- 
stitutional conditions. Most important, key decisionmakers must be held 
accountable at the ballot box for their performance; moreover, a structural 
effort is made to encourage them to deliberate seriously about the public 
interest and to constrain efforts by narrow but well-organized interests to 
use government to oppress especially vulnerable or poorly organized 
groups. 
Even when this system of normal politics is operating well, the dualist 
constitution tries to prevent the daily decisions reached by government 
from being confused with the rare decisions reached by the People. De- 
spite the ongoing temptation to exaggerate their authority, constitutional 
officers of government are not to presume that an ordinary electoral vic- 
tory has given them a mandate to overturn considered judgments previ- 
7. For more elaboration, see Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 
YALE L.J. 1013 (1984) [hereinafter Storrs]. 
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ously reached by the People. If they wish to enact laws that overrule pre- 
viously established principles of higher law, elected politicians must take 
to the specially onerous obstacle course provided by a dualist constitution 
for this purpose. Only if they succeed in mobilizing their fellow citizens 
and gaining persistent popular support, despite opponents' repeated ef- 
forts to block their initiatives, do political leaders finally earn the author- 
ity to proclaim that the People have changed their mind and have given 
their government new marching orders. 
Such a brief statement raises more questions than it answers. One set 
involve fundamental issues of institutional design. First, there is the design 
of the higher lawmaking system: How to organize a process that will reli- 
ably mark out the rare occasions when a political movement rightly earns 
the special recognition accorded decisions made by We the People after 
mobilized deliberation? Second, there is the design of normal lawmaking: 
How to create incentives for elected officials to engage in the kind of pub- 
lic-spirited deliberation that will best serve the public interest in daily 
lawmaking and administration? Third, there is the design of preservation 
mechanisms: How to preserve the considered judgments of the mobilized 
People from illegitimate erosion by normal constitutional government? 
And then there are questions that transcend issues of institutional de- 
sign: Is dualist democracy a good form of government for America? The 
best? If not, what's better? This Part does not aim for final answers. It 
will be enough to describe how the very questions provoked by dualist 
theory suggest different inquiries from those motivated by theories of the 
American Constitution now dominant in the academy. Although each aca- 
demic competitor differs from dualism in a distinct way, it may help to 
begin by noting the one thing they have in common. For all their luxuri- 
ant variety, they all ignore the special importance the dualist interpreta- 
tion places on constitutional politics8-by which I mean to describe the 
series of political movements that have, from the Founding onward, tried 
to mobilize their fellow Americans to participate in the kind of engaged 
citizenship that, when successful, deserves to carry the special authority of 
We the People of the United States. 
But let me be more specific. 
B. Monistic Democracy 
Of the modern schools of constitutional theory, the monistic democrats 
have the most impressive pedigree: Woodrow Wilson,9 James Thayer,10 
8. See id. at 1017-31. 
9. W. WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT (1885); W. WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL Gov- 
ERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1911). 
10. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. 
REV. 129 (1893). 
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Charles Beard,"1 Oliver Wendell Holmes,12 Robert Jackson,'3 Alexander 
Bickel," John Ely,15 and many other distinguished thinkers and doers 
have played important roles, over the course of a century, in making this 
the dominant opinion among serious constitutionalists today. As with all 
received opinions, complexities abound.16 But at its root, the monist idea is 
very simple: Democracy requires the grant of plenary lawmaking author- 
ity to the winners of the last general election-so long, at least, as the 
election was conducted under free and fair ground rules and the winners 
do not seek to use their power to prevent the next free and fair election. 
This monistic idea motivates, in turn, a critical institutional conclusion: 
During the period between elections, any institutional check upon the 
electoral victors is presumptively anti-democratic. For sophisticated mo- 
nists, this presumption does not necessarily imply a flat condemnation of 
all checks on the current legislative majority. Perhaps certain checks may 
prevent the victors from refusing to call the next scheduled election; per- 
haps others are justified by a richer appreciation of the social and political 
preconditions for a truly "free" or "fair" electoral process. While these 
exceptions may have great practical importance, monists refuse to allow 
them to obscure the fundamental point: When the Supreme Court, or 
anybody else, sets about to invalidate a statute, this action suffers from a 
"countermajoritarian difficulty"17 which must be squarely confronted by 
any thoughtful citizen who considers himself a democrat. 
In the work of this school, the brooding omnipresence is (an idealized 
version of) British parliamentary practice-which demonstrates, at the 
very least, that monistic democracy is no pipedream. For more than a 
century now, the Prime Minister has won her office after a relatively fair 
election. Barring exceptional circumstances, the House of Commons has 
given its unswerving support to the proposals of Her Majesty's Govern- 
ment. If the People of Great Britain do not like what's going on, they will 
return the Opposition at the next election. Until that time comes, neither 
the House of Lords, nor the Queen, nor the courts try seriously to under- 
mine the legislative decisions made by a majority of the Commons. 
So far as the monist is concerned, this British design captures the es- 
sence of democracy. The problem posed by America is its failure to follow 
the trans-Atlantic model. Rather than granting a power monopoly to a 
single, popularly-elected House of Representatives, the Americans tolerate 
11. C. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES (1913). 
12. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
13. R. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY (1941); Railway Express Co. v. 
New York, 336 U.S. 106, 111 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
14. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962). 
15. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980). 
16. For a balanced statement of the monist view, see J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE 
NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 4-59 (1980). 
17. For the classic statement of this "difficulty," see A. BICKEL, supra note 14, at 16-23. 
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a great deal of insubordination from branches whose electoral connection 
is suspect or nonexistent. While the Senate gets its share of the lumps, the 
principal object of monistic scorn is, of course, the Supreme Court. Who- 
ever gave Nine Old Lawyers the authority to overrule the judgments of 
our elected politicians? 
As I have suggested, there are monistic answers to this question. Thus, 
constitutional conservatives like Alexander Bickel,18 centrists like John 
Ely,"9 and progressives like Richard Parker" have all proposed roles for 
the Supreme Court that operate within monistic premises. For present 
purposes, an analysis of monistic solutions is not as important as the 
framework which makes the "countermajoritarian difficulty" seem so im- 
portant. So far as the dualist is concerned, the monist begs a big question 
when he asserts that the winner of a fair and open election is entitled to 
rule with the full authority of We the People. While rule by electoral 
victors is surely to be preferred to an authoritarian putsch by electoral 
losers, the dualist denies that all statutes gaining the support of a legisla- 
tive majority in Washington D.C. represent the considered judgment of a 
mobilized majority of American citizens. 
It follows that the dualist does not view every American departure from 
the British parliamentary model as if it suffered from a "countermajori- 
tarian difficulty" threatening the democratic legitimacy of the Constitu- 
tion. Instead, she can see a profoundly democratic point to some of the 
most distinctive features of American practice. For her, the most funda- 
mental fact about our system is that, in contrast to British-style monism, 
the Constitution establishes a two-track law-making system. If our elected 
politicians hope only to win normal democratic legitimacy for an initia- 
tive, they are directed down the normal lawmaking path and told to gain 
the assent of the House, Senate, and President in the normal ways. If, 
however, they hope for higher lawmaking authority, they are directed 
down a specially onerous lawmaking path-to be discussed in Part II of 
this essay. Only if a political movement successfully negotiates the special 
challenges of the higher lawmaking system can it rightfully claim that its 
initiative represents the considered judgment of We the People of the 
United States. 
Once the two-track character of the system is recognized, the dualist 
can propose democratic interpretations of many institutional features that 
endlessly puzzle the monist. Most obviously, all the time and effort re- 
quired to push an initiative down the higher lawmaking track would be 
wasted unless steps were taken to prevent future normal politicians from 
enacting statutes that impugned a successful movement's higher law 
18. A. BICKEL, supra note 14; A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 
(1970). 
19. J. ELY, supra note 15. 
20. Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory-And Its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223 (1981). 
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achievement. If future politicians can so easily ignore such successes, why 
would any mass movement ever take the trouble to overcome the special 
hurdles placed on the higher lawmaking track? 
To maintain the integrity of higher lawmaking, all dualist constitutions 
must provide for one or more institutions to discharge a preservationist 
function. These institutions must effectively block efforts to repeal estab- 
lished constitutional principle by the simple expedient of passing a normal 
statute. They must force the reigning group of elected politicians to take to 
the higher lawmaking track if it wishes to question the judgments previ- 
ously made in the higher law accents of We the People. 
It follows that the dualist will begin his encounter with the Supreme 
Court from a very different perspective than the monist. The monist treats 
every act of judicial review as presumptively anti-democratic, and strains 
to save the Supreme Court from the "countermajoritarian difficulty" by 
one or another ingenious argument. In contrast, the dualist sees the dis- 
charge of the preservationist function by the courts as an absolutely essen- 
tial part of a well-ordered democratic regime. Rather than threatening 
democracy by frustrating the statutory demands of the political elite in 
Washington, D.C., the courts serve democracy by protecting the hard-won 
judgments of a mobilized citizenry against fundamental change by politi- 
cal elites who have failed to establish the requisite kind of mobilized sup- 
port from the citizenry at large. 
This is not to say that any particular decision by the modern Supreme 
Court can be justified in preservationist terms. Before getting down to 
cases, we will have to consider the special problems involved in interpret- 
ing a Constitution whose basic institutional and substantive premises have 
been transformed, and transformed again, by Americans during the first 
two centuries of its existence. The key point is that dualists cannot dismiss 
a good-faith effort by the Court to interpret the Constitution as "anti- 
democratic" simply because it leads to the invalidation of normal statutes. 
Instead, the judicial effort to look backward and interpret the great higher 
lawmaking achievements of the past seems an indispensable part of the 
larger dualist project of distinguishing the will of We the People of the 
United States from the acts of We the Normally Elected Politicians of the 
United States. 
C. Rights Foundationalists 
In confronting the monistic school of constitutional theory, the dualist's 
main object is to break the tight link that monists have managed to con- 
struct between two distinct ideas: the idea of "democracy," on the one 
hand, and the idea of "parliamentary sovereignty" on the other. Like mo- 
nists, dualists are democrats-they believe that the ultimate constitutional 
authority in America is the People of the United States. They disagree 
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only about how easy it should be for normally elected politicians to claim 
the full authority of We the People. 
In contrast, the primacy of popular sovereignty is directly challenged by 
a second modern school. These theorists do not completely deny a place 
for popular government in their scheme of constitutional values; their 
commitment to democracy is, however, constrained by an even deeper 
commitment to fundamental rights. Unsurprisingly, members of this 
school differ when it comes to identifying the rights that are fundamental. 
Conservatives, like Richard Epstein, emphasize the foundational role of 
property rights;2" liberals, like Ronald Dworkin, emphasize each individ- 
ual's right to be treated as an equal and autonomous moral agent;22 collec- 
tivists, like Owen Fiss, stress the rights of disadvantaged groups to equal 
treatment.23 These transparent differences should not blind us to the idea 
that binds these disparate positions together. Whatever rights are Right, 
members of this school agree that the American Constitution is concerned, 
first and foremost, with their protection. Indeed, the whole point of having 
rights is to trump decisions rendered by democratic institutions that other- 
wise have the legitimate authority to define the collective welfare. To em- 
phasize this common thread, I shall call this group rights foun- 
dationalists. 
As with the monists, this school is hardly a trendy creation of the mo- 
ment. There is, however, an interesting difference between the lineages 
which the two schools construct for themselves. While the monists refer 
back to a series of American thinkers and doers from Wilson and Thayer 
to Frankfurter and Bickel, the foundationalists seem to favor philosophical 
writers further removed from the local action-with Kant (via Rawls24) 
and Locke (via Nozick25) presently serving as the most important sources 
of inspiration. The question for us, though, is not the philosophical depth 
of the competing foundationalists, but the way foundationalists as a group 
differ from the more democratic schools we have considered. 
Begin with the monists. I think it is fair to say that they are hostile to 
rights, at least as the foundationalists understand them. Indeed, it is pre- 
cisely when the Supreme Court begins to invalidate statutes in the name 
of fundamental rights that the monist begins to worry about the "counter- 
21. See R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 
(1985). 
22. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 131-49 (1978); R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 
355-99 (1986). 
23. See Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 107 (1976). 
Catharine MacKinnon has more recently developed and deepened this group-oriented perspective in 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979), and TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE 
STATE (1989). 
24. See Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77 J. PHIL. 515 (1980). 
25. See R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974). 
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majoritarian difficulty" that renders the Supreme Court presumptively 
illegitimate." 
This "difficulty" does not seem so formidable to the fourndationalist. 
She is more impressed by the fact that even a democratic legislature might 
endorse any number of oppressive actions-establish a religion, authorize 
torture or . . . ; and when such outrages occur, the foundationalist insists 
that courts intervene despite the breach of majoritarian principle: Rights 
trump democracy, so far as she is concerned. Provided, of course, that they 
are the right Rights. 
And there's the rub. While some rights-oriented theorists do not seem 
overly impressed with the perils of arbitrariness involved in the identifica- 
tion of rights, this anxiety induces more thoughtful members of the school 
to recur to great philosophers like Kant and Locke in an effort to under- 
stand the Constitution. If the Constitution may properly be construed to 
allow judges to trump democracy in the name of Rights, should not theo- 
rists aid in the process by elaborating the constitutional implications of the 
most profound reflections on rights available in the Western tradition? 
For the monist, however, the foundationalist's turn to the Great Books 
is yet another symptom of her anti-democratic disease. Whatever the phil- 
osophical merit of the resulting speculations into the nature of our Rights, 
the foundationalist's discourse is invariably esoteric-involving encounters 
with authors and doctrines that most college-educated people successfully 
avoided during their most academic moments. This elitist talk of Kant and 
Locke only emphasizes the illegitimacy involved in removing fundamental 
questions from the democratic process. 
Such monistic objections, of course, hardly convince the foundationalist. 
They only generate further anxiety about the ease with which monistic 
democracy can be swept aside by obscurantism and demagogy. And so the 
debate proceeds, with the two sides talking past one another: Democracy/ 
Fundamental Rights/Demo . . . on and on, point and counterpoint, with 
all the talk changing few minds. 
How does the introduction of dualism change the shape of this familiar 
conversational field? By offering a framework which allows both sides to 
accommodate some-if not all-of their concerns. Once again, the basic 
mediating device is the dualist's two-track system of democratic lawmak- 
ing. It allows an important place for the foundationalist's view of "rights 
as trumps" without violating the monist's deeper commitment to the pri- 
macy of democracy in the scheme of constitutional values. To see how the 
accommodation works, suppose that a rights-oriented movement took to 
the higher-lawmaking track and successfully mobilized the People to en- 
26. Not that monists necessarily oppose all exercises of judicial review. As I have suggested, mem- 
bers of this school have been quite ingenious in justifying the judicial protection of one or another 
right as instrumental for the ongoing democratic functioning of the regime. See, e.g., J. EL.Y, supra 
note 15. 
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dorse one or another Bill of Rights. Given this achievement, the dualist 
can readily endorse the judicial invalidation of later statutes that under- 
mine these rights, even when they concern matters, like the protection of 
personal freedom or privacy, that have nothing much to do with the integ- 
rity of the electoral process so central to monistic conceptions of democ- 
racy. For, as we have seen, the dualist believes that the Court furthers the 
cause of democracy when it preserves these rights against erosion by polit- 
ically ascendant elites who have yet to mobilize the People to support the 
repeal of preestablished higher law. Thus, unlike the monist, the dualist 
will have no trouble supporting the idea that rights can properly trump 
the conclusions of normal democratic politics. She can do so, moreover, 
without the need for non-democratic principles of the kinds preferred by 
the rights foundationalist. Thus, the dualist can offer a deeper reconcilia- 
tion of democracy and rights to those who find a certain amount of truth 
in both sides of the point/counterpoint that had previously been elabo- 
rated in the dialogue between monists and foundationalists. 
Not that this reconciliation will prove satisfactory to all members of the 
previously contending schools.27 The problem for the committed founda- 
tionalist, unsurprisingly, is the insufficiently deep foundations the dualist 
has built for the protection of rights. Granted, concedes the foundational- 
ist, the dualist will applaud the judicial protection of rights if a warrant 
for this special treatment can be found in prior successful higher lawmak- 
ing activity. But that is an awfully big "if." What if the People have not 
adopted the right Bill of Rights? Should the Constitution then be con- 
strued in ways that allow the statutory perpetration of injustice? 
Dualists and foundationalists continue to answer this question differ- 
ently. For the dualist, constitutional protection of rights depends on a 
prior democratic affirmation on the higher lawmaking track. To put the 
point in a single line: The dualist's Constitution is democratic first, rights- 
protecting second. For the committed foundationalist, this priority is re- 
versed. The Constitution is first and foremost concerned with the protec- 
tion of the right Rights; it is only after these rights-constraints have been 
satisfied that We the People are constitutionally authorized to work their 
will. 
This theoretical disagreement has many practical implications as 
foundationalist and dualist debate the substance of modern constitutional 
doctrine. This is not the place, though, to get into these vital doctrinal 
details. The question is whether the dualist can advance some very gen- 
eral argument that will defeat any and all foundationalist interpretations 
of our existing constitutional arrangements. 
My answer is yes; moreover, the source of this general argument 
27. I have considered the complaints of the die-hard monist elsewhere, see Storrs, supra note 7, 
and so will focus here only on the objections of the strong foundationalist. 
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should, by now, begin to seem familiar. As in the case of our earlier con- 
frontation with the monist, it is the design of the American two-track law- 
making system that serves as the key. Just as the monist proved incapable 
of accounting for the very existence of a higher lawmaking track, so the 
foundationalist has trouble accounting for an important fact about the 
particular design of the American higher lawmaking system. 
The fact is that our Constitution has never (with two exceptions I con- 
sider shortly) explicitly entrenched existing higher law against subsequent 
revision by the People. Thus, while the original Constitution gave higher 
law protection to slavery, at least it did not try to make it unconstitutional 
for Americans of later generations to reconsider the question. Similarly, 
when Americans of the early twentieth century enacted Prohibition into 
our higher law, they did not seek to make their Amendment unamendable. 
In these two cases, of course, the People have indeed exercised their right 
to change their mind. And few among us would say that we were the 
worse for repeal. The general availability of repeal, however, is a very 
great embarrassment for foundationalist interpretations of our Constitu- 
tion. For it would seem to authorize amendments to our higher law that 
most modern foundationalists consider morally disasterous. 
A hypothetical case may help make the point. Suppose that the reli- 
gious revival prominent in the Islamic world turns out to be the first wave 
of a Great Awakening that envelops the Christian West. A general revul- 
sion against godless materialism yields mass political mobilization that fi- 
nally results in a successful campaign for formal repeal of part of the 
First Amendment. With the dawn of the new millenium, Amendment 
XXVII is proclaimed throughout the land: 
Christianity is hereby established as the state religion of the Ameri- 
can people. 
The enactment of the Christianity Amendment might well inaugurate a 
deep transformation of our higher law heritage-on the same order, 
though of a very different kind, as those achieved by the Reconstruction 
Republicans and New Deal Democrats in earlier generations. Moreover, 
such an amendment offends my own commitment to freedom of con- 
science. Nonetheless, if I were then unlucky enough to be a Justice of the 
Supreme Court (serving as a hold-over from the last secular Administra- 
tion of the 1990's), I would have no doubt about my constitutional respon- 
sibility. While I hope I would maintain my conviction that the establish- 
ment of Christianity had been a terrible wrong, it would now be my 
judicial responsibility to uphold it as a fundamental part of the American 
Constitution. If some die-hard secularist brought a lawsuit in 2001 seek- 
ing to convince the Supreme Court to declare the Twenty-seventh Amend- 
ment unconstitutional, I would join my colleagues in summarily rejecting 
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the petition-or resign my office and join in a campaign to convince the 
American People to change their mind. 
The one thing I would not do is the thing suggested by foundational- 
ism: write a dissent asserting that the First Amendment had not been val- 
idly amended. Moreover, I would be very much surprised if many com- 
mentators who presently wrap themselves up in foundationalist rhetoric 
would do any differently.28 
I do not suggest that such a dissent would be preposterous under any 
and all constitutional arrangements. Consider, for example, the en- 
trenching principles deployed in the modern West German Constitution, 
which explicitly declares that a long list of fundamental human rights 
cannot constitutionally be revised, regardless of the extent to which a mo- 
bilized majority of Germans supported repeal.2" Against this legal back- 
ground, I would hope the German constitutional court would respond to a 
Christianity Amendment in a very different way. If they were faithful to 
their foundationalist legal tradition, the judges would issue a solemn opin- 
ion declaring the Christianity Amendment unconstitutional, and challenge 
the dominant political majority to use physical force to disband the Court 
if it were intent upon tearing the constitutional fabric apart. 
But this only makes it clear how far dualist America is from founda- 
tionalist Germany. What meager constitutional experience America has 
had with German-style entrenchment should be sobering to foundational- 
ist enthusiasts. When the Founders designed the original higher lawmak- 
ing system in 1787, they were perfectly aware of the entrenchment device. 
But rather than serving the cause of human freedom, the Founders used 
entrenchment to disable the American People from enacting a constitu- 
tional amendment banning the African slave trade until the year 1808.30 
Since the Founding, no successful constitutional movement has sought to 
entrench its achievements against future constitutional-as opposed to 
normal-politics. This history of abuse and non-use of entrenchment sug- 
gests, to me at least, that the foundationalist interpretation is inconsistent 
with the basic premises of the American higher lawmaking system. The 
fact that We the People may constitutionally repeal many fundamental 
rights3' eloquently expresses the dualist idea that it is the People who are 
the source of rights, and not the other way around. 
28. For a constitutionalist who may have the courage of his foundationalist convictions, see Mur- 
phy, Slaughter-House, Civil Rights, and Limits on Constitutional Change, 32 AM. J. JURIS. 1 
(1987). 
29. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 79(3) (W. Ger.), reprinted in 5 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUN- 
TRIES OF THE WORLD 68 (A. Blaustein & G. Flanz eds. 1986) and 2 KOMMENTAR ZUM GRUNDGE- 
SETZ FUR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 1479-86 (R. Wasserman ed. 1984). 
30. A second entrenching provision stipulates that no state shall be deprived of equal representa- 
tion in the Senate without its express consent. This effort to entrench federalism caused all sorts of 
trouble in the aftermath of the Civil War. See Discovering the Constitution, supra note 1, at ch. 6. 
31. My purpose in the text has been to produce a hypothetical case which illuminates the differ- 
ence between dualist and foundationalist views of constitutional rights. The Christianity Amendment 
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While there is much to be said for this dualist commitment, I do not 
mean to minimize its dangers. I myself would support a political move- 
ment that sought to lead the People of the United States to enact a modern 
Bill of Rights, and entrench it in the West German way against subse- 
quent revision by some future American majority caught up in an awful 
neo-Nazi paroxysm.-" 
Such a decision would not, of course, be enough to safeguard American 
freedoms during future crises. To the contrary, our constitutional history 
is full of eloquent warnings against putting too much faith in one or an- 
other rule limiting the way that future Americans might legitimately alter 
their higher law. While constitutional entrenchment might marginally en- 
hance the protection of rights, this is not the only-or even the princi- 
pal-reason I advocate it here. What is truly important is that a collective 
effort to enact a modern Bill of Rights could only occur after a long period 
of debate and decision that would serve to reaffirm and to root more 
deeply the role of fundamental rights in the ongoing life of the American 
People. 
My aim here, however, is hardly to anticipate the outcome of such an 
exercise in constitutional politics. It is to suggest that, unless and until it 
occurs, dualism captures the spirit of American constitutional life better 
than any foundationalist enterprise. In contrast to some other modern con- 
stitutions, we Americans hold that our rights are ultimately to be defined 
by the People acting through the higher lawmaking system, not by some 
group of philosopher-judges engaged in a deep inquiry into the nature of 
human rights. We are democrats first, though not democrats of the monis- 
tic persuasion. 
serves this purpose well, because it involves a right that most foundationalists would consider funda- 
mental but that almost all lawyers-and all dualists-would immediately recognize as repealable. 
While this suffices to distinguish dualism from foundationalism, the hypothetical does not allow us to 
consider whether dualist theory allows any conceptual room at all for entrenchment. 
A hypothetical test of this question invites one to imagine that a fundamentalist movement managed 
to ratify a second amendment along with the one hypothesized in the text: 
Any American advocating the repeal of the Christianity Amendment is hereby declared guilty 
of treason and will be subjected to capital punishment upon conviction. 
This amendment, in contrast to the first, aims to make it impossible for the People to reconsider its 
commitment to Christianity, and so amounts to the repeal of dualist democracy itself. Would it there- 
fore be constitutionally appropriate for judges to invalidate it? Or would it simply be best for all 
decent people to quit the regime and struggle to overthrow it? 
Such questions are best left to the dark day they arise. For now, it is enough to beware easy 
answers. In particular, I do not believe that judges would be justified in asserting a general authority 
to protect the fundamental principles of dualist democracy against repudiation by the People. Sup- 
pose, for example, that the next round of our constitutional politics were dominated by a mobilized 
coalition of liberals who sought to entrench a modernized version of the Bill of Rights, guaranteeing a 
right to a minimum income along with other new rights unknown to our eighteenth-century Foun- 
ders. This act of entrenchment, no less than the hypothetical Christianity amendments, would be 
inconsistent with the principles of dualist democracy, since it would try to make it impossible for the 
People to change their mind about certain constitutional values. Yet would the judges have the consti- 
tutional authority to force the People to keep these possibilities open? 
32. My own views concerning the content of a modern Bill of Rights are suggested in B. ACKER- 
MAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL. STATE 231-326 (1980). 
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D. Historicism 
The clash between monists and foundationalists dominates the present 
debate about the American Constitution. This conflict is not only theoreti- 
cally demanding but practically important. Courts in this country are 
obliged every day to mediate the tension between democracy and rights as 
they determine whether one or another statute satisfies the Constitution. 
The sharp split between the two schools mimics the split between plaintiff 
and defendant in the typical lawsuit-the plaintiff insisting that a statute 
has violated her fundamental rights, while the defendant insists that the 
court defer to the democratic authority of Congress. Little wonder, then, 
that thoughtful judges and citizens are drawn to reflections about democ- 
racy and rights, creating an audience for the work of the two competing 
schools. 
Dualism suggests that this contest between plaintiff and defendant in 
the courtroom need not be taken as a sign of unremitting conflict between 
the democratic and rights-oriented aspects of our tradition. Instead, both 
normal statutes and the judicial protection of our higher law legacy are 
part of a larger practice of dualistic democracy. This abstract synthesis, of 
course, hardly suffices to decide concrete cases. But it points in a particu- 
lar direction-toward a reflective study of the past to determine when the 
People have spoken with a higher lawmaking voice and what they have 
said on the relatively rare occasions of successful constitutional politics. 
1. Lawyer's Historicism: The Paradoxes of American "Burkeanism" 
This historicizing tendency allows the dualist to make contact with a 
third strand of constitutional thought. I call this tendency Burkean, since 
it has yet to find its modern Burke-though Alexander Bickel became an 
eloquent spokesman before he died prematurely.33 While it is certainly 
possible to isolate Burkean aspects of recent academic work,34 this litera- 
ture only hints at its powerful influence on practicing lawyers and judges. 
These professionals hardly require the services of brilliant theorists to 
cultivate a Burkean sensibility. They are already deeply immersed in a 
common law tradition that demands the very skills and sensitivities that 
self-conscious Burkeans commend. What counts for the common lawyer is 
not some fancy theory but the patterns of concrete decision built up by 
courts and other practical decisionmakers over decades, generations, centu- 
ries. Slowly, often in a half-conscious and circuitous fashion, these deci- 
sions build upon one another to yield the constitutional rights that modern 
33. See A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSEN-T 3-30 (1975). 
34. See, e.g., Fried, The Artificial Reason of the Law or: What Lawyers Know, 60 TEX. L. REV. 
35 (1981); Kronman, Alexander Bickel's Philosophy of Prudence, 94 YALE L.J. 1567 (1985); Wel- 
lington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 
YALE L.J. 221 (1973). 
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Americans take for granted, just as they slowly generate precedents that 
the President and Congress may use to claim new grants of constitutional 
authority. 
The task of the Burkean lawyer or judge is to master these precedents, 
gaining a sense of their hidden potentials for growth and decay. As al- 
ways, this basic conception can be elaborated in reformist or conservative 
directions. Reformist incrementalists try to keep the precedents abreast of 
the "evolving moral sense of the country." More conservative types may 
be more open to the incremental development of presidential power. Yet it 
is more important to focus upon the point that all these common-law 
Burkeans have in common-an emphasis on the ongoing cultivation of a 
concrete historical tradition sorely missing from the talk of the "high theo- 
rists," be they partisans of monistic democracy or rights foundationalism. 
So far as these common lawyers are concerned, there is more wisdom in 
the gradual accretion of concrete decisions than in the abstract specula- 
tions of our most brilliant academics. The only valuable "theory" is found 
in the opinions of judges responding to the facts of particular cases. Even 
these theories should not be taken too seriously; they will take on different 
meanings as they are tested over the generations by different judges con- 
fronting different cases. Given the pervasiveness of this common-law sen- 
sibility amongst the bar and bench, there is no need for a modern Burke 
to tell American lawyers that the Constitution of the United States cannot 
be understood by those who have failed to immerse themselves in the his- 
torical practice of concrete decision. 
Such historicist sentiments contain important insights-so long as they 
are not confused with the whole truth about the American Constitution. 
-To put the Burkean sensibility in its place, I shall begin by considering 
the aspect of dualist constitutionalism it entirely ignores. Only then will it 
be possible to isolate important points of convergence. 
The common lawyers' blind-side can be summarized in two words: con- 
stitutional politics. Indeed, on those occasions that Burkeanism reaches 
self-consciousness-as in Bickel's later work3-"constitutional politics is 
aggressively disparaged. All that Burkeans see in such enterprises are the 
charismatic, but unscrupulous, leaders; the loud, but hopelessly ambigu- 
ous, ideological pronunciamentos; the excited, but ignorant, masses. At 
best, such eruptions of collective irrationality will quickly disintegrate 
amongst clouds of factional recrimination. Otherwise, a government seized 
by Utopian fantasies can degenerate into unspeakable tyranny with bewil- 
35. Bickel did not get the chance to work out this view. It is easy to find eloquent advocates in 
allied disciplines. See D. BRAYBROOKE & C. LINDBLOM, A STRATEGY OF DECISION (1963); F. 
HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY (1 978); B. HUNTINGTON, AMERICAN POLITICS: THE 
PROMISE OF DISHARMONY (1981); M. OAKESHOTT, ON HUMAN CONDUCT (1975). For an outstand- 
ing recent example of this sensibility at work in the study of a particular doctrine, see Blasi, The 
Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449 (1985). 
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dering speed. Given this nightmare, could anyone of sound mind support 
a regime in which the sober and sensible Burkean did not have the final 
say ? 
It is precisely here where the dualist intervenes to disturb the Burkean's 
self-congratulatory statement of the alternatives. While only a fool fails to 
recognize the dangers which so impress the Burkean, the dualist cannot 
allow herself to forget a very different possibility. In the dualist picture, a 
political leadership challenges the traditional wisdom on behalf of princi- 
ples which, though inevitably open-ended, do have rational content. While 
these transformative initiatives inspire mass involvement, passionate com- 
mitment, great sacrifice, the result is not some unspeakable tyranny, but a 
deepening dialogue between leaders and citizenry that finally succeeds in 
generating broad popular consent for a sharp break with the received wis- 
dom of the past. Constitutional lawyers would be wrong to view these 
successful exercises in popular sovereignity as if they were nightmarish 
eruptions. To the contrary: Most Americans have no trouble identifying 
such great popular struggles as culminating in the nation's greatest politi- 
cal achievements. Thus, the original Constitution codified the Revolution- 
ary generation's defeat of monarchy on behalf of republican self- 
government; the Civil War Amendments codified the struggle of an entire 
generation to repudiate slavery on behalf of a new constitutional idea of 
equality; and so forth. Rather than wishing to forget such great achieve- 
ments, our Constitution seeks to protect them against erosion during more 
normal times, when the People are less involved in affairs of state. 
This dualist conclusion challenges the standard Burkean sensibility in 
at least four ways. First, it undermines the Burkean commitment to incre- 
mental constitutional development. While gradual adaptation is an impor- 
tant part of the story,36 the Constitution cannot be understood without 
recognizing that Americans have, time and again, successfully repudiated 
large chunks of their past, and transformed their higher law to express 
deep changes in their political identities. Perhaps these changes do not 
seem radical to those who long for a total revolution that (vainly) seeks to 
obliterate every trace of the old regime. But, when judged by any other 
standard, they were hardly incremental. If a label will clarify matters, 
American history has been punctuated by successful exercises in revolu- 
tionary reform, in which the protagonists struggled over basic questions of 
principle with ramifying implications for large areas of American life. 
Which leads to a second dualistic challenge. The Burkean is suspicious 
not only of big breaks, but of the self-conscious appeals to abstract princi- 
ples that accompany them. He prides himself in avoiding loose talk of 
Freedom, Equality, or Democracy. Even more modest theories dealing 
with limited subjects like "free speech" or "equal protection" may seem 
36. As my discussion of interpretive synthesis in Part III will begin to suggest. 
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impossibly vague to him. Yet, for the dualist, an encounter with such ab- 
stract ideals is a crucial part of coming to terms with the American past. 
Whatever else may be said about the Founders, they were hardly content 
with the Burkean arts of muddling through crises. They were children of 
the Enlightenment, eager to use the best political science of their time to 
prove to a doubting world that republican self-government was no utopian 
dream.37 Otherwise they would never have tried to write down a Consti- 
tution whose few thousand words contained a host of untried ideas and 
institutions. If abstract ideals were important to the Founders and their 
successors in constitutional politics, how can we pretend to understand our 
legacy without confronting them? 
Third, there is a particular abstraction that gives the Burkean special 
trouble: rule by the People. The People rule best, the Burkean may say 
with a broad wink, when they leave the business of government to a well- 
trained elite immersed in the nation's concrete constitutional tradition. 
Slowly but surely, this elite will sense the drift of popular sentiment and 
take the countless small steps needed to keep the tradition responsive to 
the present's half-articulate sense of its special needs. For the Burkean, 
however, the public dialogue accompanying ongoing adaptation is best 
kept to relatively small groups-judges talking to one another about the 
relationship of past decisions to present problems, statesmen telling one 
another that their constituents have not given them a mandate to accom- 
plish particular goals but have selected them for their prudent capacity to 
make sensible changes in public policy. 
Once again, it is not necessary for the dualist to belittle the importance 
of this Burkean enterprise in political adaptation. She refuses, however, to 
allow this elite conversation to obscure the even greater importance of a 
different dialogue-the one through which mobilized masses of ordinary 
citizens finally organize their political will with sufficient clarity to lay 
down the law to those who speak in their name on a daily basis in Wash- 
ington, D.C. While competing elites play a critical role in this higher 
lawmaking dialectic, we shall see that it characteristically involves a con- 
flictual and ideological politics that Burkeans disdain. This is all the more 
unfortunate because successful higher lawmaking also requires a kind of 
statesmanship to which the Burkean might otherwise make important 
contributions. 
To sum up the dualist critique in a fourth point that presupposes the 
first three: The Burkean fails to recognize that he can easily become part 
of the problem, rather than the key to its solution. An enduring problem 
of dualist democracy is to prevent government from departing from the 
principles of higher law validated by the People during their relatively 
37. See Kahn, Reason and Will in the Origins of American Constitutionalism, 98 YALE L.J. 
449, 453-73 (1989). 
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rare successes in constitutional politics. From this vantage point, the 
Burkean's elitist refusal to take seriously the principles elaborated by the 
People at past moments of constitutional politics may make him a potent 
engine in the erosion of these ideals over time. As they go about their 
business of particularistic adaptation, Burkeans may take advantage of the 
general public's weak involvement in normal politics to muddle their way 
to "statesmanlike" solutions that undercut fundamental principles af- 
firmed by the People in prior exercises of constitutional politics. In these 
cases, Burkean "prudence" degenerates, in dualist eyes, into obscurantist 
elitism that prides itself in ignoring the greatest constitutional achieve- 
ments of the American people. 
Burke himself understood this. While he is principally remembered to- 
day for the contrast he drew between the abstract and excited politics of 
the French Revolution and the concrete and incremental development of 
the British constitution, Burke recognized that the American revolutionar- 
ies eluded this easy dichotomy-and he tried, as best he could, to appreci- 
ate the distinctive character of the Americans' experiment in revolutionary 
reform.38 Perhaps he would have been the first to protest the effort by 
American "Burkeans" to understand their constitutional tradition as if it 
were a caricature of Burke's story of British development. However well 
Burkean incrementalism may fit the British experience, it falsifies the dis- 
tinctive character of the American. If the American Burkean is to put his 
historicizing genius to good use, he must recognize that American history 
reveals the ongoing development of a politics of principle that results, 
when successful, in revolutionary reforms-whose meaning must be 
deeply understood if the tradition is to continue to renew itself. 
Once this essential point is recognized, the dualist and the Burkean can 
begin to discover common ground. First, the Burkean's emphasis on the 
demagogic pathologies of excited mass politics cautions us to exercise the 
greatest care in understanding our higher lawmaking system, both as it 
was originally conceived and as it has developed in response to the con- 
crete challenges of American history. Not that this study can guarantee 
against outbursts of collective irrationality in the future. There can be no 
guarantees. Demagogy is an endemic risk in any democratic system that 
places real power in the hands of a mass public with limited time and 
energy for the great issues of politics. Nonetheless, these risks can be con- 
trolled: first, by cultivating the arts of citizenship in a wide variety of 
daily contexts, from the union hall to the school board to the Little 
League; and second, by developing constitutional structures which channel 
38. See E. BURKE, Speech on Moving His Resolutions for Conciliation with the Colonies (Mar. 
22, 1775), in SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES 147, 158-62 (P. Stanlis ed. 1968) (enumerating 
distinctive aspects of American people). 
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the energies of transformative movements into a dialogue with the larger 
body of the American people. 
This second task defines one of my central concerns. In reexamining the 
higher lawmaking experience of the Founding, Reconstruction, and New 
Deal, I will be on the lookout for distinctive features of the concrete his- 
torical process that allowed Americans to transform moments of passion- 
ate sacrifice and excited mobilization into lasting legal achieve- 
ments-victories that might continue to inspire us today as we confront 
the challenges of the future. Indeed, the principal reason why my larger 
project has turned out to be so time-consuming is that I have been com- 
pelled to reexamine in detail many features of our history that the present 
professional narrative consigns to historical oblivion. This effort will re- 
mind the common lawyer of his own search into historical precedents. The 
constitutional precedents that will seem most important, however, are not 
those handed down by courts, making interstitial changes in one or an- 
other doctrine. Instead, the critical precedents have been established dur- 
ing moments of crisis, generated by leaders like Madison, Lincoln, and 
Roosevelt-who, in a complex interaction with other institutions and the 
people at large, managed finally to gain democratic authority to make 
fundamental changes in our higher law. We should never allow a law- 
yerly fascination with judges to divert us from the fact that, during mo- 
ments of successful constitutional politics, the central foci of higher law- 
making energy have been Congress and the President, with the Supreme 
Court playing a secondary, though sometimes important, role. 
A first link with the Burkean sensibility, then, will be a concern with 
the concrete historical process through which generations of statesmen 
have confronted and resolved the distinctive dilemmas of constitutional 
politics. This inquiry will lead us to glimpse a second point of commonal- 
ity. The dualist joins the Burkean in insisting that the Constitution is best 
understood as an historically rooted tradition of theory and practice-an 
evolving language of politics through which Americans have learned to 
talk to one another in the course of their centuries-long struggle over their 
national identity. 
It is this tradition of discourse that eluded the first two schools we have 
considered. The monistic democrat worships instead at the altar of the 
present; he supposes that he knows all he needs to know about democratic 
rule if he simply consults the last statutory word approved by Congress. 
The rights foundationalist seeks to escape the limits of time altogether; he 
hopes to define some ahistorical state of nature or original position to 
serve as a constitutional platform from which to pass judgment on his- 
tory's passing show. In elaborating the constitutional will of the People, 
the dualist begins with neither the will of the present legislature nor the 
atemporal reason of some utopian assembly. Her aim is the kind of situ- 
ated understanding one might reach after a good conversation. Only this 
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time the conversation is not between friends-or even enemies-who 
share the same moment and so can hear each other's tone of voice, observe 
each other's gestures, continue tomorrow what is left unsaid today. The 
challenge, instead, is to locate ourselves in a conversation between 
generations. 
As today's Americans come to political maturity, we enter upon a polit- 
ical stage already set with a complex symbolic practice charged with 
meaning by the thought and action of prior generations. There is, of 
course, no necessity for us to seek to understand these symbols. We may 
try, if we choose, to sweep them away in a grand gesture of disdain, or let 
them die a lingering death by refusing to hear the voices of those who 
came before us. 
There is, however, wisdom to be gained from these voices, if we but try 
to hear them. They can teach us both how prior generations have man- 
aged, on occasion, to engage in great democratic achievements on a conti- 
nental scale and how they managed to sustain democratic politics during 
those periods when citizen involvement was less constitutionally creative 
and the People spoke with a more equivocal voice. In seeking to engage 
these past voices in conversation, my aim is hardly to prostrate myself 
before their superior wisdom. A conversation with the past can only be a 
part of the process through which the present gains its own voice and 
thereby makes its own lasting contribution to the constitutional tradition. 
Surely the American People have not yet pronounced the last word on 
their constitutional identity? How best to continue the practice of dualist 
democracy into the third American century? How best to revise our 
higher law legacy so that it will be equal to the demands of the future? 
I have my own answers-and so, I am sure, do you. Yet none of us can 
expect our own ideals to gain popular consent without passionate struggle 
and bitter disagreement. Do we not owe it to ourselves to understand how 
Americans have tested one another's answers in the past? For all its his- 
torical contingency and moral imperfection, this constitutional language 
has set the terms within which previous generations have disagreed with 
one another, and sometimes has allowed them to move beyond disagree- 
ment to a transformed understanding of their political commitments. Is it 
wrong to suppose that it remains a crucial resource for us in our own 
struggles over national identity? 
2. The Republican Revival: Beyond Hartz and Pocock 
In considering historicizing approaches to the Constitution, I have be- 
gun with Burke, not because he is the world's greatest philosopher of his- 
tory, but because Burkeanism expresses a powerful current of opinion 
among the community of lawyers and judges who are charged with the 
daily task of interpreting the Constitution. Since these men and women 
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are steeped in the common law tradition, it seemed important to warn 
them against extending certain Burkean preconceptions to the task of con- 
stitutional interpretation, while inviting them to reinvigorate other more 
fundamental historicist themes. Nonetheless, I hardly wish to make a fe- 
tish of today's professional law-talk, especially since I mean to challenge 
many of the categories it uses to construct the prevailing constitutional 
narrative. Just as American law has, in the past, shown a remarkable 
capacity to assimilate a host of popular and academic critiques, there is 
every reason to hope for similar revision in the future. 
Indeed, if a recent wave of legal scholarship proves a reliable guide, this 
process of narrative reconstruction has already begun. Over the past few 
years, the law journals have been full of efforts to join in a larger process 
of historical reinterpretation that has been a central preoccupation of the 
last generation of American political scientists and historians. The object 
of this generational critique, unsurprisingly enough, has been its par- 
ents-historians like Richard Hofstadter,39 political scientists like Robert 
Dahl,40 and sociologists like Daniel Bell,41 whose work dominated the ac- 
ademic horizon of the 1960's. This work, in the eyes of many, had en- 
dowed modern American liberalism with a social solidity and pervasive- 
ness it did not in fact possess-and the recent critique rippling through 
the social and historical sciences attempts to set the record straight. 
The critical enterprise most relevant here is the effort to revitalize the 
republican aspect of the American political tradition. The pathbreaking 
work of Bernard Bailyn42 and Gordon Wood43 not only set an agenda for 
many historians, but increasingly has provided legal scholars with a re- 
source for normative reflection-with Frank Michelman,44 Suzanna 
Sherry,45 Cass Sunstein,4' and Mark Tushnet47 opening a debate on the 
contemporary constitutional implications of this "republican revival" 
among historians. As the diversity of these initial legal explorations sug- 
39. See R. HOFSTADTER, THE PROGRESSIVE HISTORIANS (1969); R. HOFSTADTER, THE PARA- 
NOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1965). 
40. See R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956); R. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? 
(1961). 
41. See D. BELL, THE END OF IDEOLOGY (rev. ed. 1962). 
42. See B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967). 
43. See G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 (1969). The endur- 
ing impact of this work is suggested by the decision of a leading historical journal to celebrate the 
Bicentennial of the United States by sponsoring a symposium on the book. Forum, The Creation of 
the American Republic, 1776-1787: A Symposium of Views and Reviews, 44 WM. & MARY Q. 
549-640 (1987). 
44. See Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); Michelman, The Supreme 
Court, 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986). 
45. See Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. 
REV. 543 (1986). 
46. See Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988); Sunstein, Interest 
Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985). 
47. See M. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW (1988). 
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gests, the "republican revival" is no more a monopoly of a single political 
viewpoint than any of the other currents of constitutional thought we have 
been exploring.48 This diversity should not blind us to the common invita- 
tion implicit in all these works: In rethinking the reigning professional 
narrative, would it not be foolish for lawyers to blind themselves to de- 
bates occurring elsewhere among thoughtful historians? 
I will record my own debt by engaging two books that repay several 
rereadings: Louis Hartz' Liberal Tradition in America49 and John 
Pocock's The Machiavellian Moment."0 These works are rightly seen as 
the most philosophically self-aware statements of the older "liberal" thesis 
and its more recent "republican" antithesis. Rather than enlisting on one 
side or the other of this debate, I propose to use the insights of both in a 
larger historical synthesis. 
a. Hartz 
I share with Louis Hartz an abiding skepticism about the power of 
European models to enlighten American politics. The particular model 
that concerned Hartz was the familiar Marxist view condemning all mod- 
ern societies to a compulsory three-step march to Utopia: first Feudalism, 
then Capitalism, then (but only then) Socialism. Whatever the merit of 
this model for Europe, Hartz was clear that it did not apply to America 
for one basic reason: Americans never experienced anything like Euro- 
pean Feudalism. Because the first term of the three-stage sequence was 
lacking, America also lacked the critical social ingredients necessary to 
spark the later movement from Capitalism to Socialism. America was a 
case of arrested development, permanently frozen at Stage Two. It was a 
land firmly in the grip of a "Lockean consensus" that trivialized politics 
and glorified the natural rights of isolated individuals to life, liberty, and 
the pursuit of property (or is it happiness?). Since Americans never were 
obliged to use state power to liberate themselves from Feudalism, they 
were "born equal,"5' and could afford to look upon the state as an unmit- 
igated threat to natural liberty. The government that governs best governs 
least. Let the Europeans say otherwise. 
While there certainly is some truth in this account, it also serves as a 
cautionary tale for those, like myself, who see something distinctive in the 
American political experience. No "exceptionalist" theory can be any bet- 
ter than the theory to which it takes exception. While Hartz was obsessed 
with the inadequacies of Euro-centered Marxism, his critique accepted far 
more of this theory than he appreciated. This is, at least, the way I diag- 
48. Curiously, republicanism has not yet been mined by modern constitutional conservatives, de- 
spite their putative concern with the "intention of the Framers." 
49. L. HARTZ, THE LIBERAi TRADITION IN AMERICA (1955). 
50. J. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT (1975). 
51. See L. HARTZ, supra note 49, at 5, 66. 
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nose the non sequitur at the heart of Hartz' theory. I agree with Hartz 
that the American revolutionaries, unlike their French contemporaries, 
were not in a life and death struggle with Feudalism (whatever that may 
mean when applied to the eighteenth, rather than the thirteenth, cen- 
tury).52 But it hardly follows that the Americans found nothing important 
to struggle about in politics. It is easy to see how an old-fashioned53 
Marxist might reach this erroneous conclusion. By hypothesis, he believes 
that the only "really important" use of state power is to serve as the revo- 
lutionary mechanism for moving from Feudalism to Capitalism to Social- 
ism. Consequently, the fact that Americans did not "need" a revolution to 
push them to the Capitalist stage means that the American Revolution 
could not have been about anything "really important." If, however, there 
is more to political life than a struggle over the timing of a compulsive 
three-stage sequence, the mere fact"4 that Americans had escaped Old 
World Fedudalism hardly implies that they could afford to relax and em- 
brace a comfortable Lockeanism that denied any creative role for the state 
in social life. By embracing this non sequitur, Hartz remained in the 
thrall of the Marxist theory he sought to reject. 
To put my criticism more affirmatively, Hartz' mistake has its source 
in the meaning he chose to give the Tocquevillian dictum that Americans 
were "born equal." I am happy to adopt this slogan-as long as it merely 
emphasizes the rich cultural, material, and geopolitical resources that ena- 
bled Americans to build a regime which, over time, has protected the lib- 
erties of an increasing proportion of its citizenry. If, however, Hartz 
meant that this "equality" could be sustained without ongoing political 
struggle over its meaning and its scope, or that Americans believed that 
they could "do without" a serious politics requiring great acts of creativ- 
ity, he was simply wrong. Rather than supposing that Americans were 
"born equal," the Founding Federalists believed that the New World 
would soon become Balkanized into a host of petty military tyrannies un- 
less they could mobilize their fellow citizens to join in unprecedented acts 
of constitutional construction-an ambition that their opponents warned 
would lead to resurgent monarchy. Rather than supposing that Americans 
were "born equal," Reconstruction Republicans were painfully aware of 
the disgrace of slavery, and successfully led the American People to com- 
mit the national government to serve as the guarantor of freedom for all 
American citizens-despite the passionate warning of conservatives that 
such a use of national power would lead to military despotism. Rather 
52. For a useful statement of the critique by contemporary historians of the familiar Marxist 
account of the French Revolution, see J.F. BOSHER, THE FRENCH REVOLUTION (1988). 
53. "Old-fashioned" because, since Lenin, lots of Marxists have been trying to leap from feudal- 
ism to socialism, and lots more have been trying to liberate themselves from the economic determinism 
that Engels imposed on Marxist theory. 
54. If it is a fact. After all, there were feudal, as well as capitalist, aspects of the Southern planta- 
tion system. But it is not necessary to quibble with Hartz' facts to make the points that really matter. 
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than supposing that Americans were "born equal," New Deal Democrats 
were convinced that modern economic conditions had made the so-called 
"natural rights" of property and contract the tools of mass oppression, and 
successfully led the American People to empower the national government 
to manage the economy for the general welfare-despite the passionate 
warning of conservatives that such a use of national power would lead 
down the path travelled by Hitler and Stalin. It is only as a result of 
these, and many other, political struggles that Americans enjoy whatever 
equality they have today; and there is every reason to believe that the 
nature and scope of American equality will be open to similar debate and 
redefinition in the future. Americans have not been "born equal" through 
some miraculous act of immaculate conception. To the extent that we have 
gained equality, we have won it through energetic debate, popular deci- 
sion, and remarkable constitutional creativity. Once the American people 
lose this remarkable political capacity, it is only a matter of time before 
they will lose whatever equality they possess-and much else besides. 
b. Pocock 
Which leads me to John Pocock and his refusal to allow the Liberal 
Individualist's struggle against Feudalism to dominate his understanding 
of the modern predicament. Instead of admiring Hartz' "Lockean Consen- 
sus," Pocock elaborated a different historical understanding of the roots of 
the American experience. Building on the pathbreaking work of Bernard 
Bailyn and Gordon Wood, Pocock deemphasized Lockean liberalism and 
located the American Constitution against a different early modern back- 
ground-one that ultimately gained its inspiration from the Greek polis. 
Within this classical republican tradition, the fundamental human chal- 
lenge is not to lose oneself in the Lockean pursuit of life, liberty, and 
property, but to join with fellow citizens in a continuing project of politi- 
cal self-government. Pocock's magisterial study, The Machiavellian Mo- 
ment, traces the revival and transformation of this classical ideal during 
the Italian Renaissance, before it was taken up by radical Com- 
monwealthmen during the English Revolution of the seventeenth century. 
Defeated at the Restoration of 1660, the English Commonwealthmen 
gained a belated victory over the Crown during the American Revolu- 
tion-providing the fundamental categories for the Revolutionary genera- 
tion's diagnosis of the Crown's corruption and the republican cure. 
When set against this intellectual background, the Founding Federalists 
seem something more than a bunch of Lockean social engineers, working 
out the implications of the "natural" freedom miraculously enjoyed by 
Americans. Pocock invites us to view them as confronting the classical 
ideal of republican self-government and seeking to define its enduring 
1989] Constitutional Politics 483 
place in the modern world."" It is precisely this invitation that will, I hope 
to show, lead us to discover in the American Constitution a fund of dual- 
istic theory and practice that has something distinctive to contribute to 
humanity's enduring quest for self-government. Right now, though, I am 
more concerned to explain why Pocock's work has not generally been read 
to invite this inquiry. 
The problem is that it is impossible to deny Hartz' basic point about 
America, especially as the country evolves through the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries: Liberalism is central to American political identity. 
On the historiographic level, this perception occasions a dismal kind of 
dating game-in which the debate concerns the precise moment that the 
(neo-)classical republican ideal was conquered by the increasingly aggres- 
sive forces of liberalism. Perhaps it was the Founding Fathers themselves 
who killed the republican spirit with their new Constitution? Perhaps the 
Spirit staggered onward in a variety of nineteenth and twentieth century 
deviations?" Whatever remains obscure about the precise locations) of 
the corpus delicti, one thing seems clear enough: The ghost of republican- 
ism has long since deserted the center of American life, and liberalism has 
now become hegemonic. 
When this diagnosis becomes self-consciously normative, it leads in one 
of two directions. On the one hand, some despair at the thought of reviv- 
ing republicanism and simply proclaim their estrangement from the domi- 
nant "liberalism;"57 others more hopefully seek to use republicanism as a 
tool for moving "beyond liberalism.""" 
55. See J. POCOCK, supra note 50, at 506-52. 
56. Suzanna Sherry has a wonderful footnote that accurately summarizes the present state of 
historical perplexity concerning the putative death of the republican spirit in America: 
See, e.g., G. Wood, [The Creation of the American Republic] at 606 (1787 and the adoption of 
the Constitution signaled "the end of classical politics"); L. Banning, The Jeffersonian Persua- 
sion: Evolution of a Party Ideology (1978) (liberalism triumphed no earlier than the end of the 
War of 1812); R. Ketcham, Presidents Above Party: The First American Presidency, 
1789-1829 (1984) (classical politics ended with rise of Jacksonian democracy); D. Howe, The 
Political Culture of the American Whigs 301-05 (1979) (republican or Whig values lasted 
until after Civil War); Ross, The Liberal Tradition Revisited and the Republican Tradition 
Addressed, in New Directions in American Intellectual History 116, 122-29 (J. Highham & 
P. Conkin eds. 1979) (republicanism lingered through 1880's); J. Pocock, [The Machiavellian 
Moment], at 526-45 (classical influence and awareness of the "Machiavellian moment" con- 
tinues to present day); cf. M. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860, at 
253 (1977) ("Law, once conceived of as . . . a paramount expression of the moral sense of the 
community, had come [by 1850] to be thought of as facilitative of individual desires...."). 
Sherry, supra note 45, at 551 n.23. 
57. This seems to be Pocock's own view. See, for example, his poorly concealed outrage at the fact 
that a Marxist critic could confuse him for a "neoliberal," or even for an American. Pocock, Between 
Gog and Magog: The Republican Thesis and the Ideologica Americana, 48 J. HIST. IDEAS 325 
(1987). Within the law, this is the tack taken, by and large, in M. TUSHNET, supra note 47. See the 
perceptive review essay by Fallon, What Is Republicanism, and Is It Worth Reviving?, 102 HARV. L. 
REV. 1695, 1703-15 (1989). 
58. See, e.g., Sherry, supra note 45. 
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c. Liberal Republicanism 
I choose to do neither. Instead, I mean to question the dichotomy be- 
tween liberalism and republicanism, Hartz and Pocock, which makes a 
choice seem necessary.59 This requires, among other things, a redefinition 
of relevant terms. No synthesis will be possible so long as we allow two 
different currents of thought to masquerade under the liberal label. The 
first is better called libertarianism and has recently enjoyed something of a 
revival, among philosophers at least, in the work of Robert Nozick and 
David Gauthier.60 These writers come close to expressing the kind of 
"liberal" views that many "new republicans" seek to repudiate. Thus, 
Nozick and Gauthier outdo Locke in reasoning from a "state of nature" 
inhabited by isolated individuals who claim natural rights to property and 
contract and deny the authority of the state to disturb their peaceful enjoy- 
ment of the hard-earned fruits of their possessive individualism. Indeed, if 
these libertarian views exhausted the liberal tradition, I would agree that 
my effort to transcend the Hartz/Pocock dichotomy would be foolish and 
that the rise of libertarianismsm" in nineteenth- and twentieth-century 
America meant the death of republicanism. 
We should not allow the polemical use of L-words, however, to divert 
attention from a second strand of liberal thought. This kind of liberalism 
does not look upon people as abstract individuals, divorced from their so- 
cial contexts, nor does it embrace the notion of "natural rights" to prop- 
erty and contract, nor does it treat politics as if it were beneath the con- 
tempt of all but knaves and fools.6' Instead, it insists that the foundation 
of personal liberty is a certain kind of political life-one requiring the 
ongoing exertions of a special kind of citizenry. Rather than grounding 
personal freedom on some putatively prepolitical "state of nature," this 
kind of liberalism makes the cultivation of liberal citizenship central to its 
enterprise. Since this is the view of people like John Dewey, John Stuart 
Mill, and John Rawls,"' it seems odd to define liberalism in a way that 
makes the very possibility of liberal republicanism seem a contradiction in 
terms. 
I am greatly encouraged, then, by the fact that others-most notably, 
Frank Michelman and Cass Sunstein-have recently emphasized the im- 
59. Liberalism and republicanism are treated in dichotomous fashion by M. TUSHNET, supra 
note 47; Horwitz, Republicanism and Liberalism in American Constitutional Thought, 29 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 57, 66-67 (1987); Sherry, supra note 45, at 544-47. Critiques of this dichotomous 
treatment may be found in Fallon, supra note 57, at 1704-13, and Simon, The New Republicanism: 
Generosity of Spirit in Search of Something to Say, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 83, 86-90 (1987). 
60. See R. NozICK, supra note 25; D. GAUTHIER, MORALITY BY AGREEMENT (1986). 
61. Or "rent-seekers" as they are called in the economistic jargon now fashionable in academic 
libertarian circles. 
62. See J. DEWEY, LIBERALISM AND SOCIAL ACTION (1935); J.S. MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON 
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT ch. 3 (1861); Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysi- 
cal, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 223 (1985). Much of my own work tries to build on this tradition. See B. 
ACKERMAN, supra note 32; Ackerman, Why Dialogue?, 86 J. PHIL. 5 (1989). 
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portance of transcending the sharp dichotomy between liberalism and re- 
publicanism that is threatening to become a banality of constitutional 
scholarship." Nor would it be right to treat liberal republicanism as some 
recent scholarly invention. To the contrary, it is possible to trace the ori- 
gins of this kind of liberalism to the Founding itself. Thus, as I have 
argued elsewhere,64 a reader of the Federalist Papers will search in vain 
for an elaborate description of a "state of nature," or a penetrating analy- 
sis of our "natural rights," Lockean or otherwise. These matters simply 
do not gain the sustained attention of Madison, Hamilton, and Jay as 
they try to convince their fellow Americans to support the proposed Con- 
stitution. What does bulk large in the Federalist is a profound diagnosis 
of the prospects and pathologies of citizenship in the modern world. This 
is not because the Founders thought that citizenship was everything and 
private rights were nothing. It was because they believed that the fate of 
private freedom in America, and much else besides, were dependent upon 
a realistic appreciation of what could, and what could not, be expected of 
American citizens. The liberal idea of citizenship is not only central to my 
interepretation of the Founding; it is-also crucial to my view of the subse- 
quent course of American history. 
The basic pattern of constitutional development presented here chal- 
lenges both Hartzian and Pocockian paradigms. Against Hartz, I shall 
deny that America has been living for two centuries in some Lockean 
time-warp, without serious politics or significant ideological transforma- 
tion. American history cannot be understood without confronting the revo- 
lutionary reforms that, over time, have reworked our constitutional iden- 
tity as a nation in very fundamental ways. Against Pocock,6" I shall deny 
that the character of this centuries-long development can be most in- 
sightfully described as a decline from eighteenth-century republicanism to 
twentieth-century liberalism. Instead, American history has a cyclical pat- 
tern which we will learn to identify as the characteristic product of a 
liberal republican citizenry. One part of the cycle is characterized by nor- 
mal politics, during which most citizens keep a relatively disengaged eye 
on the to-and-fro in Washington D.C. while they attend to more personal 
63. This theme is explicit in Sunstein's recent Beyond the Republican Revival, supra note 46, at 
1566-71, and is, I believe, implicit in Michelman's recent explorations as well. See supra note 44. 
64. See Storrs, supra note 7, at 1020-31. 
65. Perhaps I am being unfair to Pocock here. As Sherry indicates, Pocock has been more alert 
than most to the survival of republican forms and ideals in twentieth-century life. See Sherry, supra 
note 45. Nonetheless, I think it plain that he continues to number himself "among the intellectuals 
. . .[whose] mood is and has long been Tocquevillean; they accept the primacy of liberalism but 
proceed at once to turn that thesis against itself, asking pressingly whether a society which is liberal et 
praetera nihil can satisfy the deeper demands of the human (or the Western) spirit." Pocock, supra 
note 57, at 337. Rather than inviting us to reflect on the possibility of synthesizing liberalism and 
republicanism into a holistic understanding of American political identity (as, pace Pocock, did Toc- 
queville), Pocock continues to insist that "the republican thesis is not part of a hypostasized liberalism 
but has been treated as an attack upon it." Id. 
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concerns. While this relative passivity meets with the predictable disap- 
proval of political activists who hope to transform the status quo, they find 
that their appeals to the People for a transformative politics are regularly 
rebuffed at the polls in favor of politics-as-usual. Then, for a wide variety 
of reasons, one or another transformative appeal begins to engage the at- 
tention of a wider audience. Often it requires a generation or more of 
preparatory work before a constitutional critique gains the mobilized sup- 
port of enough citizens to push it onto the center stage of American politi- 
cal life. Even then, its success is hardly guaranteed. Long years of mobili- 
zation may serve only to reveal that a majority of American citizens reject 
a fundamental reworking of the status quo. 
In contrast to these moments of failed constitutional politics, there have 
been times when political movements have mobilized popular consent to 
new constitutional solutions-most notably the periods of Reconstruction 
and New Deal discussed in the next Part. The important point here is to 
see how the cycle of normal politics/ constitutional politics/ normal pol 
. . . invites us to rethink competing paradigms of American history. Per- 
haps we have been premature in announcing the disintegration of the civic 
republican tradition in America? Perhaps the distinctive cycle of Ameri- 
can constitutional development lives on to the present day? Perhaps liberal 
citizens have not yet abandoned that intermittent involvement with Ameri- 
can politics which has sometimes led in the past to such great constitu- 
tional achievements? 
Which is not to deny that the spirit of dualist democracy will die if 
today's Americans fail to discover in their Constitution a living language 
for self-government. 
II. PRACTICE: THE TRANSFORMATION IN HIGHER LAWMAKING 
A. A New Professional Narrative 
A living language: This is, at any rate, the way the dualist tradition 
appears to today's lawyers and judges when they argue about the Consti- 
tution in court. These men and women are constantly speaking as if it 
were somehow self-evident that decisions made a century or two ago in 
the name of We the People should rightfully control the decisions of the 
most powerful officials in the land. The stories judges and lawyers tell 
themselves about this history have a pervasive impact upon constitutional 
government. The things that lawyers and judges allow themselves to see in 
our history affect, sometimes dramatically, what all of us can do in the 
here and now. 
When we inspect the basic structure of this professional narrative, 
moreover, we will find that it makes a good deal of sense from a dualist 
perspective. Rather than treating each year in our constitutional history 
with equal importance, the professional narrative imposes a distinctive 
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shape on the American past-a shape which expresses the distinctive per- 
spective of dualist constitutionalism. 
1. The Structure of the Deep Past 
To see my point, begin by reflecting on the shape of the deep past-a 
past so far away that no active lawyer or judge has actually lived through 
it. By reason of mortality, the line between deep past and living history is 
constantly shifting forward. As I write these words, darkness is beginning 
to settle over the interwar period. While there are still lots of legally ac- 
tive people who were young adults during the war against Hitler, those 
who were politically conscious during the Great Depression are moving 
off the stage with grim speed. The constitutional meaning of the New 
Deal will soon be determined exclusively by Americans whose first ac- 
quaintance with the facts was gained indirectly-in half-remembered con- 
versations with elders; in tenth-grade civics; in books of history, political 
science, and law. If, then, we begin with the New Deal and look back- 
wards, how does the modern professional narrative treat the first 150 
years of constitutional struggle? 
Very selectively: While 1887 is of legal interest to almost nobody nowa- 
days, the meaning the Supreme Court gives to 1787 or 1937 colors its 
entire approach to constitutional law. Specifically, our professional narra- 
tive focuses on three great turning points in our constitutional experi- 
ence-the Founding, Reconstruction, and the New Deal. It is true, of 
course, that the legal forms lawyers use to recall each of these great turn- 
ing points differ from one another. In memorializing the constitutional 
politics of the Founding, we turn primarily to the text of the original 
Constitution and its early amendments, though cases like Marbury are 
also given considerable importance. In memorializing Reconstruction, the 
three great Amendments provide the central focus. In recalling the consti- 
tutional triumph of the national welfare state during the 1930's, lawyers 
speak of the repudiation of Lochner by a set of transformative opinions 
issued in the wake of the "switch in time" of 1937. Yet, despite these 
differences in legal form, judges and lawyers take the meaning of all three 
pivotal constitutional solutions with high seriousness. Lochner, as inter- 
preted through the lens of the New Deal, is a more potent constitutional 
symbol than many of the clauses left to us by the Fourteenth Amendment 
(think of the fate of the Amendment's solemn guarantee of "privileges and 
immunities" to all citizens of the United States). Indeed, it is a fair ques- 
tion whether judges worry more about repeating the mistakes of the Loch- 
ner era than they do about enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment's re- 
quirements of "due process" and "equal protection." From Carolene 
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Products" in 1938 to Bowers v. Hardwick7 in 1986, judges and lawyers 
have been constantly treating the "switch-in-time" in 1937 as the event 
separating the modern republic from earlier eras of constitutional 
law-just as the ratification of the Civil War Amendments marks a simi- 
lar break between the law of the early republic and the law of the middle 
republic. If we look at the way practical people argue about the Constitu- 
tion in courtrooms and assembly halls today, we find that they have in- 
vested the symbols emerging from the Civil War and the Great Depres- 
sion with quite extraordinary jurisgenerativity, despite the different legal 
forms-case names like Lochner, textual phrases like "equal protec- 
tion"-within which these transformative events are recalled. 
If, however, we turn from legal practice to constitutional theory, the 
1930's and the 1860's are treated as if they were very different kinds of 
events. Theorists have no trouble recognizing that the Reconstruction 
Republicans led the People to add new principles to the fund of our 
higher law. In contrast, the reigning official theory denies to the New 
Deal a similar kind of constitutional creativity. We use a myth of redis- 
covery to describe the switch-in-time-pretending that the constitutional 
foundations of modern activist government can be firmly rooted in deci- 
sions made in the Founding era, rather than in the struggles by twentieth- 
century Americans to rework the terms of their then-traditional constitu- 
tional identity. The next two Parts argue that this narrative turn fails to 
do justice to the facts of our higher lawmaking experience and mystifies 
the modern practice of judicial review.68 
2. The Bigger Picture 
Before proceeding, it is best to put the present exercise in perspective. A 
critique and reconstruction of the myth of rediscovery can only serve as an 
initial stage of a larger project in narrative reappraisal. While Founding, 
Reconstruction, and New Deal are the three pivotal turning points in the 
modern legal understanding of the deep past, they are hardly the only 
historical exercises in constitutional politics that are important. To struc- 
ture the bigger story, I shall say that the Founding, Reconstruction, and 
New Deal each inaugurated a distinctive constitutional regime of public 
values and institutional relationships that maintain a basic continuity until 
the next regime change. Each of the regimes, however, was importantly 
transformed by constitutional movements during its existence. Thus, the 
early Republic founded by the Federalists was modified significantly by 
66. United States v. Carotene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). I have tried to situate 
Carotene in its historical context, as well as speculate about its future, in Ackerman, Beyond Carolene 
Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985). 
67. 478 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1986) (interpreting 1937 with aid of myth of rediscovery). 
68. For all our other differences, this seems to be a crucial point I share with Morton Horwitz. 
See Horwitz, supra note 59, at 61-63. 
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the Jeffersonian and Jacksonian exercises in constitutional politics before 
it was shattered by the rise of the Republican Party in the 1850's.9 The 
middle Republic established by the Republicans during Reconstruction 
experienced its greatest episode of constitutional politics during the 1890's, 
climaxing in the decisive defeat of the Populists in the Bryan-McKinley 
election of 1896.70 While this election stands as a marker of a failed con- 
stitutional moment, the Progressive and women's movements later did 
gain significant, if more limited, modifications in the pre-existing Repub- 
lican constitution.71 
Jeffersonians, Jacksonians, Progressives: These movements, as well as 
others, have made enduring contributions to modern constitutional law-if 
not quite of the same pervasive and deep-cutting type as the Founding, 
Reconstruction, or New Deal. I defer them here because a serious assess- 
ment will overburden an article that is already ponderous enough. 
So much for the deep past that lies on the other side of the New Deal. 
But what of the lived experience on our side of the historical divide? 
While the 1930's witnessed the birth agony of the modern republic, there 
have been many efforts to mobilize the American people since then. As in 
previous eras, these exercises in popular sovereignty have had a checkered 
career. The single greatest triumph of constitutional politics has been the 
civil rights movement-whose successful mobilization of citizen energies in 
the 1950's and 1960's transformed the initial meaning of Brown (to be 
discussed at greater length later72), into the constitutional symbol of a re- 
newed American commitment to equality-which other subordinated 
groups have sought to extend and deepen. For the rest,73 the modern Re- 
public has experienced a series of failed constitutional moments: Most ob- 
viously, the McCarthyites failed in the 1950's, the New Left failed in the 
1960's, and the New Right failed in the 1980's74 to gain the broad and 
considered support for their large transformative ambitions that the dual- 
69. While more work will be required to put these two exercises in constitutional politics into 
dualistic perspective, the Holmes Devise histories usefully state many of the relevant constitutional 
facts. See G. HASKINS & H. JOHNSON, FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN MARSHALL 1801-15, at 
1-98 (1981); C. SWISHER, THE TANEY PERIOD 13-245 (1974). 
70. See L. GOODWYN, DEMOCRATIC PROMISE (1976) (describing movement); J. SUNDQUIST, 
DYNAMICS OF THE PARTY SYSTEM 120-54 (1973) (describing political outcome of defeat of 
Populism). 
71. Theda Skocpol's forthcoming work casts important light on the relationship between the 
women's movement and progressivism. See Skocpol, Soldiers and Mothers (unpublished manuscript 
on file with author). 
72. See infra text accompanying notes 166-69. 
73. I am speaking here of constitutional politics directed toward domestic affairs. There is another 
story concerning the rise of America as a world power-moving from McKinley and the Spanish- 
American War, Wilson and the League of Nations, Roosevelt and the post-War consolidation of the 
national security apparatus, Vietnam and the War Powers Act-that also must be given critical anal- 
ysis to gain an overall view of the relationship between constitutional politics and constitutional law 
during the twentieth century. 
74. My interpretation of this most recent failure may be found in Ackerman, Transformative 
Appointments, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1164 (1988). 
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ist tradition requires before a new constitutional solution gains the author- 
ity of We the People. While these, and other, movements have had a sub- 
stantial impact on statutory law, their contributions to our higher law can 
be easily exaggerated. 
I defer these crucial matters, however, because I think that our failure 
to come to terms with the birth agony of the modern republic in the 
1930's has deprived us of an adequate vocabulary to discuss these failed 
moments in dualist terms. The New Deal, like Reconstruction before it, 
transformed not merely the structure of normal politics but the methods of 
constitutional change as well. In sharp contrast to movements ranging 
from progressivism to prohibitionism in the middle republic, none of our 
modern exercises in constitutional politics has successfully completed the 
higher lawmaking track laid down by the Federalists. Instead, post-New 
Deal attempts at fundamental reform have been structured through a 
higher lawmaking process that owes more to Franklin Roosevelt's initia- 
tives than to James Madison's. Under this process, a transformative move- 
ment's claim to speak for the People is not defined and tested through a 
Federalist dialogue between assemblies sitting on the national and state 
levels of government like the one described in Article Five of the original 
Constitution; instead, the movement is required to run the gauntlet of a 
more nationalized process in which President, Congress, Court, and voters 
interact with one another over time to test the constitutional credibility of 
the movement's mandate to speak for the People on behalf of its trans- 
formative initiative. As we shall see, this more centralized process has its 
historic roots in Republican Reconstruction." Nonetheless, in response to 
the crisis of the Great Depression, it was the New Deal Democrats who 
adapted these Republican precedents in a way that enhanced the role of 
the presidency. It seems wise, then, to study these New Deal precedents in 
their own right before we begin to consider how they have been used over 
our lifetimes, and how we should use them in the future.76 
3. Beyond Formalism 
Begin by considering how far the legal profession has allowed its story 
about the New Deal to diverge from those told by other serious students 
of the subject. Rather than endorsing a myth of rediscovery, political 
scientists and historians have had no trouble confronting the "constitu- 
tional revolution" of the 1930's. Nobody supposes, of course, that the New 
Deal was a "total" revolution comparable to the Bolshevik upheaval of 
1917. Rather than aiming for the utter annihilation of the ancien regime, 
75. Indeed, the roots of the process go even deeper-to the higher lawmaking exercises of Jeffer- 
son and Jackson. See Discovering the Constitution, supra note 1, at ch. 3. But we can ignore these 
early precedents in this abbreviated sketch. 
76. For some preliminary reflections, see Ackerman, supra note 74. 
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it was a characteristic American effort at revolutionary reform,77 mixing 
new and old together to lay the foundation for the constitutional order we 
take for granted today. Even when one gives full measure to the way in 
which the New Deal creatively adapted older traditions, however, the pro- 
fessional narrative now dominant among lawyers is anomalous. In any 
other field but law, it would be laughable to assert that Alexander Hamil- 
ton and John Marshall did all the really tough work in elaborating the 
constitution of the modern welfare state, and that Franklin Roosevelt and 
the New Deal Congress were basically acting out a vision of active na- 
tional government already fully established by the People in the aftermath 
of the American Revolution. Instead, the important scholarly enterprise in 
history and political science is to understand how the new structures and 
values of the 1930's interacted with older elements of the American tradi- 
tion to form the modern constitution.78 
How, then, to account for the persistent tendency of legal narrative to 
deny the obvious and to suppress the creative side of the New Deal? The 
answer in two words is Article Five. For reasons never elaborated, mod- 
ern lawyers suppose that there is only one way the New Dealers could 
have added something new to the fabric of our constitutional law, and that 
is to enact constitutional amendments by strictly following the rules laid 
down by the Philadelphia Convention in the fifth Article of their Found- 
ing text. On this formalist view, the question of the New Deal's constitu- 
tional creativity can be assessed definitively with the flick of an eye. Just 
quickly scan the familiar series of Article Five amendments: Behold, in 
1933, the Twenty-first Amendment repealed Prohibition; in 1951, the 
Twenty-second Amendment forbade the President from seeking a third 
elected term in office. Apparently, not much constitutional creation going 
on during the central decades of the twentieth century! 
Given this formalist view, there seems to be only one way to express the 
transformative character of the New Deal: the myth of rediscovery. Since, 
by formalist hypothesis, the New Dealers failed to create anything really 
new, we must rationalize their achievements by pretending that they were 
acting out constitutional lines authorized by the Founders, and that it was 
merely the perversity of Peckham & Co. that had allowed these Ancient 
Truths to be obscured for so long. 
If, then, we are to consider our present narrative in a critical spirit, it is 
clear where we should begin: with the formalist view of Article Five that 
makes the present myth of rediscovery seem the only plausible way to 
mark the birth of modern constitutional law. Where did we get this view 
of Article Five anyway? 
77. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37. 
78. See, e.g., K. DAVIS, FDR: THE NEW DEAL YEARS (1986); B. KARL, THE UNEASY STATE 
(1983); W. LEUCHTENBERG, IN THE SHADOW OF FDR (1983); T. Lowi, THE PERSONAL PRESI- 
DENT: POWER INVESTED. PROMISE UNFULFILLED (1985). 
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Not from the Supreme Court. Indeed, the principal message of this 
Part is that the enemy is us, and that we are entirely free to rethink the 
formalist premises that have led us to embrace legal fictions that might 
make old-time common lawyers blush. My argument will be in two 
stages. The first consists of a study of the Supreme Court's landmark 
1939 decision in Coleman v. Miller.7 Rather than providing authoritative 
support for the view that all constitutional change must be governed in 
strict accord with the rules of Article Five, the Court's remarkable opinion 
expressly repudiates the formalist preconceptions that nevertheless hold 
sway over the legal mind a half-century later. 
The second stage of my argument uses Coleman in a more constructive 
way-by building on some of its remarkable insights into our higher law- 
making experience. These insights, if pursued energetically, lead to a very 
different view of our higher lawmaking history. We will follow the 
Court's lead in discovering that it was the Reconstruction Republicans 
who, in their great Amendments, first ran off the higher lawmaking tracks 
laid down by the Federalists in Article Five. After describing the more 
nationalistic way in which the Republicans proposed and validated their 
great Amendments, we shall be in a position to consider how this new 
Republican process allows for a reinterpretation of the Democratic trans- 
formation of the 1930's. Rather than disguising this transformation with a 
myth of rediscovery, we shall explore the ways in which the New Deal 
Democrats creatively adapted higher lawmaking precedents from Recon- 
struction in their own effort to speak for We the People. The results of all 
this work will be a view of Reconstruction Republicans and New Deal 
Democrats that makes them seem more like the Founding Federalists than 
the traditional narrative allows. All three exercises in constitutional polit- 
ics creatively adapted higher lawmaking procedures, no less than sub- 
stance, in winning constitutional authority to speak in the name of We the 
People. The Federalist rules in Article Five should continue to serve as 
the first word on the subject of higher lawmaking; but they are not the 
last word, and it is past time for us to recognize this. 
B. The Court's Rejection of Formalism 
1. Coleman v. Miller 
Coleman could hardly have come before the Court at a more illuminat- 
ing moment. It was initially argued in October 1938, little more than a 
year after the Supreme Court's "switch in time." It was decided by a 
bench composed of Justices with very different views of the New Deal 
achievement. When the opinions came down in June of 1939, four of the 
Justices who had weathered the court-packing crisis had left the bench, 
79. 307 U.S. 433 (1939). 
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allowing Roosevelt to replace them with partisans of the New Deal 
revolution-Black, Reed, Frankfurter, and Douglas. Of the remaining 
Justices, three were judicial moderates who had been at the very center of 
the court-packing crisis-Hughes, Stone, and Roberts. This left only two 
conservatives-Butler and McReynolds-to recall the constitutional prin- 
ciples of the Republican era. Each of these three groups contributed a 
substantive opinion:80 Butler's dissent is joined by McReynolds; Black's 
concurrence, by his fellow New Dealers Frankfurter and Douglas, as well 
as Justice Roberts; Chief Justice Hughes provides an "opinion of the 
Court."8" 
The facts of the case dramatized the higher lawmaking problems left in 
the wake of 1937. The dispute concerned the status of a Child Labor 
Amendment proposed by Congress in 1924 in response to two landmark 
Old Court decisions: Hammer v. Dagenhart82 and Bailey v. Drexel Fur- 
niture Company.83 In these decisions, the Court denied that Congress had 
the constitutional power to eliminate one of the most obvious abuses of an 
unregulated market economy: the exploitation of child labor. While the 
Court did not bar individual states from banning this practice, its commit- 
ment to federalism and limited national government led it to invalidate 
congressional efforts to eliminate child labor on a national basis. Thus, the 
majority opinions in these cases exemplified the constitutional jurispru- 
dence of the Lochner era. When the second of these opinions was handed 
down in 1922, Calvin Coolidge was in the White House and the partisans 
of the activist state were hardly in a political position to threaten the con- 
servative justices with court-packing. In 1924, however, they did manage 
to convince two-thirds of both Houses to propose a Child Labor Amend- 
ment that appealed to the People to override the Court's conservative 
jurisprudence. 
Not that this Amendment proposed to sweep away the fundamental 
principles of reigning judicial doctrine, in the manner of the New Deal 
revolution. Nor did it even aim to put the People on record as committed 
to a ban on child labor; instead, it merely granted Congress the "power to 
limit, regulate, and prohibit the labor of persons under eighteen years of 
age."84 Even this modest proposal met an overwhelmingly hostile recep- 
tion from the states. By mid-1927, no fewer than twenty-six states, includ- 
80. In addition, Justice Frankfurter wrote an opinion, joined by three other Justices, denying that 
the petitioners had standing to bring the case in the first place. Since these four did not gain a major- 
ity for their effort to head off judicial consideration, they proceeded to consider the merits, in a con- 
curring opinion by Justice Black which we shall be considering shortly. 
81. While Hughes is officially described as presenting "the Opinion of the Court," Coleman, 307 
U.S. at 435, Black's "concurrence" only announces his agreement with the "result reached, but for 
somewhat different reasons." Id. at 457. As we shall see, the point at which Black marks his disagree- 
ment is highly significant. 
82. 247 U.S. 251 (1918). 
83. 259 U.S. 20 (1922). 
84. 43 Stat. 670, 670 (1924). 
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ing Kansas, had formally rejected the Amendment, while only five had 
ratified it.85 Beginning in 1933, a new ratification movement was begun, 
yielding 14 affirmations in 1933 alone, and eight more by 1937.86 When 
Kansas voted to join this list in January 1937, state legislators who op- 
posed ratification challenged this decision all the way to the Supreme 
Court. In their interpretation, Article Five did not allow the Kansas legis- 
lature of 1937 to rethink its rejection of the 1920's; nor did the Article 
permit a valid ratification by any state a decade after it had been so deci- 
sively repudiated by twenty-six states.87 The Court, in short, should de- 
clare the proposed Amendment dead and require Congress to propose it 
another time if it hoped to legitimate this particular activist measure. 
When the Kansans began their lawsuit in January of 1937, there was 
nothing odd about these demands. At that time the Court had given no 
indication that it was abandoning the constitutional principles elaborated 
in cases like Hammer and Drexel. Indeed, these principles had been ring- 
ingly reaffirmed very recently.88 So long as the Court held firm, an Article 
Five amendment was a necessary condition for the national abolition of 
child labor. The Court's "switch" in the Spring of 1937, however, had 
transformed Coleman's meaning. If the Court agreed with the Kansans 
that Congress had to pass a valid constitutional amendment to prohibit 
child labor, it would be casting doubt on the seriousness of its "switch" 
two years before. 
So far as Butler and McReynolds were concerned, this was hardly a 
reason for treating the Kansans' complaint lightly. Since these two con- 
servatives never recognized the legitimacy of the "switch in time," the 
Kansans' complaint raised a live issue: The Lochner era decisions invali- 
dating activist national interventions on such "local matters" as child la- 
bor remained good law until Congress and the states managed to enact a 
valid Article Five amendment. Moreover, the two holdovers had little 
trouble finding that Congress' proposed Child Labor Amendment had 
lapsed after its massive repudiation in the late 1920's, and that Article 
Five required its reapproval by two-thirds of Congress before it could 
again be considered open to the states for ratification.89 
85. Coleman, 307 U.S. at 436. 
86. Id. at 451. 
87. The case also raised other, more technical, issues, which can be ignored for present purposes. 
88. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 
(1936). 
89. For Butler and McReynolds, the governing precedent was Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368 
(1921), decided by a unanimous Court only 16 years previously. According to Dillon, the mere fact 
that Article Five was silent on the question of how long a proposed amendment can remain alive was 
"not in itself controlling; for with the Constitution, as with a statute or other written instrument, what 
is reasonably implied is as much a part of it as what is expressed." Id. at 373 (citations omitted). In 
language worth repeating, Dillon then called upon fundamental dualistic principles to elaborate the 
Article's meaning: 
We do not find anything in the Article which suggests that an amendment once proposed is to 
be open to ratification for all time, or that ratification in some of the States may be separated 
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Perhaps more surprisingly, the seven Justices who endorsed the "switch 
in time" could not bring themselves explicitly to disagree with the con- 
servatives' contention that the New Dealers were playing fast and loose 
with Article Five in reviving a constitutional initiative that had been so 
roundly rejected a decade earlier. At the same time, they were entirely 
unwilling to join the two conservatives in insisting that Congress would 
have to start the formal Article Five process again if it ever hoped to gain 
regulatory authority over child labor. Rather than make any such de- 
mand, these seven Justices had been working hard over the past two years 
reassuring the nation that they would no longer defend the Republican 
vision of limited government expressed in cases like Hammer v. 
Dagenhart. 
Despite these steps, the Court remained on probation. It was not yet 
absolutely clear to the President, Congress, or the nation at large whether 
the Court's switch of 1937 was merely a tactical retreat or the beginning 
of a serious effort by the Justices to build solid constitutional foundations 
for activist national government. These doubts about the Court would 
have surfaced if three of the seven New Deal justices had joined Butler 
and McReynolds in reopening the question of congressional power to 
eradicate child labor.90 How, then, were the members of the majority to 
avoid joining the conservatives in casting a cloud on the legitimacy of the 
New Deal without offending their legal consciences by declaring that the 
New Dealers had been playing by the rules in resuscitating Congress' 
from that in others by many years and yet be effective. We do find that which strongly sug- 
gests the contrary. First, proposal and ratification are not treated as unrelated acts but as 
succeeding steps in a single endeavor, the natural inference being that they are not to be widely 
separated in time. Secondly, it is only when there is deemed to be a necessity therefor that 
amendments are to be proposed, the reasonable implication being that when proposed they are 
to be considered and disposed of presently. Thirdly, as ratification is but the expression of the 
approbation of the people. . ., there is a fair implication that it must be sufficiently contempo- 
raneous . . . to reflect the will of the people in all sections at relatively the same period, which 
of course ratification scattered through a long series of years would not do. 
Id. at 374-75. 
90. It was, of course, open to the New Dealers on the Court to uphold the Kansans' complaint 
about the Child Labor Amendment, while trying to soften the blow with some dicta casting doubt on 
the vitality of Hammer and Drexel. But dicta are just that; and the New Dealers' words of reassur- 
ance would have had to compete with very different dicta, provided by Butler and McReynolds, 
stressing the need for Congress to begin the Article Five process again before it could take on the task 
of regulating child labor. 
The anxiety raised by such a mixed judicial chorus can be appreciated when it is recalled that the 
New Deal Congress had just enacted the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938-without any attempt to 
gain authorization through Article Five. The image of the New Dealers joining with Butler and 
McReynolds in Coleman would surely have put this latest piece of New Deal activism under a consti- 
tutional cloud: Despite the reassuring dicta, would the Fair Labor Standards Act survive judicial 
review when its constitutional status came before the Court? Had the Justices really reformed them- 
selves? Or was the "switch in time" of 1937 merely a tactical retreat, allowing the Justices some 
breathing room while they waited for a propitious moment to renew their constitutional assault on the 
activist welfare state? 
Given these questions, it is perfectly understandable why the New Deal judges believed that dicta 
would not adequately reassure their audience if they voted to uphold the Kansans' construction of 
Article Five. 
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1924 initiative after its emphatic rejection by the People during 1925 and 
1926? 
Much to the Court's credit, this question provoked the deepest judicial 
consideration of the law of higher lawmaking in American history. In re- 
turning to first principles, the New Deal majority challenged the formalist 
approach to Article Five that modern lawyers somehow manage to take 
for granted today. Speaking for the Court, Chief Justice Hughes explicitly 
denied that constitutionalists should look upon the rules of Article Five in 
the same legalistic way they approach other parts of the constitutional 
text. Instead, he declared that the central issues in the Kansans' case 
raised "political questions" most appropriately resolved by the political 
branches, not by judges. 
This judicial declaration was entirely unprecedented. For the first 150 
years of its history, the Court had approached Article Five in the same 
way it dealt with other parts of the Founding text-reading the rules in 
light of its best interpretation of their underlying principles and giving the 
normal juridical effect to these textual interpretations." In calling the Ar- 
ticle "political," the Court was not mindlessly repeating a traditional 
formula. Instead, the Kansans' effort to force the New Deal to conform to 
the rules of Article Five prompted an agonizing reappraisal of formalist 
presuppositions. 
But the Court did more than agonize. It placed its present predicament 
in historical perspective, by recalling some facts about an earlier constitu- 
tional transformation. Hughes' act of recollection did not, moreover, im- 
plicate some incidental feature of the constitutional tradition. Instead, it 
involved the greatest act of higher lawmaking since the Founding itself. 
For the first (and only) time in judicial history, the Court brought some of 
the harsh truths involved in the legitimation of the Fourteenth Amend- 
ment to the very surface of the United States Reports: that the then- 
existing Southern governments rejected the Fourteenth Amendment when 
it was first proposed; that Congress responded by destroying these dissent- 
ing governments and gaining the assent of new ones to the Fourteenth 
Amendment; that, when these new Southern governments sought to with- 
draw their predecessors' rejections, Secretary of State Seward first issued a 
Proclamation expressing "doubt and uncertainty" whether the Amend- 
ment had been ratified; and that it was only upon the express demand of 
Congress that Seward finally issued a second Proclamation unequivocally 
pronouncing the Amendment valid.'2 
After reciting these extraordinary facts, the Chief Justice refused to af- 
91. As Walter Dellinger puts it: "From Hollingsworth v. Virginia in 1798 through United States 
v. Sprague in 1931, the Court proved quite capable of resolving issues arising under article V." 
Dellinger, The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change: Rethinking the Amendment Process, 97 HARV. 
L. REV. 386, 416-17 (1983) (citations omitted). 
92. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 448-49 (1939). 
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firm that the Reconstruction Republicans played by the rules of Article 
Five in validating the Fourteenth Amendment. All the Court was willing 
to say was this: 
This decision by the political departments of the Government as to 
the validity of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment has been 
accepted. 
We think that in accordance with this historic precedent the ques- 
tion of the efficacy of ratifications by state legislatures, in the light of 
previous rejection or attempted withdrawal, should be regarded as a 
political question pertaining to the political departments, with the 
ultimate authority in the Congress in the exercise of its control over 
the promulgation of the adoption of the amendment.93 
Guided by its rediscovery of the formally problematic aspect of the Re- 
publican past, the Court proceeds to make short work of its Democratic 
present. As in the 1860's, so in the 1930's, the Court refused to channel the 
revolutionary shift in opinion about the welfare state through a formalistic 
interpretation of the rules of Article Five. Instead, it left to the "political 
departments" the decision whether the People of Kansas in 1937 might 
properly announce that they had changed their mind about the Child La- 
bor Amendment. 
Indeed, even this understates the extent to which Coleman repudiates a 
formalistic approach to the law of higher lawmaking. In writing his 
"opinion of the Court," Chief Justice Hughes followed the familiar prac- 
tice of restricting himself to the narrow questions94 raised by the facts of 
the Kansans' case, leaving it open for future Courts to decide that other 
aspects of Article Five allowed for a more legalistic approach. It was pre- 
cisely this lawyerly caution that provoked New Dealers Black, Frank- 
furter, and Douglas, together with Owen Roberts (who had played the 
key role in the 1937 switch) to write a special concurrence. Speaking for 
this group, Black issued a sweeping declaration that the amendment pro- 
cess is " 'political' in its entirety. . .and is not subject to judicial guidance, 
control or interference at any point.""' 
2. Taking Up the Challenge 
For fifty years now, Coleman has served as the "leading case" on Arti- 
cle Five, the first place a well-trained lawyer should look in her search for 
enlightenment. Despite the New Deal Court's remarkable insights, mod- 
ern lawyers have used Hughes' invocation of the "political question" doc- 
93. Id. at 449-50. 
94. In particular, how long may a proposed amendment remain open for ratification before it 
lapses, and whether a state like Kansas can change its mind and ratify an amendment it had previ- 
ously rejected. 
95. Coleman, 307 U.S. at 459. 
498 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 99: 453 
trine as an excuse from further thought. Worse yet, this intellectual vac- 
uum has given rise to a formalism that would have embarrassed even 
Butler and McReynolds." 
The question is whether we will continue to remain deaf to the voices 
of our constitutional past or begin to take seriously the questions that 
Coleman poses. I propose to build upon Chief Justice Hughes' suggestion 
that Reconstruction serves as the "historic precedent" most likely to illu- 
minate the higher lawmaking situation confronted by Americans in the 
1930's. My difference with Hughes lies only in the scale upon which I 
propose to elaborate his insight. Though criticized by New Dealers like 
Black, Hughes refused to make Coleman into a vehicle for some broad 
pronouncement on our higher lawmaking tradition. Instead he did no 
more than was strictly necessary to decide the narrow issues raised by the 
Kansans, mining the precedents of the 1860's only as they were relevant 
to the particular case before him. Fifty years later, there is no need for us 
to be bound so tightly to the Kansans' litigation strategies. The challenge 
is to reflect as deeply as we can about the parallels that Hughes had be- 
gun to discern between the constitutional transformations of the 1860's and 
the 1930's. 
This is easier said than done. To do the job right, we will have to 
interrogate a host of decisions in the same spirit with which I have revis- 
ited Coleman-seeking, above all, to listen to the actors as they struggle, 
often with great self-consciousness, to define and redefine the principles of 
dualist theory as they justify their constitutional practice. In attempting 
this exercise in rediscovery, we cannot allow decisions by the courts to 
occupy too much of our field of constitutional vision. During both Recon- 
struction and New Deal, the crucial decisions were often made else- 
where-by Congress, the Executive, and the people at large. As we en- 
large our field of vision, we will find Americans in these non-judicial fora 
struggling to reconcile constitutional principle and practice with an insight 
equalled only rarely in the United States Reports. Listening to these 
voices, we will come to grasp the remarkable ways in which nineteenth- 
96. Even these jurists did not commit the modern mistake of supposing that the law of higher 
lawmaking could be discovered simply by repeating the rules contained in Article Five. Instead, they 
rightly insisted that lawyers could not make sense of Article Five without interpreting it in the context 
of the Founders' theory of popular sovereignty. Like the members of the majority, they did not imag- 
ine that they could respond to the Kansans' complaint by complacently observing that the Article did 
not contain an explicit rule saying how long a Congressional proposal could remain alive before it 
lapsed. Instead, they followed a line of cases, including Dillon, which sought to answer such questions 
by considering what was necessary for a political movement to earn the authority to speak in the name 
of We the People. See supra note 89. Moreover, as a general matter the dissenters seem absolutely 
right to have insisted that "as ratification is but the expression of the approbation of the people. . .. 
there is a fair implication that it must be sufficiently contemporaneous . . . to reflect the will of the 
people in all sections at relatively the same period...." Coleman, 307 U.S. at 471-72. What they 
failed to see, and what the majority so clearly grasped, is that the People had given their approbation 
to the New Deal vision of activist government, albeit through institutional mechanisms more like those 
first elaborated during Reconstruction than those established in the Federalist period. 
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century Republicans and twentieth-century Democrats built new higher 
lawmaking procedures step-by-step out of older constitutional traditions. 
Only after undertaking this comprehensive interrogation of the sources 
can we hope to rewrite the professional narrative we presently use to triv- 
ialize the constitutional creativity of Reconstruction Republicans and New 
Deal Democrats. 
Obviously, this is not a task for a single article; while I am now finish- 
ing a book-length report, it has become apparent to me that the job, if it is 
to be done at all, cannot be the work of a single hand. The professional 
narrative can be rewritten only by the profession at large, as the result of 
a collective debate over the meaning of the documentary legacy left to us 
by the 1860's and 1930's. To get the ball rolling, I will sketch some of the 
broad patterns I have found, leaving the crucial process of detailed recon- 
struction to later work. 
C. Reconstruction and New Deal 
My argument proceeds in three steps. I begin by following Hughes in 
exploring "the historic precedents" surrounding the Civil War Amend- 
ments. This will provide us with compelling reasons to believe that the 
Reconstruction Republicans refused to follow in the higher lawmaking 
tracks set out by the Founding Federalists in 1787. The second step in- 
volves describing the "historic precedents" for higher lawmaking left in 
the wake of the Republicans' success in validating their Amendments. 
This, in turn, will allow us to take a third step, and challenge the myth 
of rediscovery that makes the New Deal seem entirely uncreative simply 
because it did not issue in Article Five amendments. For if, as the second 
step suggests, the Reconstruction Republicans provided new models for 
constitutional creation, then it is not enough to dismiss the creative aspect 
of the New Deal by remarking, with the formalist, that the New Dealers 
failed to play by the rules of Article Five. Instead, we must confront a 
new interpretive possibility: Just as the Reconstruction Republicans broke 
with the rules of Article Five to play new institutional variations on 
higher lawmaking themes, perhaps the New Deal Democrats played new 
variations on the higher lawmaking themes initially developed by the Re- 
construction Republicans? 
The third stage of the argument begins to give reasons for answering 
this question in the affirmative. Having rediscovered the institutional 
processes by which the Reconstruction Republicans defined, debated, and 
finally gained legal authority for their new constitutional solutions of the 
1860's, we shall find that these "historic precedents" bear a host of un- 
canny similarities to the institutional mechanisms through which the New 
Deal Democrats gained a similar triumph in the 1930's. Not that the 
twentieth-century Democrats were content to follow the nineteenth- 
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century Republicans in all particulars. But it is only after glimpsing the 
basic similarities between the higher lawmaking processes of the 1860's 
and the 1930's that we can begin to define the New Deal innovations with 
any clarity. 
The end result of this three-stage exercise in rediscovery will be a 
sketch of the promised revision of our professional narrative. We will 
come to see Founding Federalists, Reconstruction Republicans, and New 
Deal Democrats as engaged in enterprises that look much more like one 
another than conventional wisdom allows. Having laid the foundation for 
a constitutional narrative that self-consciously recognizes the high creativ- 
ity of three generations of constitutional politics, the essay concludes, in 
Part Three, by considering the implications of this narrative revision for 
the modern Supreme Court's effort to make sense of the Constitution in 
the aftermath of the New Deal. 
1. Refuting the Formalist 
I begin my three stage argument by elaborating on Chief Justice 
Hughes' gesture toward the dark clouds surrounding the ratification of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. As the Coleman court intimates, ten of the ex- 
isting state governments of the South, along with three border states, sol- 
emnly rejected the Republicans' initiative during the months following its 
proposal in June, 1866.97 If the Reconstruction Congress had accepted 
these rejections, it would have been obliged by the rules of Article Five to 
conclude that its proposed Amendment was dead. Thirteen rejections is a 
lot more than the nine then required to invoke the veto formally accorded 
one-quarter of the states by the rules of Article Five.98 The Reconstruc- 
tion Republicans in control of Congress, however, refused to accept this 
outcome. Instead, they passed a series of Reconstruction Acts that sought 
97. See E. MCPHERSON, THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DUR- 
ING THE PERIOD OF RECONSTRUCTION, (FROM APRIL 15, 1865, TO JULY 15, 1870), INCLUDING A 
CLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF THE LEGISLATION OF THE THIRTY-NINTH, FORTIETH, AND FORTY- 
FIRST CONGRESSES. WITH THE VOTES THEREON; TOGETHER WITH THE ACTION, CONGRESSIONAL 
AND STATE, ON THE FOURTEENTH AND FIFTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES, AND THE OTHER IMPORTANT EXECUTIVE, LEGISLATIVE, POLITICO-MILITARY, 
AND JUDICIAL FACTS OF THAT PERIOD 194 (2d ed. 1875). McPherson details the vote count in the 
ex-Confederate states: Texas (Senate, not voting; House, Oct. 13, 1866, 5 yeas, 67 nays); Georgia 
(Senate, Nov. 9,1866, 0 yeas, 36 nays; House, Nov. 9,1866, 2 yeas, 131 nays); Florida (Senate, Dec. 
3,1866, 0 yeas, 20 nays; House, Dec. 1, 1866, 0 yeas, 49 nays); Alabama (Senate, Dec. 7, 1866, 2 
yeas, 27 nays; House, Dec. 7,1866, 8 yeas, 69 nays); North Carolina (Senate, Dec. 13, 1866, 1 yea, 
44 nays; House, Dec. 13, 1866, 10 yeas, 93 nays); Arkansas (Senate, Dec. 15, 1866, 1 yea, 24 nays; 
House, Dec. 17, 1866, 2 yeas, 68 nays); South Carolina (Senate, not voting; House, Dec. 20, 1866, 1 
yea, 95 nays); Virginia (Senate, Jan. 9,1867, unanimous; House, Jan. 9, 1867, 1 for amendment); 
Mississippi (Senate, Jan. 30, 1867, 0 yeas, 27 nays; House, Jan. 25, 1867, 0 yeas, 88 nays); Louisi- 
ana (Senate, Feb. 5, 1867, unanimous; House, Feb. 6, 1867, unanimous). Three border states also 
rejected the Amendment at the time: Kentucky (Senate, Jan. 8,1867, 7 yeas, 24 nays; House, Jan. 8, 
1867, 26 yeas, 62 nays); Delaware (Senate, not voting; House, Feb. 6,1867, 6 yeas, 15 nays); Mary- 
land (Senate, Mar. 23, 1867, 4 yeas, 13 nays; House, Mar. 23, 1867, 12 yeas, 45 nays). 
98. See id. at 194. 
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nothing less than to destroy the dissenting governments of the South and 
to reconstruct them on a basis that would make ratification of the Amend- 
ment more likely-instructing the Union Army to register freed blacks as 
well as whites in the reconstructed state electorates (note that this was 
before the Fifteenth Amendment).99 
The obvious question this raises is whether congressional reconstruction 
could be justified under the clause making the United States a guarantor 
of the republican form of government in all the states.'00 Even if this diffi- 
cult problem is solved satisfactorily, it only prepares the way for a truly 
unresolvable dilemma. The impossible question arises when we see how 
the Reconstruction Act treated the new black-and-white Southern govern- 
ments even after they had organized themselves in complete compliance 
with Congress' demands. Section Five of the first Reconstruction Act de- 
nied these new democratically elected states the authority to send senators 
and representatives to Congress on an equal footing with the other states 
until they ratified the Fourteenth Amendment!'0' Now there is simply no 
way that this demand can be reconciled with the rules of Article Five. If 
these rules mean anything, they deny Congress the authority to bootstrap 
its amendments to validity by destroying dissenting governments and then 
denying congressional representation to the new ones until they accept the 
constitutional initiatives that the preceding governments found unaccept- 
99. For good overviews of the process of Reconstruction, see M. BENEDICT, A COMPROMISE OF 
PRINCIPLE: CONGRESSIONAL REPUBLICANS AND RECONSTRUCTION 1863-1869, at 210-43 (1974); 
E. FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-1877 (1988); E. McKIT- 
RICK, ANDREW JOHNSON AND RECONSTRUCTION 448-504 (1960). Section 4 of the Second Recon- 
struction Act, passed on March 23, 1867, sought to transform the Union Army into a congressional 
mechanism for reconstructing governmental authority in the South. See Second Reconstruction Act, ch. 
6, ? 4, 15 Stat. 1, 3 (1867). 
100. For a good overview of the Reconstruction debate, see W. WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE 
CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 166-243 (1972). 
101. Reconstruction Act, ch. 153, ? 5, 14 Stat. 373, 429 (1867): 
And be it further enacted, That when the people of any one of said rebel States shall have 
formed a constitution of government in conformity with the Constitution of the United States 
in all respects, framed by a convention of delegates elected by the male citizens of said State, 
twenty-one years old and upward, of whatever race, color, or previous condition, who have 
been resident in said State for one year previous to the day of such election, except such as may 
be disfranchised for participation in the rebellion or for felony at common law, and when such 
constitution shall provide that the elective franchise shall be enjoyed by all such persons as 
have the qualifications herein stated for electors of delegates, and when such constitution shall 
be ratified by a majority of the persons voting on the question of ratification who are qualified 
as electors for delegates, and when such constitution shall have been submitted to Congress for 
examination and approval, and Congress shall have approved the same, and when said State, 
by a vote of its legislature elected under said constitution, shall have adopted the amendment 
to the Constitution of the United States, proposed by the Thirty-ninth Congress, and known as 
article fourteen [emphasis added], and when said article shall have become a part of the Con- 
stitution of the United States, said State shall be declared entitled to representation in Con- 
gress, and senators and representatives shall be admitted therefrom on their taking the oath 
prescribed by law, and then and thereafter the preceding sections of this act shall be inopera- 
tive in said State: Provided, That no person excluded from the privilege of holding office by 
said proposed amendment to the Constitution of the United States, shall be eligible to election 
as a member of the convention to frame a constitution for any of said rebel States, nor shall 
any such person vote for members of such convention. 
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able. Can it be thought surprising that Secretary Seward's first Proclama- 
tion concerning the Fourteenth Amendment expressed doubts about the 
Amendment's validity when state consent had been procured under 
ground rules at such variance with those specified by Article Five?'02 
As if this were not enough, the formalist should be on notice that the 
Republican decision to play fast and loose with the rules of Article Five 
did not begin in 1868. Instead, the chain of "historic precedents" that 
mark the break with the Federalist rules begins with the Emancipation 
Proclamation of 1863.103 For present purposes, I restrict myself to a single 
additional problem, which I will call the Thirteenth-Fourteenth Amend- 
ment Paradox. The problem can be introduced with a single fact: The 
very governments Congress destroyed in response to their veto of the 
Fourteenth Amendment played a critical role in the ratification of the 
Thirteenth Amendment.104 How, then, could it be that these governments 
were legitimate enough to validate the Thirteenth but not legitimate when 
they refused to validate the Fourteenth? 
The Paradox deepens when we introduce another fact about the months 
between February and December 1865-the period during which the 
states were considering whether they would ratify the Thirteenth Amend- 
ment. As the first set of post-War governments in the South were consid- 
ering ratification, they were also selecting Senators and running elections 
for Representatives to the House. By early December, then, the 
Southerners were sending two legal signals to Washington: The first con- 
sisted of ratifications of the Thirteenth Amendment; the second, senators 
and representatives to the Thirty-ninth Congress, scheduled to convene on 
December 4, 1865. 
These two communications were treated very differently when they 
were received in Washington. On December 18, Secretary Seward pro- 
claimed the Thirteenth Amendment valid, explicitly citing the Southern 
ratifications in his official Proclamation.105 Two weeks earlier, the 
Republicans in Congress refused to seat any of the Southern representa- 
102. Seward's First Proclamation of July 20, 1868, expresses doubts about the validity of the 
Fourteenth Amendment on two scores. First, the Proclamation notes that two Northern states had 
sought to withdraw their previous assent to the Amendment. Second, Seward calls into question the 
legitimacy of the six Southern assents in his possession by listing them in a separate paragraph and 
describing them as the product of "newly constituted and newly established bodies avowing themselves 
to be and acting as the legislatures, respectively, of the States of Arkansas, Florida, North Carolina, 
Louisiana, South Carolina, and Alabama." Proclamation of William H. Seward No. 11, 15 Stat 706, 
707 (1868) (emphasis added). 
103. I present a detailed account of the entire process from the Emancipation Proclamation to 
Seward's final Proclamation on the Fourteenth Amendment in a forthcoming book. See Discovering 
the Constitution, supra note 1, at chs. 7-11. 
104. Seward counted seven of the newly elected southern legislatures among the 27 states that had 
signified their assent to the Thirteenth Amendment (Virginia, Louisiana, Arkansas, South Carolina, 
Alabama, North Carolina, Georgia). See Proclamation of William Seward No. 52, 13 Stat. 774, 775 
(1865). 
105. Id. 
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tives, and continued to deny the Southern states representation throughout 
the entire period during which the Fourteenth Amendment was proposed 
and "ratified."'1' Southern exclusion, moreover, was a necessary political 
condition for the Republicans to gain the two-thirds vote required by Ar- 
ticle Five for the proposal of a constitutional amendment.107 How, then, 
can the formalist explain the legitimacy of the proposal of the Fourteenth 
Amendment by the Rump Republican "Congress" without simultaneously 
delegitimizing Secretary Seward's Proclamation validating the Thirteenth 
Amendment? 
2. Reconstructing Reconstruction 
We have reached the first stage in our critique of the reigning profes- 
sional narrative. On this familiar account, the Civil War Amendments are 
like all the other "amendments" conveniently listed at the end of the origi- 
nal Constitution. Just like the First or the Twenty-first in the series, 
Thirteen and Fourteen owe their validity to their enactment in strict con- 
formity with the rules laid down by the Founding Federalists in Article 
Five. However often this point is presupposed in normal legal discourse, it 
is belied by Chief Justice Hughes' opinion in the "leading case" on the 
subject-and by the facts of the matter. 
Most fundamentally, the Republicans constitutionalized their initiatives 
in a more nationalistic way than that contemplated by the Federalists' 
Article Five. The rules laid down in 1787 envisioned an equal partnership 
between the national government and the states in the process of higher 
lawmaking: While national actors dominate at the proposal stage, consti- 
tutional dialogue moves to the state level during ratification. During the 
1860's, the Republicans used national institutions to call into question, 
ever more profoundly, the equal status of the states in our higher lawmak- 
ing system. During the constitutional debate over slavery, the Presidency 
served as the principal vehicle for the Republicans' assault on Federalist 
premises. Not only did Abraham Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation 
shift the constitutional status quo in 1863 before the Thirteenth Amend- 
ment was even formally proposed; Andrew Johnson's role in the ratifica- 
tion of the Thirteenth Amendment was, in many ways, even more re- 
markable. Johnson did not allow the Southern states to suppose that they 
could determine the fate of the Thirteenth Amendment with the kind of 
independence presupposed by the original Federalist idea of an equal na- 
106. See M. BENEDICT, supra note 99, at 131. 
107. The likely voting behavior of Southern representatives in Congress is suggested by over- 
whelming votes in Southern legislatures rejecting proposals to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment. See 
E. MCPHERSON, supra note 97. (Recall that this was a time when state legislatures selected federal 
senators). Even without the South, Congressional Republicans encountered enormous difficulty in 
coming up with a proposal that would gain the support of two-thirds of the rump Congress. See M. 
BENEDICT, supra note 99, at 150-53, 160, 162-87. 
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tion-state partnership. As Southern legislatures met for the first time in 
the aftermath of the Civil War, Johnson used his military governors to 
place extraordinary pressures on them to ratify the Amendment. While 
these unprecedented pressures violated original Federalist principles, they 
fell short of pure military coercion. They did not, for example, deter Mis- 
sissippi from formally rejecting the Thirteenth Amendment-though they 
significantly contributed to the ratification by other states of the former 
Confederacy.108 The process is best described, I think, as a presidentially- 
led ratification effort that elaborated a new form of state-subordination 
which stood between equal partnership and pure coercion. Andrew John- 
son took a great deal of pride in this artful mix, and he claimed a great 
deal of public credit when it resulted in Secretary Seward's Proclamation 
of December 1865, declaring the Thirteenth Amendment part of our 
higher law.109 
The higher lawmaking process was nationalized yet further in the 
struggle over the Fourteenth Amendment. After taking unprecedented 
steps to gain ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, Johnson opposed 
the congressional Republicans' demands for further aggressive action. His 
resistance led to a dramatic struggle between the Rump Congress and the 
Accidental President for the mantle of national leadership left in the wake 
of Lincoln's assassination. 
The interbranch conflict evolved in four distinct stages. During most of 
1866, Rump Congress and Accidental President struggled to an impasse 
from their citadels on either end of Pennsylvania Avenue. Each issued an 
escalating series of official messages which not only questioned the other's 
substantive vision of the Union, but also challenged the competitor's very 
right to speak on fundamental matters in the name of We the People of 
the United States.1L0 
This first period of constitutional counterpoint and institutional impasse 
induced the contending parties to transform the next regular election into 
one of the great higher lawmaking events of American history. The Con- 
108. Seven Southern states ratified in time to be formally noticed by Secretary Seward in his 
Proclamation declaring the Thirteenth Amendment valid, see supra note 104. Only Mississippi actu- 
ally rejected the Amendment. See E. MCKITRICK, supra note 99, at 169; E. FONER, supra note 99, at 
199. I describe the remarkable presidential intervention in the ratification process in Discovering the 
Constitution, supra note 1, at ch. 7. 
109. See, e.g., Johnson, First Annual Message, in 6 A COMPILATION OF MESSAGES AND PAPERS 
OF THE PRESIDENTS 353, 356-58 (1898) (speech delivered in 1865). 
110. For the defense of Republican Reconstruction advanced by the Joint Committee on Recon- 
struction, see THE REPORTS OF THE COMMITTEES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, MADE 
DURING THE FIRST SESSION THIRTY-NINTH CONGRESS 1865-66, at VII-XXI (1866). For John- 
son's assault on the legitimacy of the Rump Congress, including his February 19 veto of the Freed- 
men's Bureau bill, his March 27 veto of the Civil Rights Act, his May 15 veto of Coloradan state- 
hood, and his July 16 veto of the second Freedmen's Bureau bill, see THE MISCELLANEOUS 
DOCUMENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FOR THE SECOND SESSION OF THE FIFTY- 
THIRD CONGRESS 1893- 94, at 398-427 (1895). For a general discussion, see M. BENEDICT, supra 
note 99, at 134-61. 
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gressional leadership proposed the Fourteenth Amendment as the plat- 
form on which they called upon the American people to renew the Re- 
publican mandate. Andrew Johnson used all the resources of the 
Presidency to mobilize constitutional conservatives, railroading around the 
country to denounce the legitimacy of the Rump Congress and to call 
upon the People to repudiate the proposed Fourteenth Amendment by re- 
turning solid conservatives to Congress.111 
The result of these exercises in popular mobilization was a decisive 
electoral victory for the party of constitutional reform.112 This inaugu- 
rated the second stage of the constitutional debate. The returning Repub- 
licans claimed a mandate from the People for the Fourteenth Amendment; 
the conservatives, led by Johnson, refused to accept the idea that the Peo- 
ple had spoken decisively on the libertarian, egalitarian, and nationalistic 
themes advanced by the Republican text. Johnson encouraged the South- 
ern governments to reject the Fourteenth Amendment, generating the for- 
malist predicaments we have already canvassed.113 
The Republicans' decision to reject the validity of the Article Five veto 
inaugurated the third stage in the ratification process, which began with 
the enactment of the Reconstruction Act of March 2, 1867114 and contin- 
ued through the impeachment of Andrew Johnson one year later. Here, 
Congress claimed a mandate from the People to destroy the autonomy of 
dissenting institutions-including the Southern governments, the Presi- 
111. The Fourteenth Amendment was the centerpiece of the Republican campaign in 1866, while 
opposition to it helped Johnson rally his supporters around the "National Union" platform. In 
Foner's words: 
For the first time in American history, civil rights for blacks played a central part in a major 
party's national campaign. . . . More than anything else, the election became a referendum 
on the Fourteenth Amendment. Seldom, declared the New York Times, had a political contest 
been conducted "with so exclusive reference to a single issue." And the result was a disastrous 
defeat for the President. Defying the usual pattern whereby the party in power loses strength 
in off-year elections, voters confirmed the massive Congressional majority Republicans had 
achieved in 1864. In the next Congress, Republicans would outnumber Democrats and John- 
son conservatives by well above the two-thirds majority required to override a veto. 
E. FONER, supra note 99, at 267; see also M. BENEDICT, supra note 99, at 188-209; E. McK[TRICK, 
supra note 99, at 448-49. 
112. See M. BENEDICT, supra note 99, at 188-243; Discovering the Constitution, supra note 1, 
at ch 9. 
113. See M. BENEDICT, supra note 99, at 210-22; Discovering the Constitution, supra note 1, at 
chs. 8-9. 
114. There were four Reconstruction acts. each building on its predecessors in Congress' escalat- 
ing struggle with the President for authority over the process of Southern reconstruction. The first 
(Mar. 2, 1867) established military government in the South, required Southern states to ratify the 
Fourteenth Amendment and to institute constitutional provisions for black male suffrage before they 
would be allowed to participate fully in the Union again, and mandated the ineligibility of those 
disqualified under the Fourteenth Amendment to vote for or participate in either the state constitu- 
tional conventions or the new state governments. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428. The 
Supplementary Reconstruction Act of Mar. 23, 1867, detailed the procedures the Union Army should 
use in reconstructing new multiracial governments in the South. Act of Mar. 23, 1867, ch. 6, 15 Stat. 
2. The third Reconstruction Act was an attempt by Congress to overrule Andrew Johnson's obstruc- 
tionist behavior. Act of July 19, 1867, ch. 30, 15 Stat. 14-16. The fourth Reconstruction law allowed 
a simple majority of participating voters to ratify new Southern constitutions regardless of the propor- 
tion of registered voters who boycotted the election. Act of Mar. 1, 1868, ch. 25, 15 Stat. 41. 
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dency, and the Supreme Court-that remained under control of constitu- 
tional conservatives, if these dissenting institutions did not recognize the 
validity of the Fourteenth Amendment."'? During this period-call it the 
challenge to dissenting institutions-it remained open for the dissenters 
to continue resistance in the hope that they could return to the American 
People in the next round of national elections and gain the decisive victory 
at the polls that had thus far eluded them. 
And resist is precisely what the dissenters continued to do until they 
confronted their moment of truth in March of 1868,11O when the voters in 
the South, the constitutional conservatives on the Supreme Court, and, 
most crucially, President Andrew Johnson faced some of the most pivotal 
decisions in our constitutional history.117 The central event was the Presi- 
dent's impeachment trial, precipitated by Johnson's effort to slow down 
the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment so that its propriety could 
remain a campaign issue in the upcoming 1868 elections. Would the Pres- 
ident continue to resist the Republicans' vision of the Union at the cost of 
grievously injuring the Presidency by allowing the Republicans to convict 
him of high crimes and misdemeanors? Or would he try to save the Presi- 
dency by changing course and indicating to the Senate and the country 
that he would no longer resist Reconstruction on the basis of the Four- 
teenth Amendment ?118 
The President chose the latter course, inaugurating the final 
stage-which I shall call the "switch in time." He called a halt to his 
efforts to obstruct Congress' attempt to replace the all-white governments 
that had rejected the Amendment with black and white governments will- 
ing to ratify it. No longer did he use his power as Commander-in-Chief to 
frustrate congressional demands for a speedy reconstruction. It was only 
after Johnson began to allow the reconstructed legislatures to ratify the 
Amendment that he gained sufficient Republican support at his impeach- 
ment trial to avoid conviction by a single vote in the Senate.11' Virtually 
115. See Discovering the Constitution, supra note 1, at chs. 9-10. For published accounts of 
particular aspects of the complex constitutional struggle, see M. BENEDICT, supra note 99, at 
210-314; 1 C. FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864-1888, at 253-618 (1971). 
116. See Discovering the Constitution, supra note 1, at ch. 10. For a published account, see M. 
BENEDICT, THE IMPEACHMENT AND TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON 26-60 (1973). 
117. See Discovering the Constitution, supra note 1, at ch. 10. For more accessible accounts, see 
M. BENEDICT, supra note 99, at 210-314; C. FAIRMAN, supra note 115, at 253-618. 
118. The best modern account of the trial and its constitutional context is provided by M. BENE- 
DICT, supra note 116. Happily, it is broadly consistent with the interpretation presented here and in 
Discovering the Constitution, supra note 1, at ch. 10. 
119. There is substantial evidence suggesting that Johnson's "switch in time"-allowing recon- 
struction and Southern ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment to go forward-was instrumental in 
obtaining the crucial votes of acquittal from several of the seven Republican Senators who together 
provided his one-vote margin of victory at the impeachment trial. For example, Senators William Pitt 
Fessenden and James W. Grimes urged one of the President's attorneys, William Maxwell Evarts, to 
recommend the presidential appointment of conservative Gen. John M. Schofield, military com- 
mander of Virginia, as Secretary of War. See 3 G. WELLES, DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES 364-65 
(May 21, 1868), 409-10 (July 21, 1868) (J. Morse, Jr. ed. 1911). Schofield accepted the President's 
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simultaneous "switches" by the other dissenting institutions also allowed 
them to preserve their institutional autonomy so long as they unequivo- 
cally called off their resistance to the higher lawmaking claims of the Re- 
publican Rump Congress and recognized that We the People demanded a 
reconstructed Union on the basis of the Fourteenth Amendment.120 As a 
consequence of all these switches, a new institutional situation emerged in 
the months after the impeachment trial. Instead of escalating the constitu- 
tional conflict yet further, all the previously dissenting parts of the govern- 
ment-the Presidency, the Court, the Southern states-now accepted 
(however reluctantly) the higher lawmaking pretensions of the Recon- 
struction Congress and allowed the ratification of the Amendment to pro- 
ceed. This new unanimity among the branches gained its formal expres- 
sion in the remarkable story we have already told about Secretary of State 
Seward's two July Proclamations concerning the Fourteenth Amendment. 
After using his first Proclamation to express the Johnson Administration's 
continuing legal doubts about ratification, the second Proclamation dram- 
atized the fact that, after the four-stage process we have reviewed, the 
Executive was no longer prepared to deny that the Reconstruction Con- 
gress spoke for the People in nationalizing the process of ratifying the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
3. Reconstruction as a Precedent 
So much for a (bare-bones) summary of the higher lawmaking process 
that looms behind every legal citation to the Thirteenth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. Rather than consigning these facts to the hidden recesses of 
the legal mind, isn't it time for us to confront them? To recall Chief Jus- 
offer conveyed by Evarts, on condition that Johnson desist from obstructing Reconstruction. When the 
Senate received the Schofield nomination on April 24, it sparked obvious interest. Fessenden and 
Grimes also told Evarts they would feel more comfortable voting to acquit Johnson if the President 
promised to refrain from seeking revenge against Republicans and to stop obstructing Reconstruction. 
See M. BENEDICT, supra note 99, at 310. Johnson personally reassured Grimes. See id. at 310-11; J. 
SEFTON, ANDREW JOHNSON AND THE USES OF CONSTITUTIONAL POWER 180 (1980). On May 4, 
Senator Edmund G. Ross of Kansas told acting Attorney General Orville H. Browning that he 
wanted the President to forward the Arkansas and South Carolina constitutions to the Senate, thereby 
demonstrating his acquiescence to congressional Reconstruction. On May 5, Johnson complied. See 2 
0. BROWNING, THE DIARY OF ORVILLE HICKMAN BROWNING 195 (May 5, 1868) U. Randall ed. 
1933); G. WELLES, supra, at 347 (May 5, 1868); 6 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS 
OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 109, at 632. For a general overview, see M. BENEDICT, supra note 
99, at 310. 
By May 16, when the Senate voted to acquit on the critical eleventh article of impeachment (with 
the help of Fessenden, Grimes, and Ross), six ex-Confederate states (Florida, Louisiana, Georgia, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia) had ratified Reconstruction constitutions in a period of 
a little over a month and without much strenuous opposition from the President. See M. BENEDICT, 
supra note 99, at 311; E. MCPHERSON, supra note 97, at 328-34. 
120. One of the most fascinating parts of this story will require us to piece together the relation- 
ship between the President's "switch" in response to the impeachment trial, the Court's "switch" in 
Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869), and the "switch" by a minority of Southern white 
voters that permitted the successful reconstruction of state governments in the South willing to ratify 
the Fourteenth Amendment. See Discovering the Constitution, supra note 1, at ch. 10. 
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tice Hughes, they provide us with "historic precedents," which we are no 
more justified in ignoring than Marbury v. Madison. When we look 
closely at the actual path travelled by the Reconstruction Republicans, 
instead of trying to force their higher-lawmaking experience to fit the pat- 
tern specified in Article Five, we can see that their innovations add up to 
a legitimating process that is far more nationalistic than any authorized by 
the Federalists. 
This nationalized process relied on two structures set in place by the 
Founders, but given new meaning during Reconstruction. First, the Re- 
publican pattern involved the rise of the separation of powers to promi- 
nence in higher lawmaking. Under the original Federalist Constitution, 
the basic building block for higher lawmaking was the division of powers 
between the national government and the states. While the separation of 
powers between Congress, President, and Court was central in normal 
lawmaking on the national level, it played no comparable role in the Fed- 
eralist understanding of higher lawmaking. In the aftermath of Civil War, 
however, the contending constitutional movements transformed the na- 
tional separation of powers into a process through which the protagonists 
might test each others' claims to a decisive "mandate" from the People on 
behalf of their rival visions of the reconstructed Union. 
Second, the rise of the separation of powers led the contending move- 
ments to give a new meaning to the national elections that are a regularly 
scheduled part of the constitutional calendar. While the ideological mean- 
ing of these elections is normally diffused by a host of local and regional 
issues, a prolonged period of constitutional conflict in Washington may 
induce the protagonists to try to break their impasse by mobilizing their 
forces across the country in an effort to oust their opponents from posi- 
tions of strength in the national government. When this leads to a clear 
and decisive victory for one side, as in 1866, the terms of the struggle for 
higher lawmaking authority shift: The winners claim a mandate for their 
constitutional initiative from the People and may demand that the dissent- 
ing branches reconsider their previous patterns of resistance. When faced 
with threats by the victorious branch(es) to their normal operation in the 
separation of powers, the dissenting branch(es) may find it more appro- 
priate to recognize that the victors do speak for the People than to con- 
tinue resisting in the hope that the voters will come to their assistance at 
the next election. 
These two institutional structures-the separation of powers and na- 
tional elections-interacted to form the process of constitutional debate 
and decision first elaborated during Reconstruction. As we saw in the 
struggle between Johnson and the Rump Congress, this process has four 
characteristic stages. During the first stage-constitutional impasse-the 
constitutional protagonists contend with one another on relatively equal 
terms from different citadels of strength in the separation of powers. The 
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effort to break the impasse is the second stage: a triggering election in 
which the contenders mobilize their forces in the country for a decisive 
political victory. While such victories often prove elusive, occasions do 
arise when one contender can plausibly claim a "mandate" from the Peo- 
ple on behalf of its constitutional initiative. If, as will often happen, the 
electoral losers in the other branches remain skeptical of the breadth and 
depth of their opponents' popular support, the electoral victors may pro- 
voke a third stage in the transformative process by challenging the normal 
institutional independence of dissenting branches. During this third 
stage-the challenge to institutional legitimacy-the incumbents of the 
challenged branches are faced with a hard choice. As in the impeachment 
trial of Andrew Johnson, they must decide whether they should continue 
to resist the victors in the hope that the People will vote the reformers out 
of office at the next regularly scheduled national election or whether they 
should protect the autonomy of their office by conceding that the People 
had indeed given their opponents a mandate for decisive constitutional 
change. 
The final stage of the process-the "switch in time"-is reached if the 
dissenting branches decide that further resistance will only lead to institu- 
tional destruction rather than electoral vindication. As a consequence, they 
retain institutional autonomy in the system of separation of powers-but 
only on the understanding that they recognize that the People have indeed 
decisively supported the reformers' vision of the Republic. If a simple 
schema will help: 
Constitutional Impasse-- aTriggering Election-.- Challenge to Institu- 
tional Legitimacy-.-Switch In Time 
It is this four part schema, more than the one sketched by the rules of 
Article Five, that structured the higher lawmaking process by which the 
American people defined, debated, and ultimately legitimated the Repub- 
licans' Fourteenth Amendment. Rather than contenting ourselves with a 
professional narrative that consigns it to oblivion, constitutional lawyers 
should learn to see these changes in higher lawmaking process as part of 
the very same act of national reconstitution expressed by the new substan- 
tive principles introduced by the Republicans. Reflect on the opening 
words of the Fourteenth Amendment. This great text begins by reversing 
Dred Scott's state-centered definition of national citizenship: Hencefor- 
ward Americans would be citizens of the nation first, and automatically 
citizens of any state in which they chose to reside. This new primacy of 
national citizenship could not have gained a place through the traditional 
higher lawmaking process that gave the states an equal partnership with 
the nation in defining the terms of our constitutional identity. Instead, it 
won its place only through a lawmaking process that gave a new primacy 
to our national institutions-notably, the separation of powers and the 
system of national elections. The transformations in our higher lawmak- 
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ing process and higher law substance went hand-in-hand. Both expressed 
the new nationalistic sense of ourselves as We the People of the United 
States that Americans won in the aftermath of the bloodiest struggle for 
national self-definition of the nineteenth century. 
4. From Reconstruction to New Deal 
We have reached the final step in our critique of the reigning profes- 
sional narrative. The first step recalled the Supreme Court's remarkable 
refusal, in Coleman v. Miller, to endorse the view that the Reconstruction 
Republicans ran down the higher lawmaking tracks providentially laid 
down by the Founding Federalists in Article Five. The second step re- 
ported the results of my effort to take up Chief Justice Hughes' invitation 
to examine the "historic precedents" surrounding the Civil War Amend- 
ments. This investigation suggested that the Republicans were no less cre- 
ative in their adaptation of the higher lawmaking process than they were 
in their transformation of the higher law substance of our constitutional 
identity. Having seen how their nationalizing use of the separation of 
powers, supported by their successful appeal to the People in the 1866 
elections, unfolded in a four-stage process of constitutional debate and de- 
cision, we can take the final step. This involves grasping the remarkable 
ways in which the New Deal Democrats' struggle to constitutionalize ac- 
tivist national government in the 1930's tracked the four-stage process 
through which the Reconstruction Republicans constitutionalized the 
Fourteenth Amendment.'2' 
Roosevelt's first term culminated in a constitutional impasse between 
the branches similar to the one that set constitutional reformers and con- 
stitutional conservatives at loggerheads in 1866. Once again, the separa- 
tion of powers provided a key mechanism for constitutional articula- 
tion-allowing the conservatives institutional space within which they 
might raise basic questions of legitimacy and challenge the reformers to go 
to the People if they hoped for ultimate success. As in 1866, this confron- 
tation led the reformers to use the next regularly scheduled election to 
121. In contrast to Reconstruction, contemporary scholarship exploring the constitutional dimen- 
sions of the New Deal remains weak. Professors Freund and Leuchtenburg have contributed useful 
articles. See Freund, Charles Evans Hughes as Chief Justice, 81 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1967); 
Leuchtenberg, FDR's Court Packing Plan: A Second Life, A Second Death, 1985 DUKE L.J. 673; 
Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt's Court "Packing" Plan, in ESSAYS ON THE NEW DEAL 69 
(H. Hollingsworth & W. Holmes eds. 1969); Leuchtenburg, The Origins of Franklin D. Roosevelt's 
"Court-Packing" Plan, 1966 Sup. CT. REV. 347. The standard accounts dealing with the constitu- 
tional climax-the "court-packing" crisis-provide a sense of drama and chronology, but little more. 
See J. ALSOP & T. CATLEDGE, THE 168 DAYS (1938); L. BAKER, BACK TO BACK: THE DUEL 
BETWEEN FDR AND THE SUPREME COURT (1967). R. JACKSON, supra note 13, is important, but 
more as testimony by an engaged participant than as an effort at comprehensive analysis. P. IRONS, 
THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS (1982) provides some useful insights. But, considering its importance, the 
subject remains incredibly underresearched. I have no doubt that my own understanding has been 
greatly disadvantaged as a result. See Discovering the Constitution, supra note 1, at chs. 12-13. 
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break the constitutional impasse. When the New Dealers gained a crush- 
ing victory in the presidential and congressional elections of 1936, they 
claimed a mandate from the People in support of their new activist vision 
of American government. 
As with the Reconstruction Republicans, the New Deal Democrats 
made their claim of a popular mandate concrete by threatening the lead- 
ing preservationist branch with rapid personnel change if it continued to 
resist the substance of the reformers' constitutional initiative. Because the 
principal branch opposing the Fourteenth Amendment was the Presi- 
dency, the Republicans used the impeachment process to back up their 
demand for the constitutionalization of their reforms. Because the leading 
preservationist branch in the 1930's was the Court, the Democrats 
threatened court-packing if the Old Court continued to defend traditional 
principles of freedom of contract and limited national government. While 
impeachment and court-packing differ in legal form, their constitutional 
function was the same. In both cases, the reformers' threat of personnel 
change obliged the leading conservative institution to confront a distinc- 
tive, and fundamental, question: Should it continue supporting the older 
constitutional tradition at the risk of permanent damage to its insitutional 
autonomy, or had the time come to recognize that We the People had 
given considered support to the initiatives elaborated by the party of con- 
stitutional reform, and that further resistance would be 
counterproductive? 
In both cases, the decision of the conservative branch was the same. 
Just as President Johnson responded to the threat of impeachment by 
ending his resistance to the Fourteenth Amendment and allowing formal 
ratification to proceed, so too did the Old Court make its famous "switch 
in time." 
During both Reconstruction and the New Deal, the victorious reform- 
ers responded to the "switch" by allowing the conservative branch to re- 
treat without permanent damage to its institutional position within the 
separation of powers. Both impeachment and court-packing narrowly 
failed in the Senate after the dissenting branch made it clear that it had 
ended its principled resistance. The constitutionalization of fundamental 
reform ends with all three branches now prepared to conduct normal 
politics on the basis of the revised constitutional vision that had been so 
bitterly controverted during the preceding period of supercharged debate, 
mobilization, and decision. 
5. What Was New About the New Deal? 
If I am right, the way the American people defined, debated, and fi- 
nally affirmed the legitimacy of the Democratic vision of activist govern- 
ment in the 1930's is best seen as a variation on the "historic precedents" 
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established by the Republicans in the 1860's. It was the Reconstruction 
Republicans, not the New Deal Democrats, who first combined the sepa- 
ration of powers with decisive electoral victories to gain the constitutional 
authority to speak in the voice of We the People of the United States-a 
voice distinct from, but no less authentic than, the voice of We the People 
of the United States expressed through the Federalist rules of Article Five. 
A basic complaint about the myth of rediscovery is that it prevents us 
from confronting these more nationalistic processes of constitutional self- 
definition in a lawyerly way. It is one thing to speak in broad generalities 
about the "constitutional revolution" of the 1930's. But can we be more 
precise than that? How, in particular, did the Democrats' twentieth cen- 
tury exercise in higher lawmaking differ from their Republican 
predecessors'? 
Most fundamental, perhaps, is the different way Reconstruction 
Republicans and New Deal Democrats subordinated the states in nation- 
alizing the higher lawmaking system. As we have seen, the Republican 
Congress of the 1860's went so far as to destroy state governments that 
vetoed the Fourteenth Amendment and to bar reconstructed Southern gov- 
ernments from sending representatives to Congress until they had com- 
plied with the Congressional demand for ratification. From one point of 
view, this Republican nationalization of higher lawmaking was far more 
traumatic than anything attempted by the Democrats. In contrast to the 
1860's, a profound constitutional transformation occurred in the 1930's 
without the shattering use of the national army to destroy dissenting state 
governments. 
From another point of view, however, the Democratic variation may 
seem more nationalistic. At least the Republicans accepted the need to 
gain--if in decidedly un-Federalist ways-the formal assent of three- 
fourths of the state governments to their constitutional initiative. Indeed, 
the extremity of their measures testify to the importance they placed on 
inducing state shows of consent to the new vision of the Union articulated 
in Washington D.C. In contrast, the New Deal version of the four-stage 
process of constitutional debate and decision cut the states out of the 
higher lawmaking process entirely. Rather than submit a constitutional 
proposal for ratification by the states, the New Dealers finally prevailed 
on the Supreme Court to constitutionalize their new vision of activist na- 
tional government without the need for formal amendments. 
At the same time they were acting independently of the states, the 
Democrats were ringing new changes on the Republicans' innovative uses 
of the separation of powers. The first, and most important, innovation 
involves the role of the Presidency in the higher lawmaking system. While 
the Republicans used the Presidency to play crucial and unprecedented 
roles in the constitutionalization of Emancipation, they were obliged to 
cope with the constitutional implications of Andrew Johnson's defection 
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from the reformist coalition. Having lost control of the Presidency, the 
Reconstruction Republicans could not try to constitutionalize their vision 
of the Union by seeking to pack the Court. Indeed, with the conservative 
Johnson in the White House, they moved in the opposite direction from 
the one that Roosevelt would take-enacting a remarkable "court- 
shrinking" bill to prevent the President from filling vacancies with consti- 
tutional conservatives who would give new vitality to the President's 
struggle to block ratification of the Republican constitutional initiative.'22 
In contrast, the New Deal Democrats did not have to cope with the 
assassination of their sitting President and his replacement by a conserva- 
tive at a crucial point in their struggle to constitutionalize a reformist vi- 
sion of the Union. With the Democrats in control of the Presidency as 
well as Congress, they did not have to follow the example of the Republi- 
can Congress and threaten state governments with destruction if they 
sought to invoke their formal Article Five veto over the Democrats' activist 
constitutional initiatives. Instead, they could develop a model of presiden- 
tial leadership, in which Roosevelt put together his increasing support in 
Congress, along with a series of electoral victories, to win the Supreme 
Court's support for a transformation of constitutional doctrine.'23 
As we have seen, this effort climaxed in Roosevelt's use of the New 
Deal's overwhelming electoral triumph of 1936 to claim a mandate from 
the People for activist national government. Since reformers were domi- 
122. The Act of July 23, 1866, shrank the Court to seven as sitting Justices retired, making it 
impossible for Johnson to fill vacancies with constitutional conservatives intent on declaring congres- 
sional Reconstruction unconstitutional. Act of July 23, 1866, ch. 210, 14 Stat. 209. (Indeed, Johnson 
had already nominated his conservative Attorney General to a vacancy that was eliminated by the Act. 
See C. FAIRMAN, supra note 115, at 169.) 
Once Johnson was replaced by Grant, the Congress immediately re-expanded the Court to nine. 
Act of Apr. 10, 1869, ch. 22, 16 Stat. 44. This enabled Grant to appoint Justices Strong and Bradley, 
who immediately voted to overrule the seven-man Court's 4-3 decision invalidating paper money, 
Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870), by casting the deciding votes in the Legal 
Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1872). This remarkable story is in many respects analogous to 
the "switch in time" of 1937, with the crucial difference that the leading reformist institution in the 
Reconstruction drama was Congress, not the presidency. For a good blow-by-blow account, see C. 
FAIRMAN, supra note 115, at 677-775. 
123. I should emphasize that Roosevelt finally became very explicit about the character of his 
transformative effort. Consider, for example, this speech given just before the Senate hearings on his 
court-packing proposal: 
In this fight, as the lawyers themselves say, time is of the essence. In three elections during the 
past five years great majorities have approved what we are trying to do. To me, and I am sure 
to you, those majorities mean that the people themselves realize the increasing urgency that we 
meet their needs now. Every delay creates risks of intervening events which make more and 
more difficult an intelligent, speedy, and democratic solution of our difficulties. 
Roosevelt, If We Would Make Democracy Succeed, I Say We Must Act-NOW!, in 1937 PUBLIC 
PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 113, 120 (1941); see also Roosevelt, A "Fire- 
side Chat" Discussing the Plan for Reorganization of the Judiciary, id. at 122-33, for similar rheto- 
ric, and for a fascinating defense of court-packing as a transformational device superior to Article Five 
amendments. During the opening days of the Senate hearing, Assistant Attorney General Robert 
Jackson elaborated on the President's public speeches in a remarkable formal presentation, Reorgani- 
zation of the Federal Judiciary: Hearings on S. 1392 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 
75th Cong., 1st Sess. 37-51 (1937), which is well worth careful study. 
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nant both in the White House and on Capitol Hill, this demand took a 
very different form from the one made by congressional Republicans two 
generations earlier. Rather than trying to replace a conservative President 
with a committed reformer,124 the Democrats would try to add six reform 
Justices to the conservative Court.125 
This demand, in turn, led to a final New Deal innovation. When the 
Justices responded to the reformers' challenge to the Court's legitimacy 
with a Johnson-like "switch in time," they obviated the need for the 
Democrats to frame constitutional initiatives in the crisp terms we associ- 
ate with Article Five amendments. Instead, the Court signaled its willing- 
ness to join the New Deal coalition in the late 1930's with a series of 
transformative opinions codifying the doctrinal principles of the constitu- 
tional revolution. Thus, when modern lawyers seek to memorialize the 
constitutionalization of activist national government in America, they turn 
not to formal Article Five amendments, but to opinions of the New Deal 
court decisively rejecting the landmarks of the Lochner era. Despite the 
difference in legal form, however, these opinions have the weight and 
staying-power associated with Article Five texts. Modern judges take the 
charge of Lochnerizing as seriously as they take the charge of misinter- 
preting the meaning of "equal protection." Of course, jurists disagree 
about the precise meaning of the repudiation of Lochner, just as they dif- 
fer as to the best theory of the First Amendment. But there is one thing no 
judge would ever think of doing: seriously consider whether he or she 
should overrule the transformative opinions of the 1930's that make Loch- 
ner such a powerful antiprecedent in modern constitutional law. These 
ringing validations of activist national government are a fundamental part 
of our constitutional scheme-and cannot be repealed short of a higher 
lawmaking process comparable to the one led by President Roosevelt in 
the 1930's. 
To sum up: The New Deal model is nationalistic in a different way 
from its Reconstruction predecessor. It relies on the Presidency, not the 
Congress, as the principal insititution claiming a transformative mandate 
from the People. Partly as an institutional consequence, it authorizes the 
Supreme Court to codify the precise legal implications of this popular 
mandate in a series of transformative opinions which, even in an age not 
otherwise known for its respect for stare decisis, have a juridical authority 
124. If impeachment had been successful, Johnson's successor would have been the Radical Re- 
publican President of the Senate, Benjamin Wade. 
125. The key provision of Roosevelt's plan created a new position on any federal court if the 
incumbent judge did not resign upon reaching the age of 70 years and 6 months. Since there were 
then six Supreme Court Justices older than this, it was up to them whether they would remain on an 
expanded bench or resign and keep the Court's size below 15. In either event, the President 
could-with the approval of the Senate-make six transformative appointments. See SENATE COMM. 
ON THE JUDICIARY, REORGANIZATION OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, S. REP. No. 711, 75th Cong., 
1st. Sess. 1-2 (1937). 
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equal to the most important legal formulae enshrined in our formal con- 
stitutional texts. 
D. Conclusions 
I hope this sketch raises three kinds of questions. The first is historical, 
and involves more than simply filling details in the Reconstruction and 
New Deal patterns I have summarized. Beyond thick description is the 
question of constitutional self-consciousness: To what extent did the lead- 
ing actors, and the People more generally, recognize that they were 
changing the rules of higher lawmaking as they sought to revise the sub- 
stantive principles of American government? The only way to find out is 
to confront the documentary legacy left to us by Americans of these two 
periods: Do they reveal that Reconstruction Republicans and New Deal 
Democrats knew what they were doing, and that it is only the modern 
professional narrative that obliterates their achievement? 
The second question is normative. Once we grasp the remarkable ways 
that Reconstruction and New Deal created new forms of higher lawmak- 
ing that supplement the Federalists' effort in Article Five, we should ask 
how well the revised system serves the basic principles of dualist democ- 
racy. This is a good time to take this question seriously-since, as I have 
argued elsewhere,126 the failed nomination of Robert Bork has dramatized 
important weaknesses in the presidentially-led system of constitutional- 
change-by-transformative-judicial-appointments hat we have inherited 
from the New Deal. 
The final Part of this essay, however, takes up a third task. Here I 
shall assume, arguendo, that you have been convinced by my effort to 
retell our constitutional past in a way that dispenses with the myth of 
rediscovery that obscures the creative character of the New Deal. What 
follows from this act of narrative revision so far as the modern Supreme 
Court is concerned? 
III. DOCTRINE: THE NECESSITY OF SYNTHESIS 
A. The Interpretive Turn 
The last Part challenged the official story lawyers tell about the Found- 
ing, Reconstruction, New Deal. The reigning narrative arrays these trans- 
formative periods in descending order of constitutional creativity: The 
Founding was constitutionally creative both in higher lawmaking process 
and in higher law substance; Reconstruction was creative only substan- 
tively; and the New Deal was not creative at all. I have called this a two- 
solution narrative, because it recognizes only the Founding and Recon- 
struction as the source of new constitutional solutions and disparages the 
126. See Ackerman, supra note 74, at 1182-84. 
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New Deal through a myth of rediscovery. My aim has been to lay the 
foundation for a three-solution narrative-in which we come to recognize 
both Reconstruction Republicans and New Deal Democrats as equals of 
the Founding Federalists in creating new higher lawmaking processes and 
new substantive solutions in the name of We the People of the United 
States. 
This Part, in turn, suggests how the three-solution narrative provides 
new resources for understanding the modern Supreme Court's effort to 
make sense of the Constitution left to us after the New Deal. My argu- 
ment proceeds by inviting you to reflect on a central interpretive problem 
raised by the old two-solution narrative-the problem of synthesis-and 
then consider the ramifying implications of your solution to this problem 
within the new framework of a three-solution narrative. This effort, I 
hope, will allow you to place some of the most important modern opinions 
written by the Supreme Court in a new, and more comprehending, light. 
My test cases will be Brown and Griswold; but, if I am at all successful, 
you will ask yourself whether a similar approach enlightens other 
landmarks. 
B. The Problem of Synthesis 
I shall introduce the problem of synthesis by going back to a time when 
it did not exist. The time was 1803; the case was Marbury v. Madison. 
Whatever problems John Marshall had in reaching his decision, he could 
suppose that "We the People of the United States" referred to a relatively 
concrete group of historical actors-the generation of Americans who 
fought the War of Independence and proceeded to codify its political 
meaning in the 1787 text and its early constitutional amendments. Even at 
this early stage, interpreting the Constitution as the deliberative product 
of a collectivity as vast as "We the People" was a tricky business. The 
Americans who supported the Federalist experiment notoriously disagreed 
on important matters. Any effort to elaborate the constitutional principles 
that animated the Founding generation's political practice-the intent of 
the Framers, if you will-necessarily involved a great deal of insight and 
judgment. Nonetheless, the fact that only a single generation of Americans 
had contributed to the proposal and ratification of the Constitution and its 
early amendments greatly simplified the interpretive problem confronting 
men like Marshall and Story. However tricky the task of interpreting the 
constitutional text, at least the early Federalist justices could locate it 
against the background of a relatively concrete political culture-one in 
which they themselves were born and had reached political maturity. 
This focus on the higher lawmaking achievement of a single generation 
was shattered beyond repair by the Reconstruction Republicans. Since the 
Republicans had repudiated some, but not all, of the Founding genera- 
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tion's Constitution, the Supreme Court could no longer rest content with 
the Marshallian mission of elaborating the constitutional vision of the 
Americans who had fought and won the War of Independence. Instead, 
the Justices were called upon by history to undertake a distinctive task of 
multigenerational synthesis. This not only required them to identify the 
aspects of the Federalist Constitution that had survived the Republican 
critique. It also called upon them to synthesize these Federalist fragments 
into a constitutional order that contained the new constitutional ideals af- 
firmed by the Republicans in the aftermath of the Civil War. 
Easier said than done. Only one thing is clear. The Supreme Court has 
been acutely aware of the problem for a very long time. The very first 
judicial opinion interpreting the Reconstruction Amendments opened with 
an eloquent statement of the problem;127 over the succeeding 125 years, 
we have accumulated an enormous amount of experience with the ways 
the task of synthesis may be confronted, evaded, resolved. To take up the 
question in one of its more familiar doctrinal guises, consider the problem 
posed by the relationship between the Founders' Bill of Rights (time one) 
and the Reconstructers' Fourteenth Amendment (time two). Nobody de- 
nies that, before the Civil War, the Founding generation's commitment to 
states' rights trumped their commitment to the Bill of Rights; even Mar- 
shall agreed that the Bill applied only to the national government and not 
to the states.128 The synthetic question is whether, and how, the Republi- 
cans' achievement during Reconstruction requires us to reinterpret the 
meaning of the Founding Bill. Clearly, the People of the nineteenth cen- 
tury broke decisively with Founding premises-importing new nationalis- 
tic, egalitarian, and libertarian strains into our higher law. How, if at all, 
should our interpretation of time two's transformation alter the way we 
read time one's Bill of Rights? For example, should we read the Republi- 
can Amendment in the manner of Hugo Black,"29 and insist that it "incor- 
porated" all the rules of the first eight Amendments (but not the 
Ninth?130) and imposed them rigidly on the states? 
1. The Synthetic Triangle 
Now I have my own answers to such questions-and so, I am sure, do 
you. For the moment, I want to suspend our interpretive disagreements to 
see how our understanding of the problem of synthesis informs a host of 
different issues once we take the narrative turn suggested in the preceding 
127. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 67 (1873) (original Constitution, and 
first 12 Amendments, are now "historical and of another age," and must be synthesized with "three 
other articles of amendment of vast importance [that] have been added by the voice of the people to 
that now venerable instrument."). 
128. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833). 
129. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68-123 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). 
130. See Black's inadequate discussion in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 518-20 (1965) 
(Black, J., dissenting). 
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part of this essay. As soon as we recognize that the New Deal Democrats, 
no less than the Reconstruction Republicans, successfully led the People of 
the United States to transform crucial elements of the constitutional status 
quo, we must confront the impact of this event on the constitutional prin- 
ciples announced during earlier episodes of constitutional politics. This 
three-dimensional synthetic problem is more complex than the two- 
dimensional inquiry suggested by a narrative that only recognizes the 
Founding (time one) and Reconstruction (time two) as jurisgenerative 
events of the first magnitude. In addition to a flow of cases raising (1) 
one-two problems, modern litigants are also advancing legal arguments 
that constantly require courts and commentators to define the doctrinal 
implications of the relationships between (2) the Founding and the New 
Deal; and (3) Reconstruction and the New Deal. 
To appreciate the challenges raised by these new synthetic questions, 
consider how the New Deal transformed the status of economic regula- 
tion. For the first 150 years of our history, few doubted that the Founding 
Federalists placed a high (if not the highest) value on private property 
and market freedom in their general scheme of constitutional values. Since 
the New Deal transparently revised this Founding commitment, modern 
courts have had to find a way of preserving those fragments of the Found- 
ing ideal that have survived the popular repudiation of the property- 
oriented conception of limited government. How has the Court reinter- 
preted the Founding in a way that did justice to the transformation in 
constitutional values validated by the People in the 1930's? Call this the 
problem of one-three synthesis, because it involves the interpretive harmo- 
nization of the first and third great turning points in our higher lawmak- 
ing experience. 
Analytically at least, this is a different problem from two-three synthe- 
sis. In reconciling Reconstruction and the New Deal, the central difficulty 
is posed by the Republicans' emphasis on property ownership and free 
contract in their own transformative effort. The Thirteenth Amendment, 
after all, did not guarantee suffrage to blacks; nor did the American peo- 
ple ever accept Thaddeus Stevens' demand for redistribution of property 
from rebel whites to emancipated blacks.13" Instead, the Emancipation 
Amendment worked a fundamental change in the black slave's relation- 
ship to property. No longer could a person of color be treated as if he or 
she could be owned by others; instead, freed blacks would be constitution- 
ally endowed with the right to acquire and transfer property in the same 
way that whites had long taken for granted.132 Of course, this was a very 
formal and abstract freedom for blacks who had been remorselessly sup- 
131. See E. FONER, Thaddeus Stevens, Confiscation, and Reconstruction, in POLITICS AND IDE- 
OLOGY IN THE AGE OF THE CIVIL WAR 128 (1980). 
132. J. TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 159-97 (rev. ed. 1965). 
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pressed for centuries. Moreover, the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend- 
ments promised blacks more than this. Nonetheless, given the place of 
(self-)ownership in the Republican constitutional transformation, it was 
hardly arbitrary for courts of the Lochner era to emphasize market free- 
doms as they set about synthesizing the meaning of the Founding and 
Reconstruction. 
This meant that the modern Court had its work cut out for it in devel- 
oping a credible two-three synthesis. No longer could the Court's inter- 
pretation of the meaning of the Reconstruction Amendments center on 
protecting each American's right to own and transfer private property. 
Instead, the Court would have to restate the meaning of Reconstruction's 
guarantee of "equal protection" and "due process of law" for a world in 
which the ownership and exchange of private property were far less cen- 
tral components of constitutional liberty than they had been when the Re- 
construction Republicans sought to define the constitutional difference be- 
tween slavery and freedom. How was this act of interpretive synthesis to 
be accomplished? 
This two-three question is analytically distinct from the one-three ques- 
tion raised by a judicial effort to preserve Founding values of liberty in a 
post-New Deal world. It also requires a judicial confrontation with nine- 
teenth-century legal sources that expressed political presuppositions and 
concerns quite distinct from those of the eighteenth-century Americans 
who participated in the Founding. For all their analytic and substantive 
differences, however, the two questions cannot be answered in isolation 
from one another. Important cases tend to raise both these questions, as 
well as those of the classic one-two variety. Of course, no Court can try to 
confront all the synthetic issues lurking in the background of any single 
case. Even the greatest opinions will isolate an aspect of the synthetic 
problem for intensive deliberation, leaving the rest to other courts and 
other cases. Nonetheless, if the process of synthetic interpretation is pro- 
ceeding apace, we should expect to see modern courts grappling with the 
effort to triangulate a Constitution that has been transformed, and trans- 
formed again, since the Founding. 
2. The Communication Gap: A Preliminary Diagnosis 
Having defined the modern problem of synthesis, we are now in a posi- 
tion to glimpse the remarkable way in which the reigning two-solution 
narrative has operated to obstruct communication between the Court and 
its commentators. To define the difficulty, assume for a moment that the 
modern Court has been struggling to confront the triangular problems of 
synthesis generated by the discordant principles of the New Deal, Recon- 
struction, and Founding. If this were true, professional commentators 
would be the last to recognize it, for their two-solution narrative does not 
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allow them to define the triangular problem, let alone to assess the Court's 
efforts to deal with it. Instead, the professional commentators would turn 
a blind eye to those parts of the Court's opinions in which the Justices 
struggled to define the synthetic dimensions of their interpretive problem. 
Rather than trying to assist in the resolution of the triangular problem the 
Court identified, the two-solution commentators would systematically mis- 
read these passages in a variety of ways-all of which, however, would 
allow them to ignore the Court's ongoing effort at synthetic triangulation. 
Rather than engaging in a constructive dialogue, courts and commentators 
would suffer an odd dialectical estrangement-in which each side's ques- 
tions go unanswered by the other. 
However implausible this description may seem, I mean to establish its 
reality by rereading the Court's opinions in Brown and Griswold. Before 
pressing onward, personal conversation suggests the wisdom of con- 
fronting a preliminary objection: "If, Bruce, the two-solution narrative is 
as pervasive in the profession as you say it is, how did it ever occur to the 
Justices, of all people, to take on the burden of three-solution synthesis?" 
I do not pretend to have gotten to the bottom of this one,133 but my 
answer comes in two parts. First, the Justices are, by and large, practical 
people who do not disdain the obvious with the nonchalance of the aca- 
demic commentator or political ideologue. And it is perfectly obvious that 
the wide-ranging activist national government established in the 1930's 
has had a pervasive impact upon the daily operation and operative prem- 
ises of American government. If the Justices take seriously the preserva- 
tionist mission described by dualist principles,134 they will not need others 
to point out a need to reconcile the new activist vision decisively supported 
by the People during the 1930's with the earlier constitutional affirma- 
tions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Instead, in their effort to 
make sense of cases pressing for decision, they will point repeatedly to 
salient dimensions of the modern problem of synthesis. 
My second answer is to refine my thesis. While we shall see the Jus- 
tices struggling self-consciously with salient dimensions of the modern 
problem of synthesis, I do not suggest that they have launched a full scale 
assault on the two-solution narrative that lies at the core of their problem. 
Instead, their insights into its inadequacy have been intermittent and 
framed by the particular facts of particular cases. If the Justices are to go 
further than this, they should not be expected to travel on their own 
steam. Only if the rest of us take the synthetic questions raised by the 
Court with the seriousness they deserve, and contribute to a dialogue con- 
133. For a brilliant analysis bearing on this problem, see Shapiro, Fathers and Sons: The Court, 
the Commentators, and the Search for Values, in THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTERREVOLUTION 
THAT WASN'T 218 (V. Blasi ed. 1983). 
134. See supra text accompanying notes 20-21. 
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cerning their character, can we expect the Justices to confront the three- 
solution problem of synthesis with increasing insight over time. 
To get the ball rolling, think harder about the single synthetic problem 
that our present narrative allows us to confront self-consciously-the one- 
two problem exemplified by the "incorporation" debate. I shall argue that 
some of the lessons we may learn from this debate will give us a useful 
perspective on the synthetic questions raised by the modern Court in opin- 
ions such as Brown and Griswold. 
C. The Character of Synthetic Interpretation 
Begin with a skeletal statement of the synthetic problem raised by jux- 
taposing the Bill of Rights with the Fourteenth Amendment. At time one, 
the Founding generation announced X as higher law; at time two, the 
Reconstructers enacted Y-where Y is partly, but not entirely, inconsis- 
tent with X. How then to put X and Y together into a meaningful whole? 
1. The Lessons of the Incorporation Debate 
There are two easy ways. While they seem different on the surface, 
both share a reductionist ambition. Rather than encouraging us to reflect 
upon the tension between the different visions expressed by two different 
generations of Americans, they wish to persuade us to solve the problem 
of one-two synthesis by adopting a simple rule, which promises a quick, 
easy, and final solution to the task of doctrinal integration. 
The first reductionism solves the problem by exaggerating what was 
decided at time two. It would have us believe that the Reconstructers 
themselves seriously considered the question of synthesis and led the 
American People self-consciously to embrace a clear rule that authorita- 
tively answered the question. This, most famously, is Hugo Black's posi- 
tion on the incorporation issue.135 In Black's view, the Republicans did 
not merely amend the Constitution (Y) in ways inconsistent with the orig- 
inal understanding of the Bill of Rights (X). They also led the People 
self-consciously to endorse something I will call a synthetic rule-an S 
that explained precisely how the new Republican Y should be harmonized 
with the old Federalist X. According to Black, the Republicans' S said 
that the Federalist Bill of Rights, which had formerly applied only to the 
national government, would now apply in its entirety against the states. 
But there is a second way of characterizing the Republican achievement 
that will also yield an easy-if radically different-answer. This involves 
an inversion of Black's claim: While Black looks upon the Fourteenth 
Amendment as if it were a comprehensive restatement of the commitments 
made during both the Federalist and Reconstruction periods, this compet- 
135. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68-123 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). 
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ing characterization treats the Amendment as a relatively minor change in 
constitutional course-something I shall call a superstatute. Superstatutes 
do not seek to revise any of the deeper principles organizing our higher 
law; instead, they content themselves with changing one or more rules 
without challenging basic premises. Consider, for example, our last suc- 
cessful effort on the Article Five track: The Twenty-sixth Amendment, 
enacted in 1971, commands that the voting rights of citizens who are 
"eighteen years of age or older . . . shall not be denied or abridged by the 
United States or any state on account of age." This Amendment did not 
serve as the organizing focus of the turbulent constitutional politics of the 
late 1960's. Instead, it was treated as a side-issue, engendered by the Su- 
preme Court's 1970 decision in Oregon v. Mitchell.13 Mitchell invali- 
dated an effort by Congress to require states to allow eighteen-year-olds to 
vote. Within a year, this holding was countered by the Twenty-sixth 
Amendment. The speed of this response was a tribute to its proponents' 
success in assuring all participants that the Amendment had a very nar- 
row object: simply to overrule the Supreme Court decision and guarantee 
eighteen-year-olds the vote that Congress had sought to provide with its 
original statute. It is this kind of amendment, I think, that is rightly inter- 
preted as a superstatute. All it did was to change the voting age from 
twenty-one to eighteen. Nobody looked upon it as the culminating expres- 
sion of a broad-based effort to revise the foundational principles of our 
higher law. 
While this seems pretty straightforward in the case of the Twenty-sixth 
Amendment, it is quite another thing to treat the Fourteenth Amendment 
as just another superstatute. However, many have sought to trivialize the 
Amendment in just this way-the most influential being Raoul Berger.137 
In his view, the Fourteenth Amendment, like the Twenty-sixth, had a 
very narrow aim: to constitutionalize a single statute, the Civil Rights Act 
of 1866. Unfortunately for Berger, the text of the Amendment does not 
even mention this Act; nor does it, like the Twenty-sixth, affirmatively 
state, in relatively clear and operational terms, the specific rules that it 
wishes to constitutionalize. Instead, its first paragraph speaks the lan- 
guage of fundamental principle. Moreover, my own review of the docu- 
ments suggests that both the Republicans in Congress, and the people in 
the country, were emphatically aware that these pregnant phrases legiti- 
mated a radical break in the nation's constitutional vocabulary.138 For the 
136. 400 U.S. 112 (1970). 
137. See R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977). 
138. For illuminating accounts of the more expansive understandings of the Civil War Amend- 
ments, see C. ANTIEAU, THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
(1981); M. CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL 
OF RIGHTS (1986); W. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1988); J. TENBROEK, supra note 
132; Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 
61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863 (1986). 
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moment, however, my concern is not with Berger's bad history,139 but 
with the merits of his abstract constitutional logic. 
On this level, Berger, like Black, has an easy answer to the problem of 
synthesis. Once he has trivialized time two by characterizing its constitu- 
tional amendments as superstatutes, Berger has cleared a logical path for 
himself to insist that the comprehensive vision enunciated by the Federal- 
139. By "bad," I mean really bad. One example should be enough to encourage you to treat 
Berger's use of sources with extreme caution. Given Berger's premises, Justice Washington's famous 
opinion in Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230) is a matter of great 
importance. As Berger recognizes, Washington's definition of "privileges and immunities" was quoted 
repeatedly in and out of Congress to define the meaning of the new clause proposed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. It is therefore understandable that Berger wishes to establish that Washington's opinion 
is consistent with Berger's view that the Republicans in Congress understood the Amendment as a 
superstatute, constitutionalizing only a fixed list of rights previously enacted in the Civil Rights Act. 
Unfortunately, he achieves this end by selective quotation and italicization so egregious that it shakes 
confidence in his reliability. Here is what Berger does with Washington's text (I place in brackets 
parts of Washington's opinion that Berger conceals from the reader by the simple expedient of replac- 
ing Washington's words with ellipses): 
We feel no hesitation in confining [italics not in original] these expressions to those privileges 
and immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental [italics not in original] . . . . They 
may, however, be all comprehended under the following general heads: Protection by the gov- 
ernment; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of 
every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety . . . . The right of a citizen of one 
state to pass through, or to reside in any other state, for purposes of trade, agriculture, profes- 
sional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus; to institute and 
maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the state; to take, hold and dispose of property, 
either real or personal; and an exemption from higher taxes or impositions than are paid by 
the other citizens of the state; may be mentioned as some of the particular privileges and 
immunities of citizens, which are clearly embraced by the general description of privileges 
deemed to be fundamental; to which may be added, the elective franchise, as regulated and 
established by the laws or constitution of the state in which it is to be exercised. [These, and 
many others which might be mentioned, [my italics] are, strictly speaking privileges and immu- 
nities, and the enjoyment of them by the citizens of each state, in every other state, was mani- 
festly calculated (to use the expressions of the preamble of the corresponding provision in the 
old articles of confederation) "the better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and inter- 
course among the people of the different states of the Union."] But we cannot accede to the 
proposition . . . that . . . the citizens of the several states are permitted to participate in all 
[emphasis not in original] the rights which belong exclusively to the citizens of any other 
particular state. 
Compare R. BERGER, supra note 137, at 31-32 with Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551-52. Now the great 
abstraction and sweep of Justice Washington's statement is itself not very hospitable to Berger's view 
of the clause as a superstatute. But I am not concerned here with matters of good-faith dispute. I am 
concerned with Berger's basic ethics as an historian: Why did he stop quoting just at the point where 
Justice Washington explicitly says that he is not presenting an exhaustive list of the rights protected 
by the concept of "privileges and immunities"? Obviously, including this sentence would have hurt 
Berger's case, for it would suggest that every time the participants quoted Corfield they repeated 
Justice Washington's express warning that "privileges and immunities" could not, as Berger suggests 
they could, be reduced to some closed list of rights susceptible to codification in a superstatute. But 
this is hardly a reason that should persuade a responsible historian to mislead his readers by an act of 
selective quotation. 
I am also very disturbed by Berger's use of italics to suggest that Washington is emphasizing the 
limited character of his construction of "privileges and immunities" at the same time he is excising 
parts of the text which explicitly endorse a more expansive interpretation. This kind of shoddy work 
on a source as crucial as Corfield is inexcusable. 
I make this point here only because I fear that otherwise the interest I take in Berger's methodolog- 
ical views might help enhance the influence of a book that, even by the standards of lawyers' history, 
seems to me exceptionally narrow and tendentious in its treatment of the sources. For correctives (that 
are not free of opposite exaggerations), see the sources cited supra at note 138. 
524 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 99: 453 
ists at time one survived the Civil War essentially intact. While this argu- 
ment leads him to take very different substantive positions from Black, 
Berger has more in common with his great antagonist than he supposes. 
He, no less than Black, asserts that the People at time two self-consciously 
adopted a particular set of S-rules that once and for all resolved the ten- 
sions between time one and time two. They differ only on their character- 
ization of the S-rules. Black believes that the People authoritatively 
adopted a rule incorporating all the guarantees of the Bill of Rights, while 
Berger believes that the People looked upon the Fourteenth Amendment 
as a superstatute that changed the Founding only in the "precise" ways 
enumerated in the Civil Rights Act. 
2. Transformative Amendments-And How to Synthesize Them 
Now I hasten to add that I have absolutely nothing against easy an- 
swers. Life and law are complicated enough without needlessly complexi- 
fying them. My problem with both Black and Berger is that their compet- 
ing answers, while easy enough, are false to the historical character of 
Republican Reconstruction. The Civil War Amendments were popularly 
understood during Reconstruction as much more than the series of narrow 
superstatutes Berger imagines; at the same time, they represented a good 
deal less than the comprehensive restatement Black invokes to solve the 
one-two problem.140 Rather than restricting ourselves to Black-Berger ex- 
tremes, we require a richer set of intermediate categories to express the 
kind of constitutional break effected by the Republican amendments. 
a. Transformative Amendments 
This is my aim in characterizing them as transformative amendments. 
In contrast to superstatutes, such amendments do not contemplate a 
change in a few higher-law rules; they are the product of a generation's 
principled critique of the constitutional status quo-a critique that finally 
gains the considered support of a mobilized majority of the American peo- 
ple. In contrast to a comprehensive restatement, the leaders of the consti- 
tutional movement have not made a sustained and self-conscious effort to 
define how their new principles relate to the full array of older constitu- 
tional ideas. While the transformative constitutional movement obviously 
aims to repudiate some of the fundamental principles of the older consti- 
tutional order, the impact of its new ideals on a host of other traditional 
140. A recent student of the debates summarizes the matter well: "The debates on the Fourteenth 
Amendment were, in essence, debates about high politics and fundamental principles-about the fu- 
ture course and meaning of the American nation. The debates by themselves did not reduce the vague, 
open-ended, and sometimes clashing principles used by the debaters to precise, carefully bounded legal 
doctrine. That would be the task of the courts .... " W. NELSON, supra note 138, at 63. For the 
classic, narrowly-focused critique of Black's thesis, see Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment 
Incorportate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949). 
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principles has not yet been worked out in a thoroughgoing and considered 
way. Perhaps one or another reform politician has ventured one or an- 
other opinion on these synthetic issues. But even leading reformers do not 
feel themselves obliged to resolve their synthetic differences before proffer- 
ing their transformative amendments to the People. While adoption of the 
amendments certainly signifies mobilized support for the transformative 
principles expressed by the new amendments, it cannot be said to suggest 
decisive support for a particular synthetic rule. 
All very well and good, but where does this leave the problem of syn- 
thesis? If easy answers, of the Black or Berger type, mischaracterize the 
transformative aspirations of Reconstruction, how to harmonize time one 
and time two into a doctrinal whole? 
b. Principled Synthesis 
By an ongoing judicial effort to confront the tensions between Founding 
and Reconstruction in a self-conscious way, and then to elaborate doctri- 
nal principles that do justice to the deepest aspirations of each. Fancy 
talk? An impossible dream? 
Perhaps. But consider the way that the structure of constitutional litiga- 
tion invites the judges to take seriously the ideal of principled synthesis. 
When rules are clear, few have the incentive to bear the costs of litigation; 
it is principally when good lawyers are themselves uncertain that they will 
find it impossible to settle disputes without pressing the matter to a final 
judgment by the Supreme Court. This means that the Court will be fed a 
steady diet of cases raising the problem of one-two synthesis. For it is 
precisely these cases that will seem peculiarly unsettleable without judicial 
guidance. By hypothesis, lawyers on both sides will find a rich lode of 
principle to support their side of the argument: One side, call it the plain- 
tiffs, will predictably assert that the principles of the 1860's should be 
read in an expansive way-for that is the way they will win their lawsuit; 
the defendants, for the same strategic reasons, will insist on an expansive 
reading of the principles established at the Founding. Moreover, since the 
relationship between time one and time two has so many facets, Justices 
never try to resolve the entire problem in one massive stroke. Instead, we 
can expect a dialogue over time, in which early efforts at judicial synthesis 
serve as precedents in a continuing legal conversation seeking a deeper 
understanding of the tension-filled relationship between time one and time 
two. 
This, at any rate, is the way I think the courts have gone about their 
synthetic exercise over the last 125 years. While the principled effort to 
synthesize time one and time two has taken many revealing twists and 
turns, at no point have the Justices supposed that some simple rule of the 
Black-Berger variety authorized them to escape the burden of synthesis. 
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One pressing task, then, is to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the 
different approaches to one-two synthesis that have competed with one 
another through judicial history. For the present, I will rely on the syn- 
thetic sensibilities you have developed in your own efforts at constitutional 
understanding. This will allow us to proceed immediately to the main 
question: Can we detect, in the half-century since 1937, interpretive activ- 
ity analogous to one-two synthesis when it comes to integrating the trans- 
formative revision of constitutional principle achieved during the New 
Deal into the older affirmations inherited from the eighteenth and nine- 
teenth centuries? 
c. Synthetic Triangulation 
An affirmative answer allows a new perspective upon today's Constitu- 
tion, as it has been elaborated by the Supreme Court during the half- 
century since the New Deal. Speaking broadly, this judicial effort has 
been subjected to two very different forms of popular and academic ap- 
praisal. The first school of thought is historicist: Do the great modern 
decisions comport with the original understanding with which the Ameri- 
can people enacted one or another principle into higher law?"4' The sec- 
ond is more present-oriented. It does not (necessarily) disdain the effort by 
modern judges to look backward into the past and interpret the higher law 
decisions made by earlier generations of Americans; but it does deny that 
this backward-looking interpretive exercise is the alpha and omega of ju- 
dicial method. Instead, advocates of the "living constitution" assert that 
the Court legitimately supplements backward-looking interpretations with 
a self-conscious effort to express the moral aspirations of today's Ameri- 
cans.142 Needless to say, the debate between the historicists and the par- 
tisans of the living constitution can be pursued on any number of 
levels-from philosophy to television punditry.143 
When dealing with lawyers, however, it is always a mistake to ignore 
the practical stakes. On this level, the organizing anxiety seems plain 
enough. However much historicists differ from one another, their methods 
quite regularly lead them to question-sometimes ostentatiously, some- 
times quietly-the greatest cases of the modern period: Reynolds v. 
Sims"'44 guarantee of equality in the political process, Griswold v. Con- 
necticut's'45 guarantee of procreative freedom, even Brown v. Board of 
Education's148 assertion of equality between the races. It is these anxieties 
141. See, e.g., Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353 (1981). 
142. See, e.g., M. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS AND THE LAW (1988); M. PERRY, THE CON- 
STITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982). 
143. The philosophical side of the debate has been reinvigorated recently by the publication of R. 
DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986). 
144. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
145. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
146. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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about the interpretive foundation of modern law that fuel advocates of the 
living constitution: If Reynolds or Griswold, or even Brown, is threatened 
by an exclusive emphasis on historicist methods, perhaps it is historicism 
that should be jettisoned rather than one or more of these great decisions? 
Aren't these decisions great precisely because they appeal to, and help 
shape, the moral aspirations of Americans of today, regardless of their 
connection to decisions made the day before yesterday? 
I believe that the historicizing interpretivist has many more resources 
available to her than this anxiety-provoking question implies. The reasons 
why historicists have failed to sympathize with the modern Court have 
more to do with their unthinking acceptance of a two-solution narrative 
than with the Court's repudiation of historicism.147 This will be the point 
of the interpretations of Brown and Griswold which follow. If we make 
the effort to listen to the Justices in these cases, we will hear lots of things 
that neither of the traditional schools has noticed. In both cases, the Jus- 
tices are not engaging in the aggressive moralizing favored by advocates of 
a living constitution. Nor are they incompetently playing the two-solution 
game presupposed by the typical historicist. Instead, they are asking the 
kinds of synthetic questions that all of us should raise as we try to inte- 
grate the constitutional achievements of the Founding, Reconstruction, 
and New Deal into a principled doctrinal whole. To put my thesis in a 
single line: Brown represents a fundamental act of two-three synthe- 
sis-beginning the long effort to understand the Republicans' requirement 
of equality in a post-New Deal world of activist government; Griswold 
represents an analogous act of one-three synthesis-initiating an effort to 
understand the Founding Bill of Rights in a post-New Deal world in 
which property and contract no longer serve the libertarian functions pre- 
supposed by the eighteenth century. 
D. Brown as Interpretive Synthesis 
Surely, if the opinion of the Court in Brown was intended to breathe 
new vitality into our "living constitution," it was a weak rhetorical per- 
formance. The opinion conspicuously failed to make use of the Declara- 
tion of Independence, or the other great texts of the Western tradition that 
make out compelling moral arguments for racial equality. Still less did 
Chief Justice Warren present an inspiring image of a future America 
freed at last from the crippling historical burdens of racial hatred and 
subordination. Brown took the form of a standard judicial opinion 
(stripped of some, but hardly all, of the ordinary legalisms out of courtesy 
147. For a revealing struggle by a leading historicist with the limits of the two-solution narrative, 
see Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 732 (1988) 
("I doubt whether any acceptable conception of original understanding can provide a satisfactory 
account of the New Deal."). 
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for its wider-than-usual readership). So far as Warren was concerned, the 
key to his problem was the legalistic matter of stare decisis: Should the 
Court think itself bound by its 1896 decision in Plessy v. Ferguson?148 
Indeed, even this question was too broad for the Court. Rather than de- 
nouncing Plessy's "separate but equal" as an unacceptable cover-up for 
racial subordination, Warren limited himself to the particular case of pub- 
lic education. The opinion refused to ask whether Plessy should be over- 
ruled, but only whether it "should be held inapplicable to public 
education."'49 
The legalistic caution of the Court's question is mirrored by the con- 
ventional way in which the Court framed its answer. To justify its conclu- 
sion "that in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but 
equal' has no place,"''50 the Court turned to the standard legal sources: the 
intention of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, the course of its 
case law after Plessy. Perhaps the biggest surprise is the Court's use of 
social-scientific evidence about the impact of school segregation on black 
children. Even this was hardly novel a half-century after the Court ap- 
plauded then-counsel Louis Brandeis for his presentation of social- 
scientific evidence.'5' Moreover, the "scientific" evidence offered in Brown 
only supported a premise the Court considered obvious: that segregation 
has a "detrimental effect upon the colored children."' 5 
All in all, Brown stands at the opposite pole from the documents we 
shall be rediscovering in the course of our confrontation with the Found- 
ing, Reconstruction, and New Deal. When we review the Federalist Pa- 
pers of the 1780's,'53 the Congressional Globe of the 1860's,'54 or the 
Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt in the 1930's,'55 
we will find the protagonists making impassioned appeals to the People 
for support against predictable legalistic resistance by conservative oppo- 
nents. In contrast to these populist/prophetic efforts to heat up support in 
the country, Brown was a legalistic effort to cool the debate-to assert 
that the time had come to comply with the legal principles already af- 
firmed by the People in their past exercises in constitutional politics. 
Brown's blandness has, I think, been a secret source of disappointment 
to many activist partisans of the living constitution-who would have pre- 
ferred it if Earl Warren had somehow anticipated the great "I Have A 
148. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
149. Brown, 347 U.S. at 492. 
150. Id. at 495. 
151. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 420 & n.1 (1908). 
152. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494. 
153. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 40, at 252-54 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). 
154. See supra note 110. 
155. See Roosevelt, If We Would Make Democracy Succeed, I Say We Must Act-NOW!, in 1937 
PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 113 (1941); Roosevelt, A "Fireside 
Chat" Discussing the Plan for Reorganization of the Judiciary, id. at 122; Roosevelt, The Constitu- 
tion of the United States Was a Layman's Document, Not a Lawyer's Contract, id. at 359. 
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Dream Speech" made by Dr. Martin Luther King a decade later, under 
vastly different political circumstances. More curiously, Warren's opinion 
has proved equally unsatisfactory to the legalistically inclined. A decisive 
point in the opinion's reception was the Holmes Lecture given at the 
Harvard Law School by Professor Herbert Wechsler in 1959. A leading 
scholar of his time, Wechsler had devoted much of his prodigious energy 
to progressive law reform. And yet he could not find a principled way of 
justifying Brown: "I should like to think there is [a way], but I confess 
that I have not yet written the opinion. To write it is for me the challenge 
of the school-segregation cases."'' The expression of such anxieties by 
such a scholar from such a podium generated a host of responses by 
Brown's defenders-with a number of inspired efforts to offer an alterna- 
tive to Warren's opinion that would better survive Wechsler's search for a 
secure foundation in constitutional principle."57 
Paradoxically, the very vigor of this response served to confirm Wechs- 
ler's low opinion of Warren's opinion. Apparently, even Brown's defend- 
ers were obliged to move far beyond Warren's feeble effort if they hoped 
to justify the Court's decision in the eyes of thoughtful lawyers. This is 
not the approach I will be taking here. Far more than many of its defend- 
ers, the Court was alive to the distinctly interpretive reasons why it was 
not only legally appropriate, but legally required, to repudiate the rule of 
"separate but equal" in public education. 
Warren's opinion is remarkable precisely in its self-conscious insistence 
on the need for synthesizing the meaning of two distinct periods in our 
history in order to understand the way in which the modern Constitution 
speaks to the problem of segregated schools. The first historical period is, 
of course, Reconstruction-in particular, the fact that the Republicans 
managed, despite the fierce opposition of constitutional conservatives, to 
convince the American People to commit themselves to the "equal protec- 
tion of the laws." Warren's opinion is distinctive, however, in denying 
that a satisfactory solution to the interpretive problem is possible if we 
focus exclusively on the 1860's. Instead, we must seek to integrate the 
constitutional meaning of a second period before coming to a proper inter- 
pretive judgment: "In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock 
back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when 
Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We must consider public education in the 
light of its full development and its present place in American life 
throughout the Nation."'518 
156. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 34 
(1959). 
157. See, e.g., the very different responses of Professors Charles Black and Louis Pollak to 
Wechsler's challenge. Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960); 
Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1 (1959). 
158. Brown, 347 U.S. at 492-93. 
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This self-conscious movement beyond the 1860's has often been taken 
as an embrace of present-oriented jurisprudence. It is here, if anywhere, 
that the Court confesses that it finds the effort to interpret the constitu- 
tional past too confining, and insists on its authority to impose on the 
American people new values that do not have a deep historical relation to 
earlier achievements of constitutional politics. 
Yet this interpretation seems required only so long as one accepts the 
traditional two-solution narrative. To see my point, consider that no his- 
toricist, however legalistic she may be, believes that a Court should always 
adhere to stare decisis. There is at least one reason everybody recognizes 
for refusing to follow a prior decision like Plessy. This classic exception 
involves the effect of a subsequent constitutional amendment. Consider, 
for example, the status of the Dred Scott case""' at the time Warren wrote 
Brown. Whatever the merits of Taney's opinion barring free blacks from 
citizenship in 1857, it was enough for a lawyer in 1954 to point out that 
Taney's decision was discredited in 1868 when the Reconstruction Repub- 
licans managed to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment. The question War- 
ren's dictum raises is whether we can locate an analogous constitutional 
transformation between 1896 and 1954 that makes it equally appropriate 
for Warren to reject the binding force of Plessy. Did We the People speak 
in a new way in the first half of the twentieth century which decisively 
undercut Plessy's interpretation of the Constitution? 
It is at this point that the standard two-solution narrative impoverishes 
our response to the Court. Once the validity of the myth of rediscovery is 
conceded, the answer to the crucial question seems obvious: No, the Amer- 
ican people made no new higher law during the course of the twentieth 
century that would require a lawyer to recognize that Plessy's interpreta- 
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment was no longer valid. After all, the 
formal amendments enacted during this period seem very far removed 
from the present subject. What possible relevance does the enactment of 
the Income Tax Amendment (1913) or the Woman's Suffrage Amend- 
ment (1920) have on the continuing vitality of Plessy's interpretation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment? Little wonder that the legal community has 
not taken Warren's dictum as an invitation to consider seriously the prob- 
lem of multigenerational synthesis. Once we revise our narrative to recog- 
nize the constitutionally creative aspect of the New Deal, however, War- 
ren's dictum seems more suggestive. Is the Court struggling against the 
current of the official narrative and trying to tell us that new principles of 
activist government have decisively undercut the legal force of Plessy's in- 
terpretation of "equal protection"? Has the New Deal's affirmation of 
activist government undermined Plessy just as surely as the Reconstruc- 
tion's affirmation of national citizenship undermined Dred Scott? 
159. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
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To state my thesis more affirmatively: A revised three-solution narra- 
tive will allow the profession to place Warren's opinion in a much more 
comprehending light than it has managed thus far. Rather than looking 
upon the opinion as an inept effort to breathe new life into the living 
constitution, lawyers may find in it a compelling synthetic argument ex- 
plaining why Plessy had become inconsistent with the foundational princi- 
ples of the new constitutional order established in the aftermath of the 
struggle between the New Deal Presidency and the Old Court. 
To test this hypothesis, I propose first to rehearse Plessy's arguments 
more elaborately than Chief Justice Warren does in his opinion. Once we 
have set the stage, we will see more clearly why the Court was right to 
insist that Plessy's interpretation of the Constitution had become untena- 
ble in the modern republic. 
1. Plessy's Premises in An Activist State 
An oddity: The opinion for the Court in Plessy was written by Justice 
Henry B. Brown. The question I mean to ask is whether Brown is right 
in finding that the course of twentieth-century history had provided the 
Court with overwhelming legal grounds for rejecting Justice Brown's ap- 
proach to the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Stripping 
Plessy to its essentials, Brown gives two basic reasons for the Court's deci- 
sion. The first: 
The object of the amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the abso- 
lute equality of the two races before the law, but in the nature of 
things [emphasis supplied] it could not have been intended to abolish 
distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished 
from political equality, or a commingling of the two races upon 
terms unsatisfactory to either.160 
There are two kinds of things to be said about this. One is that this para- 
graph was wrong at the moment that it was written. This is the position 
taken by Justice Harlan in his famous dissent.161 In contrast, Chief Jus- 
tice Warren says something very different: He believes that constitutional 
developments of the twentieth century have given him reasons that Harlan 
lacked for rejecting Justice Brown's interpretation. 
Once we allow ourselves to reflect on the constitutional achievements of 
the 1930's, Warren's confidence seems justified. For the great constitu- 
tional debate of the 1930's was defined precisely by the Old Court's effort 
to insist that twentieth-century Americans could not legitimately use state 
power to pursue "social, as distinguished from political equality" by re- 
quiring the payment of a minimum wage, or the recognition of a labor 
160. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896). 
161. Id. at 552-64 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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union, or the guarantee of a retirement pension. Given the New Deal 
Court's embrace of activist government in the late 1930's, the Warren 
Court could hardly respond to the petitioner's complaint about school seg- 
regation in Brown by reaffirming Justice Brown's assertion that "the na- 
ture of things" precluded a reading of "equal protection" that demanded 
something more than a thin political equality. 
Nor could Justice Brown's second defense of "separate but equal" sur- 
vive the constitutional affirmation of the activist state: 
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's argument to 
consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two 
races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be 
so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because 
the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it.'62 
If Plessy's first rationale rejected government intervention on behalf of so- 
cial equality, this second one elaborates a similar theme on a deeper-one 
might even say, metaphysical-level. Not only does the state have no re- 
sponsibility to remedy social, as opposed to political, inequality. It should 
not even be understood as contributing significantly to the construction of 
racist reality. Jim Crow laws stigmatize blacks only because "the colored 
race chooses to put that construction upon it." The government, appar- 
ently, cannot be held responsible for these "choices." Rather than partici- 
pating actively in the construction of public understandings, the state 
stands to one side and allows social groups to give any meaning they 
"choose" to the state's treatment of them. Note the extreme way in which 
Justice Brown makes his point: It is not as if public meaning is produced 
through an interactive process between government decisions and the 
"choices" of social groups; the stigma is "solely" a product of private 
"choices"-the state simply has nothing to do with it. 
Once again, whatever the legal plausibility of this claim in 1896, such a 
view was judicially untenable after the New Deal. It is precisely the Old 
Court's insistence that the state must not intervene to alter the result of 
private "choices" in the economy that precipitated the constitutional strug- 
gle of the 1930's that decisively legitimated activist government. In repudi- 
ating Lochner, the modern Court recognized that the government was an 
important actor in the process by which groups made their "choices" in 
American society. 
If the role of the state in shaping "choices" was now recognized in the 
"free market," is it really thinkable that the Warren Court might have 
repeated Plessy's analysis of the "underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's argu- 
ment"? Compulsory public schooling had always challenged the rhetoric 
162. Id. at 551. 
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of choice in two ways. The free public school was one long protest against 
the idea that the choices of individual parents ought to be the exclusive 
determinants of the conditions under which the next generation was edu- 
cated or left in ignorance. Further, the state's requirement of compulsory 
education was premised on the idea that children were not informed 
enough to choose whether they should go to school or seek learning else- 
where. What is a public school but a place where government employees 
are paid to educate children into the "truth" about social reality, whether 
they choose to be there or not? 
Despite the deep tensions between compulsory public schooling and the 
Lochner era's rhetoric of choice, the public education movement had made 
great strides during the early decades of the twentieth century. As Warren 
rightly emphasizes,'63 the public school movement was still in its infancy 
at the time Plessy was decided in 1896. In few states was the education 
offered to every child minimally adequate; in a southern state like Louisi- 
ana, even the principle of universal education was incompletely recog- 
nized. By the 1920's, the public education movement had made progress 
toward its goals.'64 But so long as the middle republic remained commit- 
ted to the rhetoric of free "choice" in vast domains of economic life, public 
education remained a constitutional anomaly: accepted by the courts 
within its own domain, but treated as a limited exception to more general 
constitutional principles developed under the contract, takings, and due 
process clauses. 
With the constitutional repudiation of Lochner in the 1930's, however, 
what had been an anomaly became a paradigm. Public schools exempli- 
fied the newly-legitimated claims of the activist state to shape the condi- 
tions under which individual citizens ultimately come to make their ma- 
ture choices. If the state could now constrain the "free" choices of adults 
concerning their wages and hours, surely its claims to educate the young 
were constitutionally unquestionable?""' 
Within this activist setting, it was absurd to accept Justice Brown's as- 
surance that the meaning of segregated schools was up to the "choices" of 
"the colored race." Was not the state in the business of public education 
precisely because children were in no position to make an informed 
"choice" about the meaning of social reality? Rather than standing pas- 
sively to one side, the activist state was now intimately involved in the 
way children-both black and white-would interpret the fact that they 
were being bussed to different schools on the basis of race. Given its rec- 
163. Brown, 347 U.S. at 489-90. 
164. See Wrigley, Compulsory School Laws: A Dilemma with a History, in THE CRUSADE 
AGAINST DROPPING OUT (J. Simon & D. Stipek eds.; forthcoming 1990). 
165. Even in Wisconsin v. Yoder the Amish did not question the authority of the state to guaran- 
tee a minimal education. 406 U.S. 205, 224 (1972) (holding compulsory school attendance law for 
young adults as violating free exercise clause). 
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ognition of activist state involvement even where adults were concerned, 
no modern Court could possibly accept either of Justice Brown's ratio- 
nales in the case of public education. As a matter of two-three synthesis, 
Justice Brown's effort to interpret "equal protection" in the light of his 
anti-activist understanding of "the nature of things" had been discredited 
at its very foundations. 
2. Brown on Brown 
From this perspective, Chief Justice Warren's opinion for the Court 
looks much better than many of the alternatives that have been offered 
over the years as "improvements." The opinion turns on the crucial syn- 
thetic point: Twentieth-century developments since Plessy have under- 
mined the interpretive premises that informed Justice Brown's reading of 
"equal protection." 
Warren does not make this point, however, by reflecting directly upon 
the meaning of the New Deal's legitimation of activist government. Per- 
haps he thought the Court had enough on its hands in Brown without 
engaging in such an innovative reconceptualization of the 1930's. Perhaps 
he did not consciously think of the New Deal at all, since the academic 
commentary of the time had done very little to prepare the way for a full- 
scale critique of the myth of rediscovery.' 
In any event, the important thing is to emphasize what the Court did 
accomplish, not what remains to be done. Without rethinking the New 
Deal directly, Warren found an alternative way to express his insight that 
the meaning of the nineteenth century's affirmation of "equal protection" 
could no longer be properly cabined by Lochner-like commitments to the 
nightwatchman state. He marks the crucial shift from laissez-faire to the 
activist welfare state by telling a story that focuses on the concrete institu- 
tion in the case before him: the public school. In his opinion, the public 
school no longer appears as an anomalous exception to the nightwatchman 
premises of the middle republic. Instead, it is presented as a paradigmatic 
expression of the modern republic's activist commitment to the general 
welfare of its citizens: 
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and 
local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great 
expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the 
166. Thus, the most remarkable academic publication of the early 1950's was W. CROSSKEY, 
POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1953), which 
presented the myth of rediscovery in its most luxuriant form. While Crosskey's work was subjected to 
harsh critique by leaders of the academic establishment, these reviews do not suggest that the critics 
were prepared to move beyond Crosskey's particularly extreme views to challenge the very idea of 
interpreting the New Deal through a myth of rediscovery. See Brown, Book Review, 67 HARV. L. 
REV. 1439 (1954); Goebel, Ex Parte Clio, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 450 (1954); Hart, Professor Crosskey 
and Judicial Review, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1456 (1954). 
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importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in 
the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even ser- 
vice in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. 
Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural 
values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in help- 
ing him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is 
doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life 
if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, 
where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must 
be made available to all on equal terms.167 
Moreover, this now-paradigmatic context for activist government had 
slowly risen to prominence during the period between Plessy and Brown, 
and so could serve to express the Court's intuition that something crucial 
had changed in the twentieth century that must be taken into account by 
modern interpreters: 
An additional reason for the inconclusive nature of the Amendment's 
history, with respect to segregated schools, is the status of public ed- 
ucation at that time. In the South, the movement toward free com- 
mon schools, supported by general taxation, had not yet taken hold 
.. . .Even in the North, the conditions of public education did not 
approximate those existing today. . . . [C]ompulsory school attend- 
ance was virtually unknown. As a consequence, it is not surprising 
that there should be so little in the history of the Fourteenth Amend- 
ment relating to its intended effect on public education.168 
The rise of public education provided a perfect symbolic representation of 
the need to detach the nineteenth century's affirmation of "equal protec- 
tion" from its implicit commitments to the nightwatchman state. 
Whatever Justice Brown in Plessy might have thought, it was now absurd 
to dismiss the "badge of inferiority" imposed by state officials as they 
shunted black children to segregated schools as if it were "solely" the 
product of a "choice" by the "colored race . . . to put [a degrading] con- 
struction upon it." 
It is precisely on this point that Brown explicitly confronts Justice 
Brown: The state, not the children, must bear responsibility for the fact 
that school segregation "generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status 
...in a way unlikely ever to be undone. . . . Any language in Plessy v. 
Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected."'9 Given the decisive repu- 
diation of nightwatchman ideals in the 1930's, can there be any doubt that 
the Court was right in finding Plessy inconsistent with the basic premises 
of the activist constitutional order? Brown's synthetic judgment that the 
167. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493. 
168. Id. at 489-90. 
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child's sense of inferiority had become a public responsibility which must 
be judged by the constitutional standards of "equal protection" is not only 
correct, but obviously so. 
E. Interpreting Griswold 
1. From Brown to Griswold 
I choose Griswold as my second case study because the Court's initia- 
tive seems to have met a very similar fate at the hands of the legal com- 
munity. In both cases, the Justices asserted that the Constitution obliged 
them to destabilize government support for traditional values that had 
deep roots in the folkways of the country. In both cases, critics charged 
that the Court had used its authority to interpret the Constitution as a 
smokescreen for imposing Eastern establishment values on the country at 
large. In both cases, many of the Court's champions implicitly conceded 
the noninterpretive character of the Court's decisions by proclaiming the 
Justices' prophetic authority to serve as the nation's conscience.170 In both 
cases, even legalistically inclined defenders greeted the Court's opinions 
with a mixture of condescension and anxiety; rather than trying to defend 
and deepen the texts written by the Justices, academics tended to give the 
opinions very low grades and to search for different legal arguments that 
might provide these contested decisions the constitutional support they ini- 
tially lacked.171 
Yet the voices of the Justices in Griswold, no less than in Brown, de- 
serve more serious attention than we have given them. Once again, they 
direct us to the problem of interpretive synthesis. But this time the Jus- 
tices explored a different side of the synthetic triangle. Brown, as we saw, 
was a two-three case, focusing on the meaning of the Republican demand 
for "equal protection" in a Democratic world of activist institutions. The 
Court's answer to this two-three question predictably opened up a host of 
other synthetic issues;172 but, as in all concrete cases, the Justices allowed 
a host of issues to remain in the background to allow focused reflection on 
the crucial two-three question they had identified. Griswold displayed dif- 
170. Thus, Michael Perry treats it as so obvious that Griswold represents the kind of noninter- 
pretive review he champions that he dismisses the Court's protestations to the contrary in a footnote 
containing a single sentence. See M. PERRY, supra note 142, at 172 n.18. 
171. See, e.g., Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1423 (1974) 
("Whatever grade the professors might give to Justice Douglas . . ., the result is clear: . . . there is 
now a Constitutional Right of Privacy."); Kauper, Penumbras, Peripheries, Emanations, Things 
Fundamental and Things Forgotten: The Griswold Case, 64 MICH. L. REV. 235, 252-54 (1965) 
(Court's approach "accordion-like"); Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
77 MICH. L. REV. 981, 994 (1979) ("magical mystery tour of the zones of privacy"). 
172. A particularly important class of issues involves integrating the Court's answers to two-three 
questions into a larger framework that includes an interpretation of the Founding. Call these one- 
two-three cases. It is of the first importance to consider how the Court has confronted such issues over 
time. and whether its responses have made sense. Compare, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 
(1963) with McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
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ferent synthetic priorities. The fact that Estelle Griswold was suing Con- 
necticut meant, of course, that the Fourteenth Amendment was involved in 
the litigation as a formal matter. But the Court did not use the case to 
consider more deeply the relationship between Reconstruction and the 
other turning points in the American constitutional experience. It was 
content to rely on earlier cases holding that the Fourteenth Amendment 
makes applicable to the states the fundamental principles of the Founders' 
Bill of Rights, leaving other possible synthetic relationships unexplored.173 
Placing Reconstruction in the background allowed the Court to focus on 
another side of the synthetic triangle: the relationship between the Found- 
ing concern with individual freedom and the modern affirmation of ac- 
tivist government. 
To define the one-three problem, reflect on the aspect of the Founding 
most obviously undermined by the New Deal.174 This was the Federalist 
effort to link the eighteenth century's affirmation of individual liberty 
with the rhetoric of contract and private property. Thus, the Federalists 
valued market "freedom" so highly that they forbade the states from "im- 
pairing the obligation of Contract" in the original 1787 Constitution, at a 
time when they believed an elaborate Bill of Rights unnecessary. In re- 
sponse to the popular demand for a Bill, the Fifth Amendment contained 
an explicit guarantee against governmental takings of property without 
just compensation. This Founding effort to express the American commit- 
ment to individual liberty within the language of contract and property 
was emphatically reinforced at Reconstruction before it was called into 
question during the New Deal.176 One large task for one-three synthesis 
was to define what, if anything, remained of the Founding values of indi- 
vidual self-determination that had formerly been expressed in the lan- 
173. Thus, the fact that Estelle Griswold was a woman did not lead the Court to consider the 
possible application of equal protection doctrine. Cf MacKinnon, Roe v. Wade: A Study in Male 
Ideology, in ABORTION: MORAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 45-54 (J. Garfield & P. Hennessey eds. 
1984). Similarly, there was no effort to reflect on the libertarian side of Reconstruction, exploring the 
implications of the Republicans' concern with self-ownership expressed by the Thirteenth and Four- 
teenth Amendments. See, e.g., Koppelman, Forced Labor: A Thirteenth Amendment Defense of Abor- 
tion 84 Nw. U.L. REV. (forthcoming 1990) (applying Thirteenth Amendment's concern with liberty 
to woman's interest in control over her body). 
174. A second aspect of one-three synthesis involves the constitutional definition of government 
powers rather than individual rights. The legitimation of the activist state overwhelmed the decisional 
capacities of the three branches envisioned in 1787, leading to the elaboration of a host of new rela- 
tionships between these branches and the burgeoning administrative apparatus. Compare, for exam- 
ple, the Court's focus on 1787 in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946-59 (1983) with the dissent's 
focus on 1937, id. at 968-74 (White, J., dissenting). See also Note, A Two-Tiered Theory of Consoli- 
dation and Separation of Powers, 99 YALE L.J. 431 (1989) (analyzing Chadha as response to New 
Deal constitutional transformation delegating power to administrative agencies). While this aspect of 
the synthetic problem has engaged increasing amounts of judicial energy over the last decade, the 
Justices seem to have despaired (temporarily?) at the possibility of a cogent judicial contribution to 
the second fundamental structural question left in the aftermath of the New Deal: the relationship 
between the states and the nation in an era of activist government. Compare Garcia v. San Antonio 
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 995 (1985) with National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 
(1976). 
175. See supra text accompanying notes 131-132. 
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guage of property and contract, now that the People had repudiated this 
rhetoric in the constitutional struggles of the 1930's. 
So understood, the interpretive challenge in Griswold was isomorphic to 
the one confronted in Brown. Just as Warren sought to detach Recon- 
struction's affirmation of equality from nineteenth-century premises con- 
cerning the limited role of government, so too a synthesizing Court would 
be obliged to detach the Founders' affirmation of personal liberty from the 
property/contract framework within which it had been previously ex- 
pressed. My thesis is that Griswold is best understood as a critical stage in 
this process of Brown-like detachment from the abandoned premises of the 
Lochner era. 
To make this analogy persuasive, I must compensate for the fact that 
the judicial record of the Lochner era does not contain an opinion, like 
Plessy, in which the Supreme Court squarely confronted a birth control 
problem. Plessy gave us a concrete target that allowed us to locate quite 
precisely the premises that Brown correctly saw had been rendered unten- 
able by the twentieth-century triumph of activist American government. 
Since no similar opinion exists that speaks directly to the Griswold prob- 
lem, my argument will begin with a thought-experiment. Try to imagine 
what the Supreme Court from the Lochner era would have said if it had 
been obliged to confront Griswold's plea for constitutional protection. 
Once we have constructed our hypothetical target, we can assess the ex- 
tent to which Douglas' opinion in Griswold, like Warren's in Brown, is 
responsive to the distinctive needs of interpretive synthesis in the after- 
math of the New Deal. 
2. Griswold and Freedom of Contract 
Suppose that Planned Parenthood had not waited until the late 1930's 
to begin its long series of court challenges to the Connecticut statute, but 
had instead begun in 1923-when Margaret Sanger first urged the Con- 
necticut legislature to repeal its anti-contraception statute in the name of 
the Connecticut Birth Control League.176 Were there constitutional argu- 
ments available at the time that her lawyers might have used to her 
advantage? 
Absolutely. But they would have looked different from those that Jus- 
tice Douglas elaborated in his opinion of 1965. In 1923, the forensic chal- 
lenge would have been to persuade the Court to extend Lochner's affirma- 
tion of freedom of contract to the effort by the doctors of Planned 
Parenthood to prescribe and sell contraceptive devices. From this perspec- 
tive, it would have been critical that Planned Parenthood was offering its 
services only to willing buyers. This, after all, was the point that im- 
176. See D. Carpenter, Revisiting Griswold: An Exploration of its Political, Social, and Legal 
Origins 5 (unpublished senior essay, Yale College, Apr. 16, 1989) (on file with author). 
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pressed the Lochner court in invalidating New York's effort to restrict 
bakers to a sixty hour work week. So far as Lochner was concerned, the 
bakers and their bosses had freely decided that a long work week was in 
their mutual interest; unless New York came up with a specially persua- 
sive reason for second-guessing this choice, the contracting parties had a 
constitutional right to make their own decisions.177 So too here: Just as the 
bakers had a constitutionally protected liberty to contract with their em- 
ployers, married couples should be accorded the same constitutional lib- 
erty to contract with doctors or the Birth Control League. At least, this is 
what Sanger's hypothetical lawyers would have argued. 
Not that her lawyers would have had a sure winner on their hands. 
Courts of the Lochner era did hedge their libertarian principles with a 
number of important exceptions, one of them being the protection of 
"public morals." Given the role of chastity in then-traditional morality, a 
majority might well have been persuaded that the anti-contraception stat- 
ute should be sustained under a "police power" exception. Even here, 
however, certainty is by no means warranted. Indeed, when Planned 
Parenthood began its litigation campaign in 1939, its citations to Lochner- 
like cases'78 sufficiently impressed a lower Connecticut court that it de- 
clared the statutes unconstitutional-before a 1940 decision of the Con- 
necticut Supreme Court upheld, by a vote of 3 to 2, the statute as a legiti- 
mate regulation of public morals.'79 
It took a quarter of a century, however, before Planned Parenthood 
convinced the U.S. Supreme Court to hear the merits of its complaint. By 
1965, Griswold's lawyers had completely reconceptualized their argu- 
ments to emphasize the synthetic problem left in the wake of the popular 
repudiation of laissez-faire constitutionalism during the 1930's. Rather 
than relying on Lochner, Griswold's lawyers tried to distinguish it. Most 
of their brief consists of an effort to persuade the Court that the New 
Deal's repudiation of substantive due process in the 1930's involved only 
matters of economic regulation and did not undermine Lochner-like pro- 
tection for "rights of a fundamental individual and personal character."'80 
Talk of a constitutional right of "privacy" only comes at the end of the 
brief, almost as an afterthought.'8' Confronted by Griswold's arguments, 
the Supreme Court could hardly escape an encounter with the synthetic 
question: How sweeping was the New Deal transformation? Should it be 
177. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905). 
178. See Brief on Demurrer to Information at 47-48, State v. Nelson, 11 A.2d 856 (1940) (on file 
in Whitney Library of the New Haven Colony Historical Society, Box 2, Folder F). The brief for 
Planned Parenthood cited cases like Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897), and Liggett Co. v. 
Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105 (1928). 
179. State v. Nelson, 11 A.2d 856 (1940). 
180. Brief for Appellants at 22, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). This quotation 
comes near the beginning of an argument that occupies pages 21-78 of a ninety-six-page argument. 
181. See id. at 79-89. 
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interpreted as completely obliterating the Founding affirmations of private 
ordering previously expressed in the rhetoric of freedom of contract? Or 
should the courts continue to re-present the Founding concern for per- 
sonal liberty by marking off for special protection areas of life that seem 
far removed from the New Dealers' demand to regulate "free" markets 
for the general welfare? 
3. Griswold's Approach to Synthesis 
With such questions raised by the litigants themselves, it is not surpris- 
ing that the Griswold Court struggled with its problem of synthesis even 
more self-consciously than the Brown Court had done a decade previously. 
Though Warren was emphatic about the need to interpret the nineteenth 
century's demand for "equal protection" in the light of the twentieth cen- 
tury's validation of activist government, he did not explicitly pinpoint the 
role of the constitutional struggle of the 1930's in legitimating this change 
in interpretive perspective. Instead, he discussed the rise of activist govern- 
ment in terms of the particular problem before him: public education. So 
far as Warren was concerned, it was enough to emphasize the central 
place universal public schooling had won in the modern welfare state and 
to contrast this position with public education's peripheral status at the 
time the Fourteenth Amendment was first proclaimed in 1868. To adopt a 
term from literary criticism, the public school functioned in Brown as a 
metonymic placeholder: Just as one might use the history of the White 
House as a trope to express the rise of the Presidency, Warren used the 
history of public education to express the rise of the activist welfare state 
in modern constitutional interpretation. 
In contrast, the Court in Griswold self-consciously began its discussion 
by focusing on the decisive event in the constitutionalization of the activist 
state: "Overtones of some arguments suggest that Lochner v. New York 
should be our guide. But we decline that invitation as we did in West 
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish [one of the great transformative opinions of 
1937]."'182 This opening sentence defined the crucial judicial task as one- 
three synthesis: How to interpret the Founding commitment to a Bill of 
Rights in a way respectful of the New Deal's affirmation of activist gov- 
ernment? Speaking for the Court, Justice Douglas answered by distin- 
guishing between those constitutional protections designed to protect pri- 
vate ordering in economic relations and those designed to protect private 
ordering in more intimate spheres of life: 
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully en- 
during, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an associa- 
tion that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not 
182. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-82 (1965) (citations omitted). 
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political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. 
Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our 
prior decisions."8' 
A "bilateral loyalty, not [a] commercial or social project[]": While the 
New Deal gained the support of the People to regulate these "projects" 
for the general welfare, the Court denied that the transformation of the 
1930's had to be read so broadly as to imply that marriage could not serve 
as an appropriate context for re-presenting the continuing constitutional 
value of liberty inherited from the Founding. 
To make its case, the Court proposed a more discriminating view of the 
Lochner era. While Douglas left in the shadows those laissez-faire prece- 
dents-such as Lochner itself-that insulated market actors from intrusive 
governmental intervention, the Court revalorized decisions which could be 
interpreted as insulating more intimate relationships: It "reaffirm[ed]" 
two Lochnerian decisions of the 1920's, describing one as protecting the 
family's "right to educate a child in a school of the parents' 
choice-whether public or private or parochial," another as according 
"the same dignity . . . [to] the right to study the German language in a 
private school."'84 Similarly, the Court made much of its 1886 decision in 
Boyd v. United States,'85 describing the Fourth and Fifth Amendments as 
protecting "against all governmental invasions 'of the sanctity of a man's 
home and the privacies of life.' "186 
Building on this newly-rediscovered sense of continuity with Justices of 
an earlier time, Douglas found that the constitutional value of privacy had 
served as a leitmotif in the modern Court's ongoing effort to make sense of 
the Founders' Bill of Rights. Looking in particular at the First Amend- 
ment and at the Bill's multiple commands regulating the criminal process, 
Douglas reported the Court's use of the idea of privacy to give these spe- 
cific provisions "life and substance."'87 This recurring concern with pri- 
vacy motivated, in turn, a generalizing interpretation of the Founding text 
itself: 
Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association 
contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we 
have seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the 
quartering of soldiers "in any house" in time of peace without the 
consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth 
Amendment explicitly affirms the "right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
183. Id. at 486. 
184. Id. at 482-83. The two cases the Court reaffirmed are Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 
510 (1925), and Meyer v. Nebraska, 263 U.S. 390 (1923), respectively. 
185. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
186. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484. 
187. Id. 
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searches and seizures." The Fifth Amendment in its Self- 
Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy 
which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment. 
The Ninth Amendment provides: "The enumeration in the Constitu- 
tion, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage 
others retained by the people."'188 
At the heart of Griswold is the act of synthetic interpretation-an effort to 
integrate the Founding text with the New Deal transformation in a way 
that makes sense of the interpretive effort of previous generations of Jus- 
tices to give meaning to these texts. Rather than looking upon the Bill of 
Rights as a series of disjointed rules, the Court invites us to view them as 
grounded in Founding values that can still be expressed in a legally mean- 
ingful way despite the transformations and contingencies of two centuries 
of constitutional history. Once we do so, we will find that "[t]he present 
case, then, concerns a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created 
by several fundamental constitutional guarantees. And it concerns a law 
which, in forbidding the use of contraceptives rather than regulating their 
manufacture or sale, seeks to achieve its goals by means having a maxi- 
mum destructive impact upon that relationship. Such a law cannot stand 
"189 
4. Interpreting the Chorus: the Concurrences and the Dissents 
The distinctive character of the Court's opinion is displayed by con- 
trasting it with the others entered in the case. In all, there were three 
concurrences and two dissents,190 and I cannot hope to examine them fully 
here. So far as the concurrences are concerned, suffice it to say that none 
of them focused on the synthetic aspect of the problem with the same 
intensity as did the Court. None begins with Lochner and asks whether, 
despite its repudiation, the Court may find a way to re-present the 
Founding commitment to personal freedom using concepts and contexts 
distinguishable from those repudiated in the 1930's. Nor do any seek to 
ground their decision on a reinterpretation of the Founding text which 
emphasizes the extent to which the Bill of Rights recognized the constitu- 
tional value we now identify with the concept of privacy. Instead of em- 
phasizing the centrality of one-three synthesis, the concurrences sketch 
more open-ended inquiries that roam broadly without any clear sense of 
interpretive constraint. 
In contrast, the two dissenters, Justices Black and Stewart, take on the 
188. Id. 
189. Id. at 485 (emphasis in original). 
190. For those arithmetically inclined, the fact that there were three concurrences and two dis- 
sents did not deprive the Court's opinion of a majority-the Justices who joined Justice Goldberg's 
concurrence also joined the opinion of the Court. 
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synthetic challenge raised by Douglas. Like the Court, they too recognize 
that they must define the meaning of the 1930's to decide Griswold's case. 
But they offer a much broader interpretation of the New Deal struggle 
than does the majority. For the dissenters, the Court's "switch in time" 
did not merely demote the constitutional value of private ordering in 
"commercial or social projects." It amounted to a rejection of the very idea 
that the Court should insulate some spheres of life from pervasive man- 
agement by the newly-empowered activist state. On this statist interpreta- 
tion, the People not only decisively authorized their government to regu- 
late sweatshops in the 1930's. They also authorized management of 
individual choice in any and all areas of life when such regulation 
seemed in the public interest. Any judicial effort to construe the New 
Deal more narrowly and to assert that the exercise of freedom in some 
domains of life remained presumptively beyond the control of normal 
politics was tainted by "the same natural law due process philosophy 
found in Lochner v. New York. . . [and] other discredited decisions." 191 
Of course, if taken to its extreme, this statist interpretation of the New 
Deal implies the end of all constitutional limitations on normal govern- 
ment. But the dissenters do not treat the repudiation of Lochner as the 
only significant historical moment in the nation's constitutional history. 
No less than the majority, they too recognize the need to synthesize their 
understanding of the New Deal into a broader narrative that also includes 
Founding and Reconstruction. Only they propose to read the constitu- 
tional solutions generated during these earlier periods in a very different 
spirit from the Court's. As we have seen, the Court reads these older texts 
as the source of constitutional principles that may be applied to new con- 
texts that remain beyond the legitimate concerns of the activist state. In 
contrast, the statist dissenters read the Bill of Rights as Raoul Berger 
reads the Fourteenth Amendment-as a "superstatute," containing a se- 
ries of "specific prohibitions"192 with relatively straightforward meanings. 
So long as the newly empowered activist state does not violate any of these 
"specifics," its actions should be sustained. In this approach to one-three 
synthesis, the meaning of time one has been reduced to a series of narrow 
legal rules, while the meaning of time three is stated in terms so broad 
that they verge on the ontological. The constitutional revolution of the 
1930's not only empowered government to remedy economic and social 
injustice. It amounted to nothing less than the repudiation of something 
called a "natural law" philosophy-whose taint, apparently, can be de- 
tected in any suggestion that the Founders had not merely tried to codify a 
191. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 515. 
192. Compare United States v. Carotene Prods. Co. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 para. 1 (1938) with 
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 508 (Black J., dissenting). 
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list of rules but to formulate principles of personal liberty that modern 
Americans may still find relevant in a host of non-market contexts. 
This difference between the Court and the dissenters on synthetic 
method is, of course, of the greatest importance-both practical and theo- 
retical. But there is something even more important than deciding who is 
right. It is recognizing that both sides are talking about the same issue: the 
problem of one-three synthesis. 
5. From Brown to Griswold to . . . 
In presenting the exchange in Griswold, I have challenged the familiar 
view of this case as a paradigmatic example of an "activist" Court seeking 
to keep the living constitution up to date by imposing its own idea of 
"fundamental values." At the very least, this is not how the Court defined 
the crucial issues. Instead, the majority and the dissenters are debating 
very fundamental interpretive questions that all of us must face in trying 
to make sense of a Constitution that has been transformed, and trans- 
formed again, by Americans of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
Moreover, when we compare Griswold to Brown, it appears that the 
Court was even more self-conscious about the character of its interpretive 
problem in 1965 than it had been in 1954. While Brown was emphatic 
about the need to synthesize the twentieth century's affirmation of the ac- 
tivist welfare state with the nineteenth century's guarantee of equal pro- 
tection of the laws, the Court did not identify the role of the great trans- 
formation of the 1930's in legitimating its synthetic point of view. Instead, 
it made this transformative point within the terms suggested by the con- 
crete problem-public education-raised by the facts of the case. In con- 
trast, the Griswold Court reached theheart of the matter as it struggled to 
integrate the language of the Bill of Rights into a modern doctrinal syn- 
thesis. It squarely identified the problem posed by the popular repudiation 
of free-market constitutionalism in the 1930's and asked how modern 
Americans can make sense of the Founding texts once we recognize that 
we are no longer constitutionally committed to the strong protection of 
property and contract. From this point of view, Griswold's reinterpreta- 
tion of the Founding texts in terms of a right to privacy, rather than a 
right to property and contract, is to be viewed as a serious interpretive 
proposal: Granted, when the Founders thought about personal freedom, 
they used the language of property and contract; but given the New Deal 
deflation of the constitutional status of this language, isn't the most mean- 
ingful way we can interpret these Founding affirmations through the lan- 
guage of privacy?193 
193. From this point of view, the common charge, see, e.g., McKay, The Right of Privacy: Ema- 
nations and Intimations, 64 MICH. L. REV. 259 (1965); Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 
HARV. L. REV. 737, 740 (1989), that Douglas' use of the concept of privacy was light-years removed 
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A satisfactory answer must, of course, confront the challenges raised by 
the very different approach to one-three synthesis advocated by Black and 
Stewart-a view which has been reinvigorated by the appointment of a 
surprisingly large number of statists to the courts by an Administration 
that, on the surface, seemed to be full of individualistic rhetoric.194 As 
with Brown, however, my aim here has been to begin a story, not to end 
it. 
CONCLUSION 
It is time to take stock-to suggest how the three parts of this essay fit 
together in a general reinterpretation of the Constitution. 
Part I began by seeking to recover a distinctive aspect of the American 
constitutional tradition which is lost in Europeanizing accounts. This is 
our Republic's evolving commitment to dualistic democracy: its recurring 
emphasis on the special importance of those rare moments when political 
movements succeed in hammering out new principles of constitutional 
identity that gain the considered support of a majority of American citi- 
zens after prolonged institutional testing, debate, decision. 
Guided by this dualistic understanding, Part II challenged the present 
legal account of the greatest transformative moments in American consti- 
tutional history. The modern professional narrative invites us to think of 
the Founding, Reconstruction and New Deal as very different kinds of 
events: The first was creative both in its higher lawmaking process and in 
its substance; the second, only in its substance; the third, not at all. This 
myth cannot stand a serious confrontation with the constitutional materi- 
als left to us by earlier generations of Americans. Rather than telling our- 
selves a story of declining constitutional creativity over the eighteenth, 
nineteenth, and twentieth centuries, we should see ourselves as part of an 
ongoing process of constitutional revision and renewal that continues 
through the 1930's and beyond. 
Part III suggests how this redefinition of our professional narrative will 
allow new insight into the interpretive problem that gives modern consti- 
tutional law its distinctive shape: the task of synthesizing the higher law- 
making achievements of the many generations of Americans who have 
managed to rework the terms of our constitutional identity since the 
Founding. As in the preceding parts, I have done no more than scratch 
the surface. Nonetheless, I have tried to suggest that, during the half- 
from the version contemplated by Warren and Brandeis in their great article could not be further 
from the truth, For the very point of this classic article is to convince its readers to use the concept of 
privacy to carve off certain values-then often protected by property doctrine-to enable their preser- 
vation despite increasing regulation by activist government of other dimensions of property. See War- 
ren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). 
194. The recent rise of a statist form of synthesis is marked most stunningly by the majority 
opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
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century since the New Deal, the Justices have been more self-conscious 
than most of us in emphasizing the centrality of multigenerational synthe- 
sis in modern constitutional law. 
* * * 
Think of the American Republic as a railroad train, with the judges 
sitting in the caboose, looking backward. What they see are the mountains 
and valleys of our dualistic constitutional experience, most notably the 
peaks of constitutional meaning elaborated during the Founding, Recon- 
struction, and New Deal. As the train moves forward in history, it is 
harder for the judges to see the traces of volcanic ash that marked each 
mountain's emergence onto the legal landscape. At the same time, a differ- 
ent perspective becomes available: As the more recent eruptions move fur- 
ther into the background, it becomes easier to see that there is now a 
mountain range out there that can be described in a comprehensive way. 
As this shift is occurring, lots of other things are happening. Most obvi- 
ously, old judges die, and new ones are sent to the caboose from the front 
of the train by those who happen to be in the locomotive. These newcom- 
ers' view of the landscape is shaped by their own experiences of life and 
law-as well as the new vistas constantly opened up on the mountains by 
the path that the train takes into the future. The distinctive thing about 
the judges, however, is that they remain in the caboose, looking back- 
ward-not in the locomotive arguing over the direction the train should 
be taking at the next crossroads, or anxiously observing the passing scene 
from one of the passenger cars. Despite their rearguard position, they are 
not without a certain power over the course of events. 
Each time the train stops at a station, the passengers are faced with a 
choice. They may, of course, instruct the engineers to continue driving 
down the main line that points ahead. But at every station, there is at 
least one other track, pointing obliquely toward a mountain range on the 
horizon. 
Most of the time, most of the passengers do not give this second track a 
second thought. After a perfunctory discussion, they send people to the 
locomotive who promise to steam down the mainline. At other times, there 
is greater controversy as the passengers descend to the platform to debate 
their next destination. Sometimes the debate ends in the selection of new 
engineers who promise (often vaguely) to take the train down a new track. 
In either event, when the train leaves the station, the passengers may be 
in for a surprise. The view from the observation cars may be very differ- 
ent from the one they imagined on the platform. Even more alarming, it 
may become increasingly difficult for the judges on the caboose to keep 
sight of the familiar mountain ranges. At this point, the folks on the ca- 
boose begin to apply the brakes. 
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The train travels more slowly; the distance between stations shortens. 
When the engineers come down from the locomotive, they have two 
choices. They may be apologetic about their poor service. Or they may 
bitterly accuse the old-timers in the caboose of slowing down progress. If 
they take the latter course, the passengers have more than the usual 
amount of thinking, arguing, deciding, to do. It's their train, isn't it? 
The moment of truth comes, and goes. The train begins to move more 
quickly into the unknown. As the smoke clears, the folks on the caboose 
look back and begin to see familiar mountains from a different angle; new 
mountains come into view for the first time. 
But the effort to make sense of the landscape remains. 
